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4.
The Big Shift is a fundamental
reordering of the way we live, learn,
play, and work. A new technology
infrastructure is a big part of this
transformation. Consider technology
platforms such as Amazon Web
Services, Google Apps, Android,
Facebook, Twitter, the iPhone App
Store, and now the iPad... Just as the
telephone, automobile, and aeroplane
reshaped society in the first half of the
20th century, the digital infrastructure
is reshaping life in the 21st.
Financial Times, 22 September 2010
The App Store is like nothing the
industry has ever seen before in both
scale and quality.
Steve Jobs, Apple’s CEO, 2009
Summary
“App platforms” are electronic software distribution platforms for mobile devices
like smartphones or tablets. They have gained popularity after Apple launched its
App Store in July 2008. Since then, app platforms have transformed the entire
mobile communication industry. Although the App Store’s advantage seemed to be
incontestable, other app platforms like Google Play managed to enter the market
and achieve high popularity. More platforms followed Apple and Google, trying
to create niche markets. This makes the app platform market very dynamic and
disruptive.
App platforms are not a single example but a part of a large-scale change.
Over the last decade, platforms became the “invisible engines” of our economies
(Evans et al., 2006). Amazon, eBay, and Google have advanced to top brands
worldwide. Following Gawer and Cusumano (2007), we define platforms as “systems
of technologies that combine core components with complementary products and
services usually made by a variety of firms.” Platforms have spread across many
industries, leading to creation of new business areas and products. Moreover,
they change the whole economic structure and influence business strategies in
fundamental ways.
Platforms that enable interactions between two groups of customers, which
value each other’s presence, are called two-sided markets. Over the last decade, a
large body of literature on two-sided markets has emerged, for example, Rochet
and Tirole (2003, 2006), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Evans (2003) and Armstrong
(2006), to name just a few. Two-sided market models reflect one of the key
characteristics of app platforms, namely, the prominent role of indirect network
effects. Unfortunately, currently existing two-sided market models are not suitable
to model Internet platforms such as app platforms. Hence, it is necessary to come up
with an appropriate two-sided market model first. Also, a dynamic two-sided model
which would be able to reflect dynamic and disruptive nature of two-sided markets
is lacking. These are the first two research gaps addressed in the dissertation at
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6hand. The third research gap consists in developing strategies for app platforms
based on two-sided market theory and existing management literature.
The objective of this thesis is to address these gaps in three research papers:
“An integrated two-sided market model”, “Toward Understanding Dynamics and
Disruptions in Two-sided Markets: A Dynamic Two-sided Market Model” and
“App Store, Quo Vadis? Challenges and Strategies for App Platforms”. All three
research papers are based on two-sided market theory and aim at providing insights
for industries based on Internet platforms, in particular, for app platforms. The
central objective of the first research paper is to develop a two-sided market model,
which can be applied to analyze app platforms. In research paper I, we provide
theoretical background and develop an integrated two-sided market model, which
includes the most relevant parameters. We also provide a closed-form solution for
this model and discuss how it can be used to analyze app platforms.
The second research paper builds on the results of the first one and extends
it to the dynamic setting. This allows us to go beyond static solution and provide
insights regarding strategies in a dynamic and disruptive setting. We consider a
range of situations and research questions, for instance, “chicken-and-egg” problem,
minimal number of agents necessary to kick-off a platform and external shocks
through competitive entry.
In the third research paper, we discuss key challenges and central strategic
decisions along the life-cycle phases. In addition to the two-sided market theory,
we build on the platform management literature. The third research paper focuses
on applying theoretical concepts to derive strategies and suggestions to mitigate
challenges faced by app platforms.
The present thesis is structured as follows: part I includes an introduction to
the research field, part II consists of the three stand-alone research papers. The
first part begins with introduction to the research project motivation and structure.
Background information on the app platform industry and overview of two-sided
market theory follows. Then we provide derivation of research gaps and questions,
summaries of the research papers and, finally, general discussion and conclusion.
The second part of the dissertation at hand presents the three research papers, as
they were (or will be) submitted for academic conferences and journals.
Supported by the extensive introduction to the research field, the three studies
together provide insights on theoretical aspects of two-sided markets, as well as
on application to the app platform industry (and other similar platforms). The
integrated two-sided market model with its new parameters and a closed-form
solution developed in the research paper I, and introduction of a dynamic two-sided
7market model in the research paper II, represent main theoretical contributions.
Insights regarding strategies for app platforms along the life-cycle stages are crucial
from the managerial point of view. The most promising avenues for future research
include further development of the models, such as introduction of stochastic
parameters, and empirical testing of the models.
Thesis structure overview
This thesis consists of two parts, the first provides an overview of the research field,
including description of the underlying industry, theoretical background, research
gap analysis and general discussion. The second part includes three research papers
which focus on extending two-sided market theory and modeling, analyzing and
understanding app distribution platforms for mobile devices, like Apple’s App
Store, Google Play (formerly Google Android market) and Amazon Appstore. The
previous versions of these research papers were accepted and presented at academic
conferences and are intended for publication in academic journals. Since these are
stand-alone research papers, some repetitions and similarities are inevitable.
Paper I: An Integrated Two-sided Market Model for Internet
Platforms
Presented at:
• 10th International Industrial Organization Conference (IIOC), March 2012,
Arlington, USA.
• V International Think Tank on Innovation and Competition (INTERTIC),
October 2011, Venice, Italy.
• Network of Industrial Economists (NIE), Doctoral Student Colloquium, June
2011, Nottingham, United Kingdom.
Paper II: Toward Understanding Dynamics and Disruptions in
Two-sided Markets: A Dynamic Two-sided Market Model
Presented at:
• Research Seminar in Economics, January 2012, Aachen, Germany.
• TIM Doctoral Student Seminar, June 2012, Wildenburg, Germany.
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9Paper III: App Store, Quo Vadis? Challenges and Strategies for
App Platforms
Presented at:
• International Conference on Mobile Business (ICMB), June 2012, Delft,
Netherlands.
• 12th European Academy of Management (EURAM), June 2012, Rotterdam,
Netherlands.
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Part I
App platforms as two-sided
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“App platforms” are electronic software distribution markets for mobile devices
like smartphones or tablet PCs. They gained popularity after Apple launched its
App Store in 2008. Since then, app platforms have transformed the entire mobile
communications industry, including mobile network operators, device producers,
software suppliers, content providers, advertisers, etc. The focus of the mobile
communication industry shifted from network operators and hardware provides
to the app platform owners. We believe that the “app economy” (cf. MacMillan,
Burrows and Ante, 2009), led by Apple and Google, currently belongs to the most
exciting, dynamic and disruptive industries.
Platforms (like the App Store) which intermediate between two distinct
affiliated groups of customers are called “two-sided markets” (cf. Rochet and
Tirole, 2003, p. 990). Such platforms can be effectively analyzed by applying two-
sided market theory. The research project presented here combines development of
two-sided market theory and application of this theory to such Internet platforms as
Apples’ App Store, Google Play (formerly Android market) and Amazon Appstore.
Part I of my research provides an overview of the research field, including
motivation and research project outline, a description of the app economy and an
overview of two-sided market theory, which is central for the research presented
here. Building on that, we identify research gaps and show how the three research
papers at hand address these gaps. Subsequently, we provide a brief summary of
the research papers, which are included in Part II. We conclude with a general
discussion. A more detailed outline of the dissertation follows in Section 1.2. Now
we turn to the motivation (Section 1.1) and the research project outline (Section
1.2).
19
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1.1 Motivation
Over the last five years, the mobile industry has undergone significant changes. All
branches of the industry have been involved, including mobile devices, software,
apps, mobile networks, etc. (Basole and Karla, 2011). The largest disruption in
terms of hardware was probably the launch of Apple’s iPhone in 2007 with its
innovative touchscreen concept. This was a breakthrough of a new generation of
mobile devices, namely smartphones with large touchscreen. In the following years,
some hardware producers managed to succeed (e.g., Apple, Samsung, HTC), others
experienced considerable difficulties or even ceased to exist (e.g., Nokia, Palm),
as Gasse´e (2012) suggests. The second disruption (cf. Crothers, 2010) was the
introduction of tablet PCs with Apple’s iPad leading the way. With 25 million
tablets sold in Q2 2012 worldwide (cf. Figure 1.1), these mobile devices managed
to replace PCs in many ways, but also introduced entirely new usage opportunities.
3,7 3,1
9,2
17,0
0,40,6
0,90,4
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2,4
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Others
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3. Amazon.com
2. Samsung
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2Q 2012
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1,1
Top 5 Ve dors, Worldwide Media Tablet Shipments
Second Quarter 2012, unit shipments, USD mln
Figure 1.1: Top 5 Vendors, Worldwide Media Tablet Shipments, unit shipments
are in millions. Source: IDC (2012).
These changes in the hardware landscape went hand-in-hand with major shifts
in the mobile software. New operating systems were established, like Apple’s iOS,
Google’s Android, and previously successful operating systems were abandoned, like
21
Palm OS or Nokia’s Symbian. Besides operating systems, other type of software
assumed a central role in the mobile ecosystem. This type of software were apps.
Apps are small pieces of software built to perform certain tasks or fulfill concrete
functions, like listening to music, playing games, watching news, translating or
providing convenient access to different types of content and media (cf. Oxford
Dictionary, 2012). Apps can be web-based or stand-alone programs. For mobile
devices, stand-alone programs are currently leading the field (cf. Global Intelligence
Alliance, 2010). App distribution platforms for mobile devices are used to make
downloading apps simple and convenient.1
The first app platforms go back as far as the end of the 1990s. For instance,
PocketGear – one of the first app platforms – was introduced around 1999. Several
other platforms like Handango, GetJar and MobiHand followed. But it was not
until 2008, when Apple launched its App Store, that the app platform industry
gained traction. Other platforms followed, inspired by the App Store’s success.
Since then, the app platform industry has been booming. At the same time,
hardware began to converge more and more, as Figure 1.2 illustrates.2 These two
developments together resulted in app platforms becoming the heart of mobile
ecosystems. Gawer and Cusumano (2007) call this phenomenon “coring strategy”.3
SOURCE: http://www.w3.org/2005/Talks/1213-sb-w3c-tech/mobilechristmas2004.jpg
http://static1.businessinsider.com/image/4cf5601bccd1d5f978020000/smartphones.jpg
From a great variety… … to a uniformity
Figure 1.2: Convergence of the mobile phone form factor.
1A full definition for the term “app platform” will be discussed in Chapter 2. We will use the
short form “app platform” instead of “app distribution platform for mobile devices” from now on.
2This is indicated by patent battle between Apple Inc. and Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd,
documented in, for instance, Williams (2012).
3Cf. research paper III.
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Most of the (management) literature on app platforms focuses on app devel-
opment (e.g., Meier, 2010, Allan, 2010). Not much literature is available on the
overall analysis of the industry or its theoretical background. The same holds for
the strategic and managerial perspective from the platform owner’s point of view.
We believe, that two-sided market theory provides a suitable approach to model
app platforms. Since currently existing two-sided market models lack important
features and parameters to model such markets as app platforms, this represents
a second research gap from the theoretical point of view. Most two-sided market
studies focus on static models. However, app platforms change over time in a
non-linear and disruptive way. This requires possibility to adjust strategy taking
market dynamic into account. This represents one more research gap. The next
section provides an overview of the dissertation project in general and on how we
address these gaps in particular.
1.2 Research project outline
The present dissertation focuses on building a connection between theoretical eco-
nomic models and applications in electronic online markets as figure 1.3 illustrates.
The underlying theoretical concepts are two-sided market theory, indirect network
effects and complementary products. The motivating application industry are
Internet platforms, in particular mobile app distribution markets, intermediary
business models and e-business.
The structure of the first part of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 is
devoted to the applied side, namely to the app platform industry, which inspired
all papers presented here. Chapter 3 provides general background information on
the the theoretical basis of the papers. Then a chapter on research gaps, research
questions, and the corresponding research papers follows (cf. Chapter 4). It includes
brief summaries of the three research papers. We conclude this Part I with a
general discussion of the three research papers. It includes theoretical contributions,
managerial implications, limitations and suggestions for future research.
The second part of the dissertation at hand consists of three research papers
corresponding to the research gaps mentioned in the previous section. We begin by
developing an appropriate two-sided market model, which includes all parameters
necessary to model Internet platforms, and app platforms in particular. This is
in the focus of research paper I presented here: “An integrated two-sided market
model”. The objective of the second research paper “Toward Understanding
Dynamics and Disruptions in Two-sided Markets: A Dynamic Two-sided Market
23
McKinsey & Company 1|
The key goal of the dissertation is to develop a two-sided market model that is 
suitable for app platform analysis and exploration
Application
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Figure 1.3: Structure of the dissertation project.
Model” is to provide a two-sided market model which would cover dynamic and
disruptive behavior of app platforms. Research paper III presented here, “App
Store, Quo Vadis? Challenges and Strategies for App Platforms”, connects two-
sided market theory and platform management literature to analyze challenges
and strategies for app platforms. The first two papers strive to further advance
two-sided markets theory and address identified research gaps. Moreover, the three
research papers together elucidate different aspects of Internet platforms and help
to understand general structure, challenges and strategies for them, as will be
discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
Chapter 2
The “app economy”
In this chapter, we consider key concepts of the “app economy” and provide
definitions. Furthermore, we discuss the current state of the industry and the value
chain of mobile ecosystems. Subsequently, we describe the main app platform
stakeholders, namely app platform owners, developers and users. We conclude with
an outlook, including some thoughts on arising research questions.
2.1 Key concepts and definitions
App platforms offer a channel for developers to distribute their apps for mobile
devices. Hence, to understand app platforms, we need to know what apps are and
what mobile devices are considered. This is the focus of the following section. We
begin by discussing the terms “app” and “mobile device”. A definition for app
platforms follows.
Apps
“App” is short for application. Applications are software programs that can run on
different electronic devices. Apps are created to fulfill certain tasks, like visiting
Internet pages, reading texts, editing tables or photos and playing different media.
The word “app” gained popularity following the App Store launch. In 2010, the
word “app” was even chosen “word of the year” by the American Dialect Society
(cf. American Dialect Society, 2011).
In general, there are three kinds of software for mobile devices: operating
system, middleware and mobile apps. The operating system controls the processor
and memory, middleware is responsible for the interfaces between different software
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and hardware parts, and apps are used to perform certain dedicated tasks (cf.
Oxford Dictionary, 2012). In the context of mobile devices, apps can range from
several kB and up to several GB, but since memory space on a mobile device is
limited, they generally need to be small. Apps usually have a dedicated concrete use
area, e.g., the Facebook app makes it more convenient to use a Facebook account
on a mobile device than would be the case using a browser. Also, their functionality
tends to be less broad compared to PC programs. An app is often arranged around
content. For instance, 17% of apps in Apple’s App Store are categorized as books
and education (cf. Scott, 2012), many newspapers and journals have own apps to
share the content. Generally, there are many apps for entertainment purposes on
all app platforms (17% are games and further 9% are entertainment on the App
Store, as Scott (2012) asserts). This is not surprising given that mobile devices are
mostly used on the go, between “real” activities.
Zheng und Ni (2006) suggest that there are two generations of mobile apps.
The first generation comprises simple apps like ringtones, instant messaging and
personal information management apps. Although many mobile phones available
on the market in 2006 were able to run quite complex apps, ringtones were still the
most popular ones, as Evans et. al. (2006, p. 198) point out: “Ringtones are by
far the most popular application for mobile phones as of early 2006”. The second
generation contained more sophisticated apps like mobile commerce, gaming, music
streaming and mobile social networking. With the gap between reality and the
virtual world becoming increasingly blurred, it can be said that the third generation
of apps covers augmented reality, ubiquitous social networks and the merging of
functions of different apps. What is key for the third generation of apps is seamless
switching between reality and the virtual world, as well as the seamless switching
between different functions. For instance, if navigation and social network apps
are merged, it is possible to obtain recommendations for a restaurant based not
only on objective information, but also on information from social networks, like
recommendations of friends, location of friends, etc.
Mobile devices
Over the last five years, two new types of mobile devices have been introduced
that changed the entire industry: touch smartphones and tablets. These are the
main types of hardware used to run apps on. There are also other types of devices
capable of running apps, e.g., computers or music players like iPod. We will focus
on smartphones and tablets.
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There is extensive debate on the precise definition of smartphones. This may
be attributable to the fact that the meaning of this term has evolved considerably
over time. As Zheng and Ni (2006, p. 4) point out, “smartphone” referred to
a “then-new class of cell phones that could facilitate data access and processing
with significant computing power. In addition to traditional voice communication
and messaging functionality, a smart phone usually provides personal information
management (PIM) applications and some wireless communication capability.”
Encyclopedia Britannica (2012) suggests the following definition:
Definition 2.1. Smartphone, also spelled smart phone, mobile telephone with
a display screen (typically a liquid crystal display, or LCD), built-in personal
information management programs (such as an electronic calendar and address
book) typically found in a personal digital assistant (PDA), and an operating system
(OS) that allows other computer software to be installed for Web browsing, e-mail,
music, video, and other applications. A smartphone may be thought of as a handheld
computer integrated within a mobile telephone.
Furthermore, older mobile devices like basic mobile phone used to have a
small set of apps (like address book or calendar). But it was not until (touch
screen) smartphones were introduced that apps became central for the mobile
ecosystem. We would suggest to differentiate between three generations of mobile
phones: basic mobile phones, feature phones and smartphones.1 The key features
are summarized in Figure 2.1.
Basic mobile phones were primarily developed mostly for mobile telephony.
Feature phones provided some extras, like an integrated camera, mp3-player or radio.
Smartphones are characterized by strong computing power, large high-resolution
screens, reliance on the Internet and media consumption and usage of third-party
apps. As Figure 2.2 shows, smartphones managed to win out compared to other
types of mobile phones and are now the driver of the entire mobile industry.
Tablets were pioneered by Apple with the introduction of the iPad in 2010.
Meanwhile, a whole new industry has emerged. Figure 1.1 illustrates the develop-
ment of the tablet industry over time, revealing high growth rates of more than
66% per year. Apple remains the dominant player in the market. Since tablets
have more processing power than smartphones, as well as larger screens, many
apps have been customized for tablets. Apple, for instance, has an own iPad App
Store featuring apps that are adjusted to the iPad.
1Tablets are assumed to be a category on their own, placed between PCs and phones.
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▪Simple mobile phones with simple functions
▪Usually no additional features, only mobile calls available
▪Key differentiating factors include size, weight and battery 
life
▪Additional multimedia features like FM radio, music player, 
camera central
▪ Integration of PDA features like calendar, address book, to-
do-lists, maps, dictionaries 
▪A whole range of different form factors available
▪ iPhone (introduced in 2007) caused a revolution in mobile 
devices with impact in all adjacent industries
▪Strong computing power, large high-resolution screens, 
reliance on the Internet and media consumption and usage of 
third-party apps
▪Convergence of form factor, differentiation driven by mobile 
apps and the mobile ecosystem (including content availability)
Basic 
Phone
Feature 
Phone
Smart-
phone
Overview smartphone development
Figure 2.1: Evolution of smartphones in 3 steps: basic phone, feature phone and
smartphone.
App platforms for mobile devices
In the previous two sections, we described what apps are, and which hardware
they run on. We will now turn to the definition of app platforms. App platform
is short for mobile app distribution platform. We follow a definition provided by
Businessdictionary (2013):
Definition 2.2. An online marketplace where users of smartphones and other
mobile devices can browse, purchase, and download applications, or “apps”, that
augment the capabilities of their devices. While Apple, Inc. created the original
“App Store” for iPhone apps, and claims copyright to the term, online stores selling
mobile apps for other platforms are also referred to as “app stores”.
Many different names have been used for app platforms. The App Store is
probably the most common one. As mentioned in the defenition, the term App
Store was coined by Apple to refer to that part of the iTune service where apps can
be downloaded. Apple’s competitors adopted this term for their own services (cf.,
for instance, Carew, 2009, Furchgott, 2009, Ganapati, 2009). Apple filed a motion
to use the term “App Store” as a trademark (cf. MacNN, 2008). This was granted
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Figure 2.2: Worldwide mobile phone sales (million units). Development of the
smartphone industry is driven by smartphones. In Q2 2013, smartphones outsold
feature phones for the first time. Source: Gartner (2013).
at first, but Apple lost the case against the Amazon Appstore (cf. Foresman, 2011).
Other terms like app shop, app market, app marketplace are used for app platforms
as well. To avoid ambiguity, we use the term app platform. This also reflects the
fact that there are many apps that are free of charge – using terms such as app
shop or app market would thus be misleading.
As the definition above states, app platforms allow users of mobile devices to
browse, purchase and download apps. Usually, app platforms do not program the
apps themselves (apart from minor exceptions), but they let app developers design
and program app which can be subsequently offered over app platforms.2 Therefore,
app platforms connect app developers and user of mobile devices. By doing so, app
platforms create indirect network effects and “create value primarily by enabling
direct interactions between two (or more) distinct types of affiliated customers” to
quote Hagiu and Wright (2011, p.2). The fact that app platforms connect two
groups of customers valuing each other’s presence is crucial for a market to be
called “two-sided”, as we will see in Chapter 3.
2We will discuss the processes which take place on an app platform in more detail in Section
2.3.
29
2.2 Industry overview
We begin this section with a discussion of the mobile communication industry value
chain and the overall structure of the mobile ecosystems. This helps elucidate the
role of app platforms in the entire ecosystem. Subsequently, we briefly describe the
current development of the app platform industry, providing information on the
size of the market.
Mobile communication industry value chain
Mobile ecosystems as we know them today are combinations of many industries:
hardware manufacturers, operating system and middleware providers, mobile
network operators, content and media providers, app developers and app platform
owners. In 2005-2006, mobile network operators were in the center of mobile
ecosystem as Evans, et al. (2006, p. 186) suggest:
“These ’mobile operators’ ultimately control what mobile telephones
their subscribers use, what software platform runs those phones, and
what applications can be downloaded onto them.”
Currently, mobile devices and software apps are at the center of customers’
attention, but other participants play an important role in the mobile ecosystem as
well. For instance, content availability from iTunes may be an argument in favor
of buying an iPhone and serves as a unique value proposition. There are many
interdependencies between different parts of the mobile ecosystem, as illustrated in
Figure 2.3. Consumers have to choose a mobile device, a mobile plan, the content
and software apps.
While the industry used to be focused on the top part of the value chain
with hardware playing a central role, we are now observing a shift toward software.
As the “Gesellschaft fu¨r Konsumforschung” (GfK), the largest German consumer
research agency, suggests in its press release from 7 October, 2010 (cf. GfK, 2010):
“Amidst a landscape where overall handset sales are declining, sales
of smartphones have steadily increased as more consumers gravitate
towards mobile applications. The survey of 1,000 adults found that
the value of the smartphone and selection of mobile applications were
greater priorities to consumers than reliable coverage and customer
service. ’Our research shows that we are at a mobile application tipping
point, where the applications are driving customer purchases of the
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technology more so than the smartphones themselves,’ said [David]
Krajicek, [Managing Director of GfK Business & Technology].”
McKinsey & Company 9|
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Figure 2.3: Structure of the mobile industry. Based on Evans et al. (2006).
Many well-established companies from the adjacent parts of the mobile
ecosystem want to profit from the growing popularity of app platforms. They
try to establish own app platforms building on their individual strengths. Apps
and app platforms can trigger consumption of other complementary areas of the
mobile ecosystem. For instance, iOS developers have to use Macs to program apps
for the iPhone or the iPad, therefore iOS apps development results in stronger
demand for Macs. For a potential platform owner it is much easier to set up a
platform if she has a payment process and customer relationships in place, as
is the case for Amazon, Apple or mobile network operators. Being a hardware
and software producer at the same time also brings advantages, like customer
knowledge and expertise in mobile technology. The strategies and objectives of all
potential app platform owners might differ. And this has to be reflected in the
classification of app platforms. For instance, Distimo (2012)3 suggests the following
four groups: device manufacturers, operating system developers, operators and
independent platforms. This classification is not clear-cut, since many hardware
manufacturers are also operating system providers. In fact, the most successful app
3Distimo is a market research company focusing on app platforms analysis.
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platforms, like Apple, RIM, Nokia and Windows, belong to this category. Hence, we
assume that the integration of software and hardware is an important factor which
determines app platform success. Based on this hypothesis, we suggest the following
classification: native (or integrated hardware and operating system providers),
device manufacturers, mobile network operators and other (e.g., independent) app
platforms. Figure 3.2 in section 3.3.2, Part II provides examples for each category.
App platform industry
Apple’s App Store and Google Play for Android are probably the most popular
app platforms. In fact, many more app platforms aside from these two exist – and
some of them were founded as early as 1990s.4 The launch of the App Store has
changed the mobile phone industry in practically all dimensions.5 After three years
on the market there were 425,000 apps available in the App Store. The number of
downloads exceeded 14,000,000,000 (cf. Apple, 2011).
The app platform industry as a whole thrived especially in 2011, growing by
around 150% and reaching USD 5.6 billion in revenues in 201. Apple managed
to remain the market leader, accounting for 75% of total market revenues, by far
outpacing other market participants (Kent, 2011). Projections for the future are
positive as well: In 2013, total revenues are expected to reach USD 26 billion and
this number is estimated to grow up to USD 77 billion in 2017 (Gartner, 2013b).
In 2011, Apple, Google, Nokia and RIM were the most important players in
the market. Apple will probably remain the leader for the next 2–3 years, but other
platforms will also gain traction. As Gartner (2013a) suggest, Google’s Android
currently has the highest sales with over 70% in Q3 2012. Windows and Nokia are
continuously loosing market share (Nokia from around 70% in 2006 to under 10%
in 2012 in terms of number of handsets sold worldwide), however, together they
4Several hypotheses can be provided to explain why it was not before 2008 that app platforms
have gained momentum, for example, usability (size of screen), connectivity (3G and 4G coverage)
or the hardware price could have contributed to the app platform success.
5Cf. for instance, the remark by Steve Jobs, the founder and former CEO of Apple: “The
App Store is like nothing the industry has ever seen before in both scale and quality.” (cf. Cohen,
2009) or this comment in Financial Times by Hagel and Brown (2010): “The Big Shift is a
fundamental reordering of the way we live, learn, play, and work. A new technology infrastructure
is a big part of this transformation. Consider technology platforms such as Amazon Web Services,
Google Apps, Android, Facebook, Twitter, the iPhone App Store, and now the iPad... Just as
the telephone, automobile, and aeroplane reshaped society in the first half of the 20th century,
the digital infrastructure is reshaping life in the 21st.”
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have an interesting value proposition for the future. Due to the consolidation and
merging of mobile devices and computers, Windows could become the key player
in this process. Nokia has the capacity to produce low-cost devices that can boost
sales as soon as the high-end market is saturated (cf. Virki, 2012).
2.3 Key stakeholders of app platforms
In this section, we provide a brief description of app platform operations and key
stakeholders. At this point, we only include the most important information which
is required to understand the app platform structure and its connection to the
two-sided markets. Please refer to research paper III for a more detailed analysis
of key stakeholders and their strategies.
App platforms include three key types of participants: the platform owner,
developers and users (cf. Figure 1.3 in section 1.7.2 of Part II). As we have seen
in the previous section, there are other important players like content providers,
mobile network operators, etc. Since app platform owners, developers and users
are crucial for the app platform’s existence, we will primarily focus on them.
In a nutshell, the functions of the key stakeholders are as follows: platform
owners connect developers and users and provide rules and services. Developers
program apps and submit them to the platform, so that users can download them.
At this point, we would like to provide some background information and explain
the overall context. It is necessary to have a view on how app platforms operate,
to understand which parameters are crucial and how they can be modeled and
analyzed.
App platform owners
An app platform owner covers several functions. It provides the app platform
infrastructure (like user interface, server space, etc.) and determines rules for the
interaction between the two market sides. She can also provide information about
apps and developers and serve as a trusted third party by controlling app quality.
Belleflamme and Peitz (2010) refer to the business model used by platforms as an
intermediary one, as is discussed in detail in research paper III.
Apple’s App Store was not created to yield high revenues, but rather to
strengthen the ecosystem and drive demand for iOS-devices (cf. Ahonen, 2010).
As we have seen, app platforms now are a business on their own, especially for
the large native platforms (cf. Apple, 2012). The main source of app platform
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revenue are commission payments obtained from developers as a percentage of the
downloaded app’s price. Additionally, app platforms charge users membership fees
in form of an annual lump sum payment and complementary products like mobile
devices and software tools. This will be described in more detail in the following
sections.
Native app platforms are probably the most important category of app
platforms. They produce mobile devices as well as the operating system (and some
other parts of software, like apps). Many native app platforms also license their
operating systems to other mobile device producers. It is probably not by chance
that the most important app platforms are offered by integrated hardware and
operating system producers. The biggest advantage of native platforms is that
they can develop a holistic strategy and perfectly align software and hardware
requirements. The market of mobile operating system owners is highly concentrated
as Figure 2.4 illustrates. But nonetheless, it is highly dynamic, as a comparison of
the key players and their market shares in 2009 and 2012 shows.
Shipments worldwide, Q2 2009, percent
9%
Others
3%
Android
5%Microsoft
iOS
Apple
15%
RIM
BlackBerry
21%
Symbian
(Nokia)47%
5%
16%
68%
bada
Windows Phone
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Figure 2.4: Global smartphone market, split by platform. The smartphone market
is highly concentrated and very dynamic as this comparison of 2009 Q2 and 2012
Q2 illustrates. Source: Canalys (2010, 2012).
Furthermore, the number of apps on different platforms shows interesting
trends and developments. We observe different types of platform dynamics. Con-
sider, for instance, sales development of smartphones by operating systems. This is
basically equivalent to consideration of the number of app platform users. Figure
2.1 in section 2.3.1, Part II presents the development of the major operating systems
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over the last 5 years.6 Cumulated smartphone sales show how the customer popu-
lations for different smartphones have evolved over time. Some show exponential
growth, like Android, others have grown only slowly over the last 5 years, like
Nokia’s Symbian during the last 5 years.7
Due to the upsurge in the number of app platforms, the challenges relating to
platform competition are currently at the center of app platform owners’ attention.
However, new platforms are also being launched. Platform launch and design are
key for new platforms. But existing platforms should also reevaluate their design
from time to time and consider adjustments in the pricing and/or quality to deter
deter entry of new platforms.
Developers
Developers program apps and offer them via app platforms. The population of
developers is highly heterogeneous: ranging from developers who program apps
as a hobby to professional firms whose only business is app development. This is
illustrated in Figure 2.5. There are also major differences between app platforms:
86% of RIM’s BlackBerry app developers are professionals, while only 39% are
professional developers at Apple’s iOS (cf. GigaOM Pro, 2010).
Mobile operating systems are not compatible, that is, apps created for one
operating system cannot be used with other operating systems. Also, the portability
of apps from one operating system to others is not straightforward: a transition
to another platform involves costs of around 50% of the development cost due
to the differences in programming language, operating system and hardware (cf.
GigaOM Pro, 2010). The possibility of programming universal apps that run on
all platforms is still very limited (Newel, 2011). There are several engines like
Titanium, Ramp or PhoneGap with which apps can be developed for more than
one platform, but further work is still necessary to adopt the apps. Hence, each
developer has to decide which operating system(s) to cater to. It is plausible to
assume that hobby developers only develop for one operating system (the one
they are using themselves) and that professionals typically develop apps for several
platforms. iOS is by far the most popular app platform, however, many developers
6Apple iOS includes only iPhones. To take the full impact of the operating system into account,
iPads and iPods ought to be considered as well.
7With regard to Nokia, we have to take into account that this is only a part of a larger picture.
They have been part of the smartphone market since 1999, hence, in 2007–2012, their smartphones
were in a different phase of the product life cycle compared to Android smartphones.
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also develop apps for other operating systems, as Figure 2.6 illustrates. As many
as 55% of developers only work on one or two app projects at the same time.
To participate in an app platform, developers have to pay a membership fee
and commission. The membership fee is paid once a year. It can vary for different
platforms and different segments of developers e.g., developers pay a membership
fee of USD 99 for the App Store. The commission fee for the majority of app
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platforms is currently 30% of the app price (cf. for instance Apple, 2013, Duryee,
2010). The developers set prices and receive 70% for each download. Some app
platforms review apps before offering them in their store. For instance, Apple
reviews apps. 95% of apps are reviewed in less than 7 days (cf. Apple, 2010).
There are also cases in which the review procedure takes up to several weeks.
The objective of the review process is to ensure that apps fulfill minimum quality
requirements (e.g., that the app does not include viruses and that it is consistent
with its description). If no quality review procedure is in place as is the case with
Google Play, formerly Android market, it may result in redundancy and value
erosion due to copying and danger of malware. App quality is an important factor
that should be taken into account (cf. Developer Android, 2013).
Once the app is made available on an app platform, it can be downloaded,
reviewed and rated by users. Developers and app platform receive payments for
paid apps. We will describe the users’ role in detail in the next section.
Platform users
Platform users represent the second market side of app platforms. Users search
and download apps, they pay for and rate them. Therefore, it is important for the
platform to be able to attract as many users as possible, who are willing to pay
for apps. Usually, native app platforms can be accessed through a pre-installed
app on a mobile device. Some platforms also allow app searches and downloads
on computers. Yet, in order to use apps, the user must possess a mobile device.8
Hence, mobile devices are complementary goods for apps (cf. Riley, 2010). Mobile
devices can be considered a one-time membership fee (or in fact, a regular payment,
if the mobile device is replaced every 1-2 years). Users tend to view mobile device
and available apps as a package. They consider the entire ecosystem and then
decide which hardware-software combination to pick.
The user interface of an app platform usually consists of different areas: a few
featured apps, top lists and a search window. When searching for an app, a user
can quickly see the amount of available apps, prices and date of last update. To
obtain further information, like features and functionality, screen shots and rating,
the app needs to be opened. Once the user decides which apps to obtain, she can
download or buy them.
8Here, we only consider app platforms for mobile devices. Other app platforms, e.g., for other
devices, like PCs, follow similar principles.
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Many app platforms use “one-click-shopping” (cf. Wolverton, 2000). In the
present case, the account data has already been provided to the platform and the
user only needs to confirm the password. This means that platforms are in the
possession of the client’s contact data together with the credit card information.
This is considered a measure of a platform’s influence. It also has an impact on
other participants of the ecosystem. If earlier mobile network operators owned
customer contacts (not the hardware producers), many hardware and OS producers
have managed to leverage mobile network operators through own app platforms
and have become key contacts. App platforms usually charge a commission fee,
which depends on the number of interactions (or downloads) and the value of the
app. The remaining part of the payment goes to the developers. Hence, besides
membership fees, a model for app platform has to include usage fees (or commission
fees) and payments between customer groups.
2.4 Outlook
Over the last 5 years, the mobile industry in general and app platforms in particular
were experiencing extensive changes as was discussed in the Section on Mobile
industry value chain. The role of each and every mobile communication value chain
participant was altered. In particular, mobile network operators who reigned the
industry by facing the customers, were crowded out by app platforms. The latter
took over customer relationships and in the following became central for the new
mobile ecosystems. Using the terms of Eisenmann (2007), we can say that app
platforms have “cornered” the entire mobile industry thereby establishing the new
“app economy” (cf. MacMillan, Burrows and Ante, 2009). We believe that these
developments call for research which would help to analyze and better understand
them.
The first challenge we are facing is to determine, which economic theories and
models can be useful for our analysis. As was described in the previous section, App
platforms are “creating value primarilly by enabling direct interactions between
two distinct types of affiliated customers”, developers and users (cf. Hagiu and
Write, 2011, p.2). We will show in the following Chapter, that this qualifies app
platforms as so-called two-sided markets.
We believe that two-sided market theory is central for modeling and un-
derstanding app platform. Further related economic theories include network
economics and the theory of complementary and multi-product pricing (cf. Katz
and Shapiro, 1985, 1986; Farrell and Saloner, 1986) and theory of information goods
38
(cf. Shapiro and Varian, 1999). All together, these economic theories and models
allow us to approach questions like “How to model app platforms?”, “Which pricing
instruments should be used by app platform owners?”, “How to combine different
pricing instruments?”. The next Chapter provides an overview of two-sided market
theory and research paper I addresses research questions mentioned above.
As was discussed in the “Industry overview” Section, the app platform industry
is highly dynamic with several companies fighting for survival and leadership in the
new mobile communication world. Therefore, we would like to understand, how to
model app platform dynamics. Research paper II addressed these issues, answering
such research questions as “How to model app platforms in a dynamic setting?”,
“What is the difference between short-term and long-term strategies?”, “What is
the optimal reaction to competitor’s entries and external shocks?”.
Overall discussion of strategies for app platform and differences between
the life-cycle phases builds on strategic platform management literature (e.g.,
Gawer and Cusumano, 2008; Eisenmann, 2007). Research paper III combines the
insights from all aforementioned economic theories and models to provide answers
to questions related to app platform strategies along the life-cycles. In the following
Chapter we will concentrate on two-sided market theory which is central for all
three research papers mentioned above. Other aforementioned economic theories
are discussed in more detail in the respective research papers.
Chapter 3
Two-sided market theory
Two-sided market theory is central for all three research papers presented here. It
considers markets in which a platform connects two groups of customers who value
each other’s presence. We begin by explaining the intuition behind the two-sided
market concept. Then, in Section 3.2 we describe the historical context and the
related literature and provide examples from various industries showing the huge
range of possible applications. Section 3.3 focuses on providing a formal definition
for two-sided markets. And finally, we discuss the two-sided market model provided
by Rochet and Tirole (2003), which is considered canonical.
3.1 Introduction
Two-sided markets can roughly be defined as platforms that enable interaction
between two groups of customers who value each other’s presence (cf. Rochet
and Tirole, 2003; Evans, 2003, Tag, 2008). The underlying phenomenon is called
“indirect externalities” or “indirect network effects”: the utility on the one side of
the market increases with the number (and/or quality) of participants on the other
side. Examples of platforms that can be interpreted as two-sided markets range
from credit card systems and software platforms to night clubs and shopping malls.
The underlying structure of two-sided markets can be represented graphically
as shown in Figure 3.1. A platform owner connects users/buyers B with devel-
opers/sellers S. The owner charges membership fees1 AB, AS and usage fees2 aB
and aS for the given platform. In return, users obtain per transaction benefits
bB and membership benefit BB, and seller obtain bS and BS. r stands for the
1Membership fees are also called lump sum or upfront registration fees.
2Usage fees are also called transaction fees.
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amount, which a buyer pays for a good bought from a seller. Some platforms use
commission fees, allowing for direct payments between users and developers and
charging a certain percentage (1− γ), with γ being the share of payments obtained
by developers.An app-platform can be considered a two-sided market
Platform
User/
Buyer (B)
Developer/ 
Seller (S)
▪ Usage fee aB and benefit bB
▪ Membership fee AB and benefit BB
▪ Usage fee aS and benefit bS
▪ Membership fee AS and benefit BS
Transaction payment/ 
app price r
Figure 3.1: Graphical representation of the two-sided market structure includes
the platform owner, sellers and buyers.
The presence of indirect network effects that cannot be internalized by sellers
and buyers themselves represent the basis for the platform’s existence. As Evans
(2011, p. 5) asserts:
“Generally, one can think of two-sided platforms as arising in situa-
tions in which there are externalities and in which transaction costs,
broadly considered, prevent the two sides from solving this externality
directly. The platform can be thought of as providing a technology for
solving the externality in a way that minimizes transactions costs.”
The two-sided market’s owner has an intermediary role. She acts as a
gate keeper, providing a platform where two groups of agents can interact (cf.
Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010). A two-sided market functions as a substitute for
direct interaction between the two customer groups. It also acts as a substitute for
dealers who buy and sell the product. Two-sided market owners charges for access
to the platform and/or for transactions via the platform.
In addition to providing the possibility to interact, two-sided markets can
provide information about the products and services offered by one side. Consider,
for instance, Amazon product reviews. Other platforms provide information about
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the agents, e.g., on eBay, evaluations of the interaction on both sides can be
submitted: sellers can provide feedback on transactions and similarly, buyers can
rate and comment on the interaction with the seller. This results in reputation
building and makes information on agents’ reliability and other characteristics
available to future buyers and sellers. That is, the platform offers trusted third-
party services (cf. Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010). Most app platforms perform three
functions: they act as platform operators by connecting the agents and charging for
access and transactions, but they also act as infomediaries and trusted third-parties
providing information about the products and the agents.
3.2 Historical context and related literature
The two-sided market concept appears quite simple. What is more surprising is
the fact that two-sided market theory originated around 2001 – only a decade ago.
In 2001, the first research papers on two-sided markets were circulated by Rochet
and Tirole, Caillaud and Jullien. They were published in 2003, initiating a boost
of literature on two-sided markets.
The studies of Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) are considered the “most
influential” (Jullien, 2012, p. 163). They coined the term “two-sided market”
for platforms that connect “two distinct sides whose ultimate benefit stems from
interacting through a common platform” (cf. Rochet and Tirole, 2003, p. 990).
Based on the credit card market, they developed a model which describes price
allocation between the two market sides. They only consider usage fees aB, aS,
and no membership fees, and assume that the number of interactions is the power
set of the number of participants, that is, each seller interacts with each buyer.
This model has become the canonical model for two-sided markets. Over time,
many extensions were developed for it. We will provide a detailed discussion of
this model in Section 3.4.
The research paper by Caillaud and Jullien (2003, p. 309) discusses “imper-
fect price competition between intermediation service providers”. They model a
Bertrand game between two matchmakers, taking into account indirect network
effects, usage and membership fees, multi-homing possibilities and bargaining over
usage fee allocation between the two market sides. The main contributions by
Caillaud and Jullien (2003) include the calculation of equilibrium market structures
and determination of entry deterrence strategies, like usage of transaction fees
instead of membership fees.
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Two-sided market theory developed very rapidly, covering various settings,
modeling approaches and application areas. The main reason why two-sided market
theory has recently gained such significance is explained by Eisenmann et al. (2006,
p. 101) as follows:
“In the past, this lack of understanding was less problematic because
executives usually had the luxury of formulating strategies for two-sided
markets through trial and error. Markets today are less forgiving. Many
opportunities for platform creation arise in high-tech sectors with short
product life cycles. Opportunities also abound in traditional industries
reconceived as two-sided networks. And, thanks to the Internet, firms
have easy access to both sides of new markets. In this environment, if
you draw attention to a platform opportunity and don’t get it right the
first time, someone else will.”
Two-sided market theory has its origins in network economics and the theory
of complementary and multi-product pricing. Network economics introduced the
concept of network externalities, where the utility of consumers depends on other
consumers joining the network (cf. Katz and Shapiro, 1985, 1986; Farrell and
Saloner 1986). Two-sided markets extend the concept of network externalities to
indirect (intra-market) network effects, the main difference being that the utility
of consumers depends on the number of consumers on the other market side, and
not the same side as for direct network effects. For instance, users might value
other users joining an app platform because they can exchange information or play
games together, but what they ultimately care about, is the number (and quality)
of available apps on the platform. Hence, it is necessary to differentiate between
inter-market and intra-market network effects.
Complementary products theory suggests that not only the total price for the
complementary product is relevant, but also the allocation of prices to the single
complementary product (cf. Baumol et al., 1982; Wilson, 1993). This is also the
core element of the two-sided market pricing theory: on two-sided markets, it is
necessary to attract users as well as developers, and it might be useful to subsidize
one side at the cost of the other. The correct fees allocation is crucial for two-sided
markets and the consequences of failing to do so can cause a platform to go out of
business in a short time. For instance, when Yahoo raised seller fees in 2001, the
result was a reduction in listings by 90%. The higher fees for Yahoo caused the
sellers to switch to eBay.
43
The literature on two-sided markets exploded during the last decade along
four main directions of research:
• Introduction of new extensions for a static monopoly model (see Armstrong
(2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2006) on membership fees, Hagiu (2009), Jeon
and Rochet (2010) on quality preference of participants);
• Analysis of duopoly setting and development of extensions for it (see Arm-
strong (2006) on “competitive bottlenecks”, Choi (2010) on tying and multi-
homing, Tag (2008) on comparison of open and closed platforms);
• Introduction of dynamic view (see Sun and Tse (2007) on an optimal control
model based on differential equations, Lee (2010) on dynamic demand esti-
mation, Kumar et al. (2010) on evolution of two-sided markets, Vogelsang
(2010) on entry deterrence Cabral (2011) on stochastic modeling);
• Conducting of empirical research (see Rysman (2004) on evaluation of the
indirect network effects, Sokullu (2010) on non-parametric analysis of two-
sided markets).
The emphasis has clearly been on the first two research directions — devel-
opment of extensions for monopoly and duopoly cases. The majority of studies
investigates one extension at a time: they either consider the impact of preference
for quality or payments between market sides, namely usage fees or membership
fees.
Many markets can be interpreted as two-sided. Figure 3.2 contains some
particularly prominent examples, like credit card, night clubs or operating systems.
The variety of markets that can be interpreted as two-sided has fostered the
discussion about the appropriate definition for two-sided markets. We will discuss
the definition attempts in detail in the next section.
3.3 Definition of two-sided markets
Various attempts have been made to provide a definition for two-sided markets.
The “intuitive” definitions refer to the bringing together of two distinct groups of
customers, two market sides that value each other’s presence, or they explicitly cite
indirect network effects.
One of the first attempts by Roche and Tirole (2006, p. 645) is as follows:
44Examples for the two-sided markets range from auction platforms over night clubs 
and to operating systems
Market side 1Intermediary Market side 2
▪ Buyers
▪ Credit card user
▪ Men
▪ Readers
▪ User of software 
programs
▪ Auction platform
▪ Bank
▪ Night club
▪ Magazines, TV
▪ Operating system
▪ Sellers
▪ Merchants
▪ Women
▪ Advertisers
▪ Software developer
SOURCE : Parker, J.J. und Van Alstyne, M.W. (2005) Two-Sided Network Effects, Management Science 51(10), pp. 1494–1504
Figure 3.2: Examples of two-sided markets. Source: based on Parker and Van
Alstyne (2005).
Definition 3.1. Two-sided (or, more generally, multi-sided) markets are roughly
defined as markets in which one or several platforms enable interactions between
end users, and aim to get the two (or multiple) sides “on board” by appropriately
charging each side. That is, platforms court each side while attempting to make, or
at least not lose, money overall.
Evans et al. (2006, p. 54) consider the aspect of “valuing each others’ presence”
central for two-sided markets:
Definition 3.2. Multisided platforms3 cater to two or more distinct groups of
customers. Members of at least one customer group need members of the other
group for a variety of reasons. Platforms help these customers get together in a
variety of ways and thereby create value that the customers could not readily obtain
otherwise.
Something similar is true for Tag (2008, p. 5):
Definition 3.3. On two-sided markets, platforms intermediate transactions between
two groups of agents valuing each other’s presence.
Furthermore, indirect network effects can be considered a crucial feature of
two-sided markets. The following definition was provided by Choi (2010, p. 608):
3Evans et al. (2006) use the terms “multi-sided markets” and “multi-sided platforms” in
addition to “two-sided markets”. Sometimes more than two customer sides can be connected
through one platform.
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Definition 3.4. The defining characteristic of two-sided markets is indirect network
effects or inter-group network externalities that arise through improved opportunities
to trade with the other side of the market.
The first formal definition of two-sided markets was developed in Rochet and
Tirole (2006, p. 648), based on the importance of fee allocation as opposed to the
overall level of the fees:
Definition 3.5. Consider a platform charging per-interaction charges aB and aS
to the buyer and seller sides. The market for interactions between the two sides
is one-sided if the volume V of transactions realized on the platform depends only
on the aggregate price level a = aB + aS, i.e., it is insensitive to reallocations of
this total price a between the buyer and the seller. If by contrast V varies with aB
while a is kept constant, the market is said to be two-sided.
Furthermore, Rochet and Tirole (2006) discuss the possibility of defining
two-sided markets as those markets where Coase theorem does not hold. Assume
a situation where externalities exist, transaction costs are zero, bargaining is
possible and property rights are established. Then, according to Coase (1960), the
outcome of negotiations would be efficient and independent of the initial allocation
of goods/fees. Rochet and Tirole (2006, p. 649 ff.) show that, unfortunately, the
failure of Coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient for a market to be two-sided.
Later, Roche and Tirole (2006, p. 657 ff.) show that their formal definition
only described the case where membership fees are zero. They therefore extend
the formulation to the case where usage fees are neutral, but membership fees
allocation plays a role. The verbal formulation of this definition is as follows:
Definition 3.6. Factors making a market two-sided include (a) transaction costs
among end-users or, more generally, the absence of, or limits on the bilateral setting
of prices between buyer and seller, (b) platform-imposed constraints on pricing
between end-users, and (c) membership fixed costs or fixed fees.
The most recent definition has been proposed by Hagiu and Wright (2011, p.
2):
Definition 3.7. We define MSP to be an organization that creates value primarily
by enabling direct interactions between two (or more) distinct types of affiliated
customers.
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One important implication of this definition is that indirect network effects
are not assumed to be central for a market to be two-sided. Hagiu and Wright (2011,
p. 3) also show that indirect network effects are neither necessary nor sufficient.
The second implication is that they do not consider price structure to be defining
for the two-sided markets:
“[...] our definition suggests that the focus on price structure across
the multiple sides may not be the only (or even the main) point of dif-
ference when comparing MSPs with other organizational forms. Rather,
the economics of MSPs as analysed from the vantage point we propose
emphasizes their role as an alternative form of intermediation that
directly brings together different affiliated customers rather than acting
as a middle-man standing between them, which we call a re-seller. By
requiring that MSPs enable direct interactions, we are able to clarify
what distinguishes MSPs from re-sellers (e.g. grocery stores, retailers).
By requiring that multiple customer types be affiliated, we are able to
clarify what distinguish MSPs from input suppliers.”
It remains to be seen whether this definition will be adopted by the two-sided
markets research. From our point of view, this is a simple yet powerful definition
of two-sided markets, that can be helpful in various contexts. Hence, we will follow
Hagiu and Wright (2011) and use their definition of two-sided markets.
On the whole, the discussion regarding definition of two-sided markets shows
that this phenomenon, although easy to grasp intuitively, is still not straight
forward to define. All provided definitions seem to be contestable, in some settings
they may appear too broad or too narrow, too rigorous or too fuzzy. As Rysman
(2009, p. 127) suggests, a way out may be to concentrate on the impact of the
“two-sidedness”:
“The interesting question is often not whether a market can be
defined as two-sided – virtually all markets might be two-sided to
some extent – but how important two-sided issues are in determining
outcomes of interest.”
This implies that analyzing a certain industry, we should concentrate on
understanding the influence of the two-sided effects. Consider, for instance, app
platforms. They connect users and developers, as was described in Chapter 2.
Users value developers’ presence, since developers offer apps. In turn, developers’
revenue depends on the users’ demand for apps. Therefore, app platforms are
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two-sided markets according to simplified definitions like 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 or 3.7. Also,
indirect network effects are present on the app platforms. Hence, app platforms also
comply to the definitions based on indirect network effects like 3.4. Similar holds
for definitions, where price allocation is central, like those provided in Rochet and
Tirole (2006). Overall, we observe that app platforms seem to exhibit all typical
two-sided market features. Therefore, in this case it does not really matter, which
definition we pick. Hence, we have to agree with Rysman’s (2009) conclusion that
it is not central, if an industry at hand can be considered two-sided by definition,
it is rather the fact, that it is affected by two-sided issues.
3.4 Two-sided market models
This section introduces two-sided market models. Several parts of this section
are used in the research papers included in Part II. We begin with the canonical
two-sided market model by Rochet and Tirole (2003). Then we briefly discuss
extensions to this model. The canonical model developed by Rochet and Tirole
(2003) conveys the key idea of two-sided markets. At the same time, it is not
particularly complicated and provides the common denominator for several two-
sided market models. This characteristic is crucial for us, since our aim is to
integrate the most important extensions into one model. In the following, we
describe the model of Rochet and Tirole (2003). We begin with customer utility
and proceed with platform profit and its maximization.
The model of Rochet and Tirole (2003) was motivated by credit card systems.
In their canonical model, the authors include usage fees pB and pS as decision
parameters for both market sides and take and take into account costs per interaction
for platform c. Two-sided market models are usually based on three equations: the
platform profit equation and the two utility equations for the two market sides (cf.
Rochet and Tirole, 2003). All of them can have a membership and a usage part.
Membership benefits, fees and costs are induced only once, usage benefits, fees and
costs are recurring and depend on the number of transactions, e.g., downloads.
The key insight of two-sided market models is that the solution does not only
depend on the total fee level, but on the pricing structure. Hence, total demand
(and total revenue) depend on the allocation of fees among the two market sides.
Imagine two customer groups (sellers and buyers) with their respective demand
curves shown in Figure 3.3. Assume that the buyers’ fees are reduced and sellers’
fees are increased by the same amount. As a result, the number of buyers increases
significantly, attracting new buyers so that the sellers’ demand curve shifts. The
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total effect is a relatively minor revenue reduction on the buyers’ side, leading to a
strong revenue increase on the sellers’ side. This example shows the interdependence
between the market sides and the importance of finding optimal fee allocation.Bestimmung der optimalen Preisstruktur aus Sicht von Plattformen –
Einfluss der indirekten Netzwerkeffekte
Quelle: Parker and Van Alstyne (2005) Two-Sided Network Effects, Management Science 51(10), pp. 1494–1504, wikipedia
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Figure 3.3: The key feature of two-sided markets is that the platform owner has to
take into account two interdependent demand functions.
Traditional economic intuition suggests that if the prices for both sides are
equal in the beginning, a price increase is more effective on the side that has a
steeper demand curve, while a reduction will be more effective on the side with
the flatter curve. This still holds for two-sided markets. One prominent example
are free drinks for women at night clubs. Often, women not only have free entry,
they are even offered a free drink. If there are many women in a night club, men
are willing to pay more due to a steeper demand curve, thus compensating for the
revenue loss when offering free drinks.
What is new in two-sided market theory is that in equilibrium, the ratio of
fees for the two market sides ought to be proportional to the ratio of their price
elasticities (not the other way around). The side with the lower price elasticity
pays less than the other side and is often even subsidized (“subsidy side”) to
attract the other side (“money side”). This result was first reported in Rochet
and Tirole (2003). It is often seen as counterintuitive, as the more elastic market
side is supposed to pay more (Bolt and Tieman, 2005). Price elasticities cannot be
treated as constants, but should be seen as functions of prices. The inverse slopes
of demand curves are not equivalent to price elasticities. As Krueger (2009) shows,
this resolves the seeming contradiction.
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For the model to reflect the app platform’s structure, we have to adjust the
canonical model of Rochet and Tirole (2003). We have to consider additional
parameters and extensions, such as usage fees, membership fees, payments be-
tween customer groups, quality review of participants, which were discussed in
different research papers on two-sided markets in a different context or industry.
Armstrong (2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2006) introduce membership fees and
payments between customer groups, and Hagiu (2009) and Jeon and Rochet (2010)
analyze quality reviews. New parameters must be introduced, like segmentation of
participants, commission payments and adjustments for the number of interactions.
For the competition between platforms, multi-homing is an important issue.
“Multi-homing” occurs when participants potentially join more than one platform
(Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Armstrong, 2006; Armstrong and Wright, 2007;
Sun and Tse, 2007). Market participants might choose between three possibilities:
to not join any platform, to join only one platform (“single-homing”) or to joint
more than one platform (“multi-homing”). The decision is taken at the individual
participant’s level, that is, in the multi-homing case not all participants need join
more than one platform, only some. For the single-homing, not all agents have to
be part of the same platform, but they might decide to join different platforms
(albeit only one at a time). Single-homing behavior can be driven by requirements
imposed by platforms, like exclusive contracts. Alternatively, it can be driven by
costs of multi-homing, for instance, when platforms are incompatible or require
high membership fees. The more single-homing behavior is observed, the more
likely the domination of a single platform (“winner-takes-all” dynamics).
Although many parameters were introduced to extend the canonical two-sided
market model, some parameters that are necessary to reflect app platform structure
are still missing. Also, to be able to analyze all parameters simultaneously, they
have to be integrated into one model. This leads us to research gaps which will be
discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 4
Research gaps and corresponding
research papers
We begin this chapter with the derivation of research gaps. To these research gap,
we provide the corresponding research questions and research papers presented
here. Brief summaries of the three research papers follow in Sections 4.3, 4.4 and
4.5 for the three research papers respectively.
4.1 Derivation of research gaps
As was mentioned in Chapter 1, this theses is rooted in two areas: on the one
hand, it is motivated by the need to analyze and understand emerging Internet
platforms, especially, mobile app distribution platforms. On the other hand, it
aims at further developing two-sided market theory, which can be used to model
Internet platforms. Hence, the motivation and research gaps derivation are also
two-fold, including both applied and theoretical aspects.
The first research gap concerns analysis and modeling of emerging Internet
platforms, such as the App Store, Amazon and Google Play. There are many books
describing how to develop apps for the App Store, or how to be successful selling
on the Amazon. But what is missing, is a model, which would help to analyze key
aspects of these platforms. The App Store, Amazon and Google Play connect two
groups of customers who value each other, and hence these markets are based on
indirect network effects. Two-sided market theory provides models for the markets.
Two-sided markets theory was evolving over a decade by now. Many extensions
were introduced, many industries were interpreted as two-sided markets. But
emerging Internet platforms were not yet covered. To be able to model behavior of
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the platform participants and to understand strategies from the platforms’ point
of view, the following parameters ought to be included: membership and usage
fees, payments between the two market sides (e.g., users and developers), quality
of products, customer segmentation and the number of market participants and
their interaction patterns.
Furthermore, all these parameters ought to be considered simultaneously.
Research papers on two-sided markets usually concentrate on one parameter at a
time. For instance, Jeon and Rochet (2010) introduce parameter “quality”, but
they interpret it in a context without payments between customer groups. Hence,
a model is needed which would combine in one model as many relevant parameters
as possible. This would allow to consider trade-offs between different parameters
and analyze how they influence each other.
As was described in Chapter 3, two-sided market theory evolved along four
major directions: i)introduction of new extensions for a static monopoly model, ii)
analysis of duopoly setting and development of extensions for it, iii) introduction of
dynamic view, and iv) conducting of empirical research. The majority of research
papers on two-sided markets are concerned with a static view. Dynamic models are
just beginning to receive attention. Since such industries as Internet platforms are
highly dynamic in a non-linear way and prone to disruptions, static models are not
sufficient to capture and ensure full understanding of Internet platforms. Therefore,
we believe that a dynamic model need to be developed, which would reflect dynamic
and disruptive nature of Internet platforms. Currently available models, e.g., Sun
and Tse (2007) or Cabral (2011) do not include parameters necessary to model app
platforms, such as commission fees, and are not well-equipped to answer research
questions relevant for app platforms.
The next area which required additional attention from our point of view,
is application of two-sided market theory and platform management literature to
such emerging markets as mobile app distribution platforms. Currently available
literature on app platforms does not cover such aspects, but rather focuses on app
development (e.g., Meier, 2010, Allan, 2010). What is also lacking, is an industry
description and analysis. We apply management literature developed by Gawer
and Cusumano (2007) and Eisenmann (2007) to the app platform context and
develop strategies for app platforms.
The aforementioned research gaps range from purely theoretical two-sided
market models development and to such applied aspects, as app platform industry
description and analysis. Hence, all of them require a different approach. Our
proposal of how to begin covering these gaps follows in the next section.
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4.2 Research questions and corresponding re-
search papers
The papers presented here are organized along three lines according to the research
gaps identified in the previous section. The first research paper presented here,
“An Integrated Two-sided Market Model for Internet Platforms”, depicts a general
integrated two-sided market model for online platforms building on research from
Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006), Armstrong (2006), Hagiu (2009), Jeon and Rochet
(2010) among others. We derive a close-form solution for it. This is supposed to
cover the gap of developing a two-sided market model suitable for Internet platforms.
Also, it provides an integrated model, tying the most relevant parameters into one
model. Research questions addressed in research paper I are as follows:
• How to model two-sided markets (esp. app platforms)?
• Which additional parameters are needed to model such online platforms as
app platforms?
• Is it possible to integrate all necessary parameters into one model?
• Is there a closed-form solution for this integrated model?
Research paper I is a mostly theoretical, it is rooted in Industrial Organization
theory. One of its key objectives is to further develop two-sided market models.
At the same time, it provides a basis for analyzing and understanding Internet
platforms, in particular app platforms.
The next research gap identified in the previous section concerns possibilities
of developing a dynamic two-sided market model presented in research paper II.
This is needed to reflect dynamic and disruptive nature of Internet platforms. This
model helps to answer such research questions as
• How to model two-sided markets in a dynamic setting?
• How to model platform population dynamics?
• What is the difference between the short-term and long-term optimization?
• What is the optimal reaction to competitors’ entries and external shocks?
• Is the result of optimization consistent with our observations in the real
world?
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Research paper II “Toward Understanding Dynamics and Disruptions in
Two-sided Markets: A Dynamic Two-sided Market Model” develops a dynamic
two-sided market model based on dynamic systems and optimization theories. Since
this model is too complex to be solved analytically, we use Matlab simulation to
obtain the results. The dynamic model at hand shows, how platform decisions
are impacted by consideration of population dynamics. This enables us to derive
strategies which remain valid over time, as opposed to static models.
The third research paper, “App Store, Quo Vadis? Challenges and Strategies
for App Platforms” is devoted to the challenges and strategies for app platforms. It
provides an industry description and an overview of key app platform stakeholders.
Research paper III connects two-sided market theory and platform management
literature. Based on these theories and app platforms analysis, it identifies challenges
and develops strategies to mitigate these along the life cycle phases. Therefore,
research questions addressed in research paper III include:
• How can two-sided market theory and strategic platform management litera-
ture be combined to derive strategies for app platforms?
• What are the key challenges and strategies for app platforms?
• How do app platform strategies evolve in different life-cycle phases?
Figure 4.1 summarizes the research questions along the identified research
gaps. The three research papers presented here correspond to these three areas of
research questions. In the next three sections we provide brief summaries of the
three research papers.
4.3 Summary of research paper I
As was pointed out in Chapter 3, a broad range of two-sided market models evolved
over the last decade. Most of the models add one parameter at a time. However, in
order to take account of the trade-offs between different parameters, such as quality
and various pricing instruments, all of them need to be integrated into one model.
One main objective of the research paper I is to elaborate an integrated model,
which includes such prevalent parameters as usage and membership fees (Rochet and
Tirole, 2003, 2006; Armstrong, 2006), payments between customer groups (Rochet
and Tirole, 2006) and quality review of participants (Hagiu, 2009). Furthermore,
we introduce three new parameters: i) commission payment dependent on payments
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Research questions and corresponding papers – what is the storyline? 
▪ How to model two-sided markets (esp. app platforms)?
▪ Which additional parameters are needed to model such online 
platforms as app platforms?
▪ Is it possible to integrate all necessary parameters into one 
model?
▪ Is there a closed-form solution for this integrated model?
▪ How to model two-sided markets in a dynamic setting?
▪ How to model platform population dynamics?
▪ What is the difference between the short-term and long-term 
optimization?
▪ What is the optimal reaction to competitors' entries and external 
shocks?
▪ Is the result of optimization consistent with our observations in 
the real world?
▪ How can two-sided market theory and strategic platform 
management literature be combined to derive strategies for app 
platforms?
▪ What are the key challenges and strategies for app platforms?
▪ How do strategies evolve in different life-cycle phases?
Corresponding papers
“An Integrated Two-sided 
Market Model” – a 
theoretical model in Industrial 
Organization Theory
Research questions
“Toward Understanding 
Dynamics and Disruptions in 
Two-sided Markets: A 
Dynamic Two-sided Market 
Model” – a dynamic model, 
incl. Matlab simulation
“App Store, Quo Vadis? 
Challenges and Strategies 
for App Platforms” – focus 
on managerial perspective and 
implications for app platforms
Figure 4.1: Research questions and corresponding papers.
between customer groups, ii) segmentation of participants, and iii) adjustments for
the number of interactions.
Commission payment dependent on payments between customer groups is
crucial for such platforms as the App Store or eBay. Since the price of apps at the
App Store and the value of goods sold on eBay vary considerably, platform owners
link their commission to the price of the apps/goods. On the one hand, this makes
selling cheap (or even free) apps and goods profitable for the seller/developer side.
This drives traffic. On the other hand, it ensures that platform owner obtains big
profits for high-priced apps and goods.
The second extension – segmentation of participants – makes it possible to
apply price discrimination inside one market side. This reflects the differentiation
available on many platforms, including app platforms and e-commerce platforms.
For instance, the App Store membership fee varies for different developer groups:
usually, developers pay USD 99 per year, while an enterprise developer license costs
USD 299, and universities can join for free. Amazon or eBay typically differentiate
between private and professional sellers, offering different services and providing
different pricing models for them.
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Usually, two-sided market models assume that on platforms, each participant
on one side of the market interacts with each participant from the other side exactly
once. The mathematical term for the number of interactions in this case is the
“power set”. This would be equivalent to each and every iPhone owner downloading
all available apps on her smartphone. The third extension we introduce is crucial
for modeling real-world platforms, where participants on the one side of the market
interact with only a small fraction of participants on the other side. In this case,
using the power set would lead to highly implausible results. Imagine what would
happen if each and every iPhone owner would download all available apps on her
smartphone. Hence, it is necessary to make an adjustment. We assume that the
interaction (or purchase) decision is a two-step process: the first step is taken by
buyers. It includes scanning for possible interaction partners or apps. The second
step is the selection of partner(s) from all those scanned. To better illustrate the
importance of this adjustments, we present an example. If each of the 125.000,000
iPhone owners bought or downloaded each of the 300,000 available apps, this would
result in 37.500,000,000,000 downloads instead of the registered 7.000,000,000
downloads, which is less than 1/5300.1 The power set rule does not take into
account the crowding out and the search effects: at the beginning, users/buyers
are pleased to have a variety of choices, but at a certain point in time the effect
reverses, since they start experiencing difficulties to find what they want. Also, due
to the law of diminishing marginal utility, the increase from 100 to 200 participants
will have much more impact than the increase from 100,100 to 100,200 participants.
The adjustments for the number of interactions allows taking this into account.
Despite the high number of parameters, the new integrated two-sided model
can still be solved analytically. We derive equations for buyers’ and sellers’ utility
and platform profit and transform them so they can be solved, similar to the
extended canonical model of Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006). In the core of this
solution is the argument, that usage and membership fees are interdependent. That
is, if one of them is fixed (e.g., membership fee), the other part (usage fee) cannot
vary arbitrary in the optimal case. The other consequence is that the solution
is not unique (cf. Armstrong, 2006; Reisinger, 2010), there exists more than one
combination of usage and membership fees. This interdependence is one important
point, which becomes visible once we consider an integrated model, which includes
both, usage and membership fees.
Considering quality reviews, we realize that there is a trade-off between
high overall price level, higher average quality and lower number of participant
1All numbers as of November 2010, see www.148apps.biz.
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on the one hand, versus low overall price level, lower average quality, but higher
number of participant on the other hand. These trade-offs become clear through
the simultaneous consideration of all parameters.
Finally, we show an example of how to apply the integrated model to app
platforms. The model at hand advances two-sided market theory, proposing new
extensions and integrating all parameters in one model. At the same time, it creates
a basis for analyzing and modeling newly emerging Internet platforms.
4.4 Summary of research paper II
Most two-sided market models focus on pricing strategies in a static setting (see,
for instance, Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Armstrong, 2006). As was mentioned
in the previous sections, a static model is not sufficient to reflect development
of Internet platforms. To provide suggestions which would be relevant for the
real-world applications, we need to take dynamics and disruptions into account.
Therefore, a dynamic two-sided market model is required to reflect these aspects.
Research paper II “Toward Understanding Dynamics and Disruptions in Two-sided
Markets: A Dynamic Two-sided Market Model” addresses this issue.
The dynamic two-sided market model at hand is based on dynamic systems
theory (cf. Stermann, 2000), population diffusion and evolution examples from life
sciences (cf. Schoen, 2006), and finally, on differential game theory2 (cf. Dockner
et. al, 2000). This theories help us to define problem structure and to develop
equations which reflect dynamics of the two market sides. We consider a platform,
which distributes goods (e.g., software apps), offered or even produced by the seller
side (e.g., developers) to the buyers (or users). Our goal is to determine fees, so
that platform profit is maximized. Hence, platform profit is the first equation we
need. It represents our goal function. Compared to the static case, we have to
consider cumulative profit over time, not only current profit. Furthermore, we
have to take into account constraints reflecting population dynamics. For that,
we have to define how amounts of participants on both market sides evolve over
time. Based on system dynamics, examples from life sciences and differential game
theory, we develop population dynamic equations. They represent the core of the
dynamic model. Model’s behavior is contingent upon them. Hence, it is important
to carefully examine possible dynamics and explain, which dynamics are chosen
and why.
2Differential game theory is basically optimal control theory applied in economic settings.
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Based on the dynamic types suggested by Sterman (2000), we assume that
platform’s population growth follows an S-curve pattern in the long run, that is,
after a period with exponential growth, it slows down at a certain point of time.
Potential number of users is restricted by total population with income high enough
to buy a mobile device (this restriction is called carrying capacity), hence, there
will be a growth limit. Similar suggestion holds for developers. Once assumptions
on the shape of the population dynamics curve are determined, the next challenge
is to provide a mathematical formulation for it.
In life sciences, birth and death rates are usually used to model population
diffusion (cf. Schoen, 2006). Birth rate determines population size growth and
directly depends on the current number of participants. Every participant “produces”
future participants with a certain probability at a certain point in time. For the
platforms under consideration, what is crucial are not necessarily the platform
participants on the same market side, but rather the number of participants on the
other market side. This is the manifestation of the indirect network effects. More
specifically, the dynamics of the number of participants on the one market side
depends on the expected utility based on the number of participants on the other
side. The expected utility equation we propose is based on the results developed in
research paper I on the integrated two-sided market model and some additional
assumptions that reflect the dynamic nature of the model.
We propose to use optimization theory instead of optimal control theory3
which was used in Sun and Tse (2007). This has two reasons: i) solution for the
optimal control problems as proposed by Sun and Tse (2007) is proven to be unstable
and highly dependent on assumed initial and end conditions (cf. Pickenhain and
Lykina, 2006, Pickenhain et al., 2006); ii) it requires constant price adjustments. To
overcome these two challenges, we transform this continuous time control dynamic
into a discrete-time optimization dynamic.
Since the model is too complex for an analytical solution, we use Matlab
simulation to determine the optimization result. With the help of Matlab we
provide answers for a range of research questions. We begin with research questions
that are central for static models, i.e., “Which side to charge and how much?”,
“How to divide fees into usage/commission and membership fees?”, “Is the solution
unique?” We discuss this questions in the dynamic setting. Further research
questions concern the “chicken-and-egg” problem, that is, the question of how
to start-off a platform (cf. Caillaud and Jullien, 2003). We also show how to
determine the minimal number of participants on both sides (and comment on its
3For a more detailed explanations see research paper II.
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uniqueness). This is important for potential platform owners who want to launch a
platform and want to know how many participants (and, consequently, resources)
are needed to get the platform up and running.
The dynamic nature of the model leads to further changes, such as repre-
sentation of platform dynamics and profit calculation in a dynamic setting. We
can show that there is still a trade-off between usage (or commission) fees and
membership fees, but the solution is unique due to the dynamic nature of the
model. Furthermore, we show that in our setting it is better to use commission
fees instead of usage fees. This is consistent to the the real-world observations, for
instance, the App Store employs commission fees instead of fixed usage fees.
Since we have assumed non-linear platform dynamics and existence of carrying
capacity, pricing strategies might change over time. That is, price setting for 30
periods would be different compared to prices chosen for 50 or 100 periods. This is
confirmed by Matlab simulation. We observe that short-term and long-term profit
maximization leads to quite different results. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate
carefully the differences and to clearly define, which perspective to focus on.
The next aspect under consideration is price adjustment over time. We model
a setting, where after a certain period of time the platform obtains the opportunity
to adjust its prices. In the reality, we have observed that app platform fees did
not change much, at least not in an obvious way, that is, commission fee remains
the same over time and across most app platforms. Also membership fees, which
are the costs of the devices, seem not to change much. But a more close look
shows that there are some changes going on. For instance, recently the App Store
adjusted the app price levels (Essers, 2012). This has a similar effect to increasing
commission fees. Our Matlab simulations confirms this, showing that the optimal
platform owner behavior is to increase fees if given a chance. Also, simulations
show that fees increase should be the higher, the later it occurs, since platform
owner can afford to set the higher prices if more agents have already joined the
platform.
Reaction to competition is one more important aspect (cf. Armstrong, 2006;
Sun and Tse, 2007) and is analyzed here as external shocks. We focus on the
optimal behavior of platform owners in the case of competitor entry. Matlab
simulations show that optimal price reduction due to the entry of new competitors
might turn out to be surprisingly small (less than 5%), although the competitor is
assumed to claim as much as 1/2 of the new potential participants. This is in line
with real-world observations: despite of fierce competition prices do not change
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much. On the whole, the dynamic model proves to be a powerful instrument for
understanding the behavior of two-sided markets, and app platforms, in particular.
The dynamic two-sided market model is a first step in the direction of under-
standing platform dynamics. Future research could focus on further uncovering the
potential of dynamic two-sided market modeling introducing further extensions. A
comparison of optimal control and optimization modeling approaches could deliver
new insights. However, the most interesting avenue for future research would be
an empirical validation of the model at hand. This could be especially valuable
from applied point of view, providing insights on the future of platform businesses.
4.5 Summary of research paper III
The third research paper is devoted to challenges faced by the app platform industry
and potential strategies to master these challenges. We combine the insights from
the literature on strategic management of platforms with the economic literature
on two-sided markets. Strategic management literature on platform management
(e.g., Gawer and Cusumano, 2008; Eisenmann, 2007) provides practical guidelines
on to take network effects into account. However, it does not provide an adequate
theoretical framework to thoroughly analyze complex interactions. Economic
literature, on the other hand, analyzes two-sided markets focusing on theoretical
aspects, and does not consider the managerial implications of these theories in
detail. With the research paper III, we aim to bring these two streams of literature
closer together.
Following a literature review, we provide an overview of the app platform
industry, including the current situation and trends, platform business model and
key stakeholders. The three key stakeholders are the platform owners, developers
and users. For each stakeholder type, we provide a description of their role in
the app platform industry and add a brief analysis of the key strategic aspects
from their point of view. The main contribution of this research paper is the
application of the theoretical findings to the app platform industry: we illustrate
which strategic decisions are most important in the different life-cycle stages of
an app platform. We mainly cover the app platform owner’s perspective, leaving
the developer and customer perspective for future research. Following Eisenmann
(2007), we consider three phases of the platform life-cycle – design, launch and
competition.
For each phase we develop several management recommendations. For plat-
form design, pricing represents the key strategic challenge. Two-sided market
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theory suggests that in equilibrium, fees should be proportional to price elastici-
ties. Furthermore, it provides suggestions regarding types of fees to charge (usage,
membership, one-time or periodical fees). We also discuss the impact of quality
on platform design. Quality, besides price, is the key parameter that determines
platform design. On two-sided markets, the side that requires higher quality is
subsidized.
During the second phase – the platform launch – the “chicken & egg” problem
occurs. Two-sided market theory helps elucidate and reduce or avoid the problem
by determining an optimal membership component. Here, we build on insights
gained from simulations of the dynamic model presented in the research paper II.
The third life-cycle phase is competition. It pertains to the possible market
structure, including “the winner takes all” dynamics and the number of competing
platforms that can share the market. We identify four factors which determine
the market structure for app platforms: multi-homing, size of indirect network
effects same-side effects, and differentiation opportunities. By analyzing these
factors, we demonstrate that the app platform industry reveals a high tendency
toward convergence, but leaves room for niche building and differentiation. The key
implication for the incumbent app platforms is to push for further consolidation
while possible challengers have to find their niche to be successful. It is crucial for
developers to scan the market for disruptions and trends toward consolidation in
order to efficiently allocate their resources.
Based on this analysis, several thrusts for future research emerge. They
include, for instance, evaluation of price change over time (partially covered in
paper II on dynamic two-sided market models), empirical evaluation of compliance
to the fee allocation rule, and the impact of platform openness and compatibility.
The combination of the economic two-sided markets literature and the strate-
gic management literature provides valuable insights for the app platform industry.
Although we focus on app platforms for mobile devices, this approach and the
developed strategies apply to many other Internet-based platforms.
Chapter 5
General discussion and conclusion
All three research papers presented here are based on the two-sided market theory
and aim at providing insights to such industries as online platforms, especially app
platforms. The three studies together provide insights on theoretical aspects of
two-sided markets, as well as on the application to the app platform industry (and
other similar platforms). Extensions to the two-sided market models proposed in
the first research paper, solutions for the integrated two-sided market model and
the introduction of a dynamic two-sided market model are the main theoretical
contributions. Insights on strategies for app platforms along the life-cycle phases
are crucial from the managerial perspective. In the following, we discuss the overall
contribution of these papers from the theoretical and the managerial points of view.
We discuss limitation and thoughts on future research in Section 5.3. Section 5.4
concludes.
5.1 Theoretical contribution
Two-sided market theory started to develop in the early 2000s as was mentioned in
Chapter 3. Since then many industries were covered and many parameters and
extensions were introduced. Newly emerging Internet platforms like the App Store,
Amazon, Google Play are calling for new extensions and research methods. In
particular, there are some aspects, which require further examination and research,
since they were not covered sufficiently in the existing literature on two-sided
markets. These parameters include i) commission payment dependent on payments
between customer groups, ii) segmentation of participants, and iii) adjustment for
the number of interactions.
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Furthermore, papers on two-sided markets tend to consider different extensions
one-by-one, isolated from the others. In this case, it is not possible to understand
the interdependencies between the parameters. For instance, if models include
only membership fees, but not commission fees, it is not possible to survey the
interdependence between these parameters. Also optimization with respect to
one of these parameters lacks the insights as to how the overall impact of both
parameters on the optimal pricing would look like.
In research paper I we introduce new parameters including i) commission
payment dependent on payments between customer groups, ii) segmentation of
participants, and iii) adjustment for the number of interactions. This allows us
to represent Internet platforms as two-sided markets and therefore answers the
first and the second research questions mentioned in Section 4.2. Moreover, we
integrate all these parameters into one model instead of considering them isolated
from each other. This answers the third research question. We find out, that it is
still possible to apply similar methodology as Rocher and Tirole (2006) to provide
a general solution to obtained problem. This addresses the fourth research question
that was formulated in Section 4.2.
Two-sided market models are rooted in comparative static approach. In
general, they attempt to offer the optimal pricing solution at a certain point of
time. This is a large limitation from the theoretical, as well as the applied point of
view. Based on the integrated two-sided market model which was developed in the
research paper I, we aim at overcoming this limitation in the research paper II.
Most research papers on two-sided markets tend to employ purely analytical
techniques for solving of developed models. This limits possible approaches con-
siderably to pretty simple models. Otherwise, analytical solution is not possible.
The dynamic modeling approach we are interested in leads to a formulation of a
complex dynamic two-sided market model. This model cannot be solved analyti-
cally, therefore, we need to part ourselves from the purely analytical approach and
rely on computer simulation techniques. We use Matlab simulations to provide a
solution for the proposed model. This allows us to consider a much more complex
dynamic setting compared to the majority of static two-sided market research
papers. As a result, our model extends two-sided market methodology to the cases
where dynamic approach is required.
The first two research questions we were covering in the research papers II
are “How to model two-sided markets in a dynamic setting?” and “How to model
platform population dynamics?”. The answers to these two questions are as follows.
The dynamic model proposed in the second research paper develops an approach
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which relies on a different mathematical background, as well as on different modeling
and simulation technique compared to other dynamic models, such as Lee (2010),
Kumar et al. (2010), Cabral (2011). The first dynamic modeling approach – the
continuous time optimal control model – is inspired by Sun and Tse (2007), but
uses different principles for the goal function and population dynamics, which are
better adapted for online markets. For instance, we assume that population growth
is proportional to the expected utility of participants, not only to the current prices
and number of participants on the other market side. This allows for a general
formulation, where expected utility can be defined depending on the market under
consideration. The second discrete time optimization approach is entirely new in
two-sided market theory, and is the central contribution of the research paper to
the development of the dynamic two-sided market models.
Further research questions we are addressing in research paper II pertain
to the number of participants necessary to start off the platform, comparison
of short-term and long-term optimization, adjustment of prices over time and
optimal reaction to competitors’ entries and external shocks. With help of Matlab
simulations we show how the number of agents necessary to start off the platform
can be determined and we show that this number is not unique, but represents a
trade-off between the number of users and the number of developers. Furthermore,
we calculate optimal prices depending on the time horizon, showing that for short
horizons optimal platform owner behavior consists in exploitation of the initially
available number of participants. For longer time horizons we show that platform
owner begins with lower initial prices and increases the prices over time if given a
chance.
The next research question was investigating optimal platform strategy in
case there is a possibility to adjust prices after a certain period of time. In the
real world we observe that some platforms, e.g., eBay (cf. Steiner, 2010), adjust
prices considerably over time, others do not (e.g., the App Store). With the help of
Matlab simulations we were able to show that platform owner should increase prices
if there is a chance to do so, in particular, membership fees for the users. The later
this price adjustment happens, the higher fees platform owner should chose. One
more research question we consider in paper II is optimal reaction to competitor’s
entry. We are able to show that competitor’s entry has comparably low impact on
optimal platform pricing. This is consistent with the real-world observations, for
instance, Apple Inc. did not reduce their fees after other competitors like Android
have entered the market.
64
As was mentioned before, research paper II builds on the extensions introduced
in research paper I. The two research papers together provide a way to consider
the most important parameters simultaneously and show how platform dynamics
can be taken into account for two-sided market models. In particular, two-sided
market models elucidate trade-off between membership fees, per-interaction usage
fees and commission fees in a dynamic setting. The key prerequisite to answering
these questions is integration of the relevant parameters into the model. The
dynamic model offers in addition answers to research question which arise in a
dynamic setting and were not considered for the static two-sided models. For
instance, in research paper II we analyze how pricing strategies evolve over time
as more participants join the platform or if there is a chance to adjust prices over
time. Since optimal prices depend on the point of time under consideration and
also on the length of the time horizon, this illustrates the importance of dynamic
models. Static models cannot provide these insights, since they do not consider
these developments. The dynamic model also provides insights for the real-world
Internet platforms. We will elaborate on this in the following section.
The third research paper is devoted to applying two-sided market theory and
strategic platform management literature to app platforms. Therefore, it focuses
rather on managerial perspective than on developing two-sided market theory. The
main theoretical contribution of the research paper III is that it connects two-sided
market theory and strategic platform management literature, pointing out how
they can profit from each other. We also build on and further develop the life-cycle
phase analysis suggested by Eisenmann (2007). The insights from research paper
II on how two-sided platforms evolve over time allow us to extend and enrich the
life-cycle phase analysis. We subdivide platform life in three phases – platform
design, launch, and competition, – and discuss key challenges along these phases.
One of the insights from the dynamic two-sided model analysis is that in a later
phase when there are many platform participants, it is optimal for the platform
owner to adjust her pricing strategy.
The three research papers together provide a theoretical modeling approach
for online market places such as the App Store. The integrated model introduces
hitherto unresearched extensions and bundles the prevalent parameters in one
model. The dynamic model builds on the integrated model and extends it, thereby
helping to cover dynamic aspects of two-sided markets. The third research paper
builds on the insights derived in first two research papers, combining two-sided
market theory and strategic management literature.
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5.2 Managerial implications
The ultimate objective of the three research papers presented here is to drive
further the understanding of the emerging app platform industry and other online
platforms with a similar structure. Since the industry is quite young, not much
scientific literature on this topic is available. The objectives of the work presented
here include providing an initial overview of the industry, developing models to
describe and analyze platforms, and, finally, to provide strategies for the challenges
app platforms face at different points in time.
A brief industry overview of app platform strategies is provided in research
paper III. We describe the current state and trends of the app platform industry and
discuss app platform business models and key stakeholders. In the introduction to
this dissertation we also provide a comprehensive overview (cf. Section 2). Section
2 discusses key concepts and definitions, presents a detailed industry overview and
a broader stakeholder analysis.
Both research papers I and II are devoted to modeling and analyzing app
platforms. The first research paper proposes extensions necessary to model app
platforms and integrates the prevailing parameters into one model. In Section 1.7.3,
we show how the proposed integrated model can be applied to app platforms. The
second research paper focuses on the dynamic aspects of app platforms. Since the
app platform industry is developing extremely fast and is also prone to disruptions,
this is an important part of the analysis. The second research paper aims to provide
a dynamic model for app platforms and undertakes first attempts at explaining
some paradoxical observations of app platforms, for instance, the fact that app
platforms do not significantly reduce prices when a new competitor enters the
platform.
Both the integrated model as well as the dynamic model are formulated in
a general way. Hence, they can also be used to model other types of two-sided
markets, not only app platforms. For instance, such online platforms as Amazon
and eBay have a similar structure and (to the best of our knowledge) have also not
yet been modeled as two-sided markets.
The third research paper on challenges and strategies for app platforms takes
a managerial perspective. It combines insights from two-sided market theory and
strategic platform management literature. In the third research paper, we consider
the challenges for app platforms along the life-cycle phases, determining what
challenges may arise when and how they can be dealt with. For instance, we derive
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the four conditions that make the “winner-takes-all” dynamics likely (based on
Eisenmann et al. 2006, Sun and Tse 2007). They include:
• It is costly to multi-home – at least for one market side,
• There are high indirect network effects – at least for the side with high
multi-homing costs,
• Same-side effects are not negative and strong, that is, the congestion effect is
not too high,
• The goods are rather homogeneous and there is no demand for differentiation.
Such considerations are important for incumbent platforms aiming to defend
their position and to deter the entry of competitors, but also for the competitors
who want to understand whether it makes sense to enter the market and how
best to do it. Compiling strategies for app platforms, many factors need to be
taken into account: direct and indirect network effects, pricing of information
goods, complementary products pricing, multi-homing vs. single-homing situations,
platform openness, adjacent industry and the entire ecosystem. The third research
paper attempts to structure the challenges app platforms face and introduces
strategies to deal with these, while taking as many factors into account as possible.
5.3 Limitations and future research
In this section we will discuss limitations of our research and provide some thoughts
on future research possibilities. We describe limitations of single papers and the
overall research. We comment on how these limitations are addressed in other
parts of our research and which research opportunities arise from the limitations of
the research at hand.
One of the biggest limitations of the integrated two-sided market model
developed in research paper I is that is concentrates on the static aspects of two-
sided markets. That means, it is assumed that the number of platform participants
remains constant over time and therefore optimal pricing strategy for the platform
needs to be determined once and for all. In the real world we observe that many
two-sided markets, in particular, app platforms are highly dynamic. Therefore,
a strategy adjustment might be required. This means that optimal prices might
change over time, that is, platform might prefer to set low fees in the beginning
67
to attract more users and developers and then increase the fees once lock-in took
place.
One more shortcoming of the static two-sided market models is that they
cannot analyze strategies for competitive entry and further external shocks like new
regulations or technologies. We overcome the limitations of the comparative-static
nature of the integrated two-sided market model in research paper II. The last relies
on a dynamic approach and allows to investigate how platform platform strategy
might change over time, in particular, in case of external shock like competitive
entry.
Research paper II provides one possible approach to building a dynamic
two-sided market model, it builds on dynamic system theory, examples from life
sciences and differential game theory. Other promising avenues to dynamic two-
sided models were presented in the research of Sun (2006), Sun and Tse (2007),
Vogelsang (2010) and Cabral (2011). It would be interesting to compare different
dynamic modeling approaches and their results, including continuous vs. discrete
modeling, optimization vs. optimal control approach, etc. Currently, these models
target different research questions and use different parameters and mechanisms,
not only different mathematical theories. We believe, it would be insightful to see
if the results developed with the help of different approaches are compatible. If
they are not, it would be necessary to analyze, how this can be overcome to arrive
at viable recommendations for the real world platforms.
The integrated two-sided market model solution depends strongly on price
elasticities. Hence, in order to determine optimal pricing strategy, the platform
owner requires high transparency for existing price elasticities. In the real world
situations this might be challenging, especially if the platform owner wants to
determine pricing strategies for a new platform she is trying to set up. The dynamic
model presented in research paper II does not require explicit knowledge of price
elasticities, but makes use of other parameters instead, which are less abstract and
therefore might be easier to estimate.
The dynamic model presented in paper II is too complex to be solved analyt-
ically. Therefore, we have employed Matlab simulations to provide answers to the
research questions. As computer simulations mostly do, our Matlab simulations
provide an indication of solution for certain parameter ranges. Although we did
our best to extend parameter ranges as far as possible, it is necessary to be aware
of the fact that this is not equivalent to a closed-form analytical solution.
One more important limitation of our research, is the perspective we employed.
In all three research papers we considered strategic issues from the platform owner’s
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point of view. It would be of particular interest to connect this with customers, and
in particular with developers’ perspective. They also are facing strategic decisions
(e.g., for which platforms to develop, how to set monetization strategy and prices,
how much to invest in advertizing and promotions). There is an interdependence
between platform owners’ and developers’ decisions, which would be very interesting
to further elucidate.
In our research, we tried to include as many relevant parameters as possible.
Integration of different parameters discussed in two-sided market research into one
model belongs to the main theoretical contributions of research paper I. Nonetheless,
a model remains a simplified version of the real world. Clearly, there are many
more parameters and factors affecting real world app platforms. Examples include
explicit consideration of additional impact of available content (e.g., music, films,
news) as opposed to apps, explicit modeling of open vs. closed platform.
Internet platforms in general, and app platforms in particular are multi-
sided markets, connecting many more stakeholders, than just platform owner,
users/buyers and developers/sellers. As was described in section 2.2, mobile opera-
tors, content providers, advertisers and many more other participants contribute
and depend on mobile ecosystems around app platforms. These stakeholder can
have significant impact on the mobile ecosystem, platform owner decisions and
pricing strategies. Although we refrained from including further stakeholders in our
models to avoid further complexity, we believe that it would be a great opportunity
for future research to include these stakeholders in two-sided market models and
thereby develop a real multi-sided model.
One of the most interesting opportunities for future research consists in
conducting empirical surveys and evaluating how models presented here fit to
existing real platforms. Empirical research can be used to estimate parameter
values for the developed models. This would enable a realistic calculation of pricing
strategies. Also, it would help to test assumptions and hypotheses used in the
models. And finally, an empirical survey would allow us to see, if developers, users
and platform behavior “observed” in our Matlab simulations provide an adequate
representation of the real world.
5.4 Conclusion
On the whole, this thesis contributes to describing, analyzing and understanding
newly emerging app platforms, while at the same time extending two-sided market
theory. The three research papers represent three different approaches, relying on
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different mathematical backgrounds and methodologies. This allows us to elucidate
different parts of the app platform industry and two-sided markets theory. Also, it
helps to compensate for limitations connected with each methodology.
The first research paper introduces a new two-sided market model and a
solution for it as its centerpiece. The new model introduces parameters necessary
to reflect the app platform structure, and it also combines all these parameters in
one integrated model. The methodology behind this model is totally rigorous, still
allowing for a closed-form solution, despite the number of introduced parameters.
But this model, as the majority of two-sided market models, is build for static
environments. However, app platforms are exhibiting strong and non-linear dynamic
and are prone to disruptions. Therefore, a static model is not sufficient to provide
valid long-term strategies for app platform.
Based on this observation, in addition reinforced by the fact, that there is a
rising appetite for dynamic models in two-sided market theory itself, we develop a
dynamic model for app platforms to compensate for these limitations. The second
research paper builds on optimal control, optimization, differential and differences
game theory and system dynamics. Moreover, in this research paper we revert to
Matlab simulations to provide insights for the dynamic case.
The dynamic model at hand provides several insights which were not pos-
sible with the static model. For instance, it suggests, how many participants on
both market sides are needed to start of a platform. Also, it shows how prices
should be adjusted if a competitor enters the market or other disruptions occur.
Clearly, simulations are not as rigorous as closed-form solutions, since they rely on
assumptions regarding appropriate parameter ranges.
The need for research paper III results from the observation that two-sided
market literature should have the aspiration to provide insights for the underlying
industries. Two-sided market theory belongs to Industrial Organization research,
and therefore, one of its main objectives is to provide insights for various industries,
not only developing economic models. Following this aspiration, in the third
research paper we focus on analyzing app platform industry based on the two-sided
markets theory and platform management theory (cf. Gawer and Cusumano,
2007, 2008). Research paper III aims at identifying key challenges and developing
strategies to mitigate these.
As discussed in the previous section, there are many interesting avenues for
future research. They include introduction of new parameters and inclusion of
new stakeholders. Furthermore, usage and comparison of different mathematical
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approaches might provide interesting insights. Empirical approach would be also a
promising avenue for future research.
We believe that the combination of the approaches applied in the three
research papers at hand, provides a better overview and understanding of the app
platform industry, than each individual one. They elucidate different aspects of
app platforms and at the same time contribute to different research areas and show
how these can be connected to develop new insights.
Bibliography
[1] Ahonen, T.T. (2010). Blog available at http://communities-dominate.blogs.
com/brands/2010/06.
[2] Allan, A. (2010) Learning iPhone Programming. O’Reilly.
[3] American Dialect Society (2011) “App” 2010 Word of the Year, as
voted by American Dialect Society. Press release, January 7, 2011. Avail-
able at http://www.americandialect.org/American-Dialect-Society-
2010-Word-of-the-Year-PRESS-RELEASE.pdf.
[4] Developer Android (2013) Available at http://developer.android.com/
distribute/googleplay/quality/index.html.
[5] AndroLib (2010) Available at www.androlib.com/appstats.aspx.
[6] Apple (2010) Apple Keynote Address at the Worldwide Developer Conference,
June 2010. Available at http://www.apple.com/apple-events/.
[7] Apple (2011) Apple Keynote Address at the Worldwide Developer Conference,
June 2011. Available at http://www.apple.com/apple-events/.
[8] Apple (2012) Apple Special Event, October 2012. Available at http://www.
apple.com/apple-events/.
[9] Apple (2013) iOS developer program. Available at https://developer.apple.
com/programs/ios/distribute.html.
[10] Armstrong, M. (2006) Competition in two-sided markets. The RAND Journal
of Economics, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2006, pp. 668–691.
[11] Armstrong, M., Wright, J. (2007) Two-sided markets, competitive bottlenecks
and exclusive contracts. Economic Theory, Vol. 32, pp. 353–380.
71
72
[12] Basole, R.C., Karla, J. (2011) On the evolution of mobile platform ecosystem
structure and strategy. Business and Information System Engineering, Vol. 5,
pp. 313–322.
[13] Baumol, W., Panzer, J., Willig, R. (1982) Contestable markets and the theory
of industry structure. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
[14] Belleflamme, P., Peitz, M. (2010) Industrial Organization: Markets and Strate-
gies. Cambridge University Press.
[15] Bolt, W., Tieman, A.F. (2005) Skewed Pricing in Two-Sided Markets: An IO
approach. SSRN Working paper. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
665103orhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.665103.
[16] Businessdictionary (2013). Available at www.businessdictionary.com.
[17] Cabral, L. (2011) Dynamic Price Competition with Network Effects. Review
of Economic Studies, Vol. 78, pp. 83–111.
[18] Caillaud, B., Jullien, B. (2003) Chicken & egg: competition among inter-
mediation service providers. The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, pp.
309–328.
[19] Canalys (2010) Canalys research release February 4.
[20] Canalys (2012) Canalys research release August 2.
[21] Carew, S. (2009) In app store war, BlackBerry, Google hold own, 22 April
2009. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/
idUSTRE53L5DK20090422.
[22] Choi, J.P. (2010) Tying in two-sided markets with multi-homing. The Journal
of Industrial Economics, Vol. 58, No. 3, pp. 607–626.
[23] Coase, R.H. (1960) The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics,
Vol. 3, pp. 1–44.
[24] Cohen, P. (2009) App Store counts 1.5 billion downloads in first year, 14 July
2009. Availalble at http://www.macworld.com/article/1141679/appstore.
html.
[25] comScore Reports (July 2010) U.S. Mobile Subscriber Market Share. Avail-
able at http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2010/9/
comScore_Reports_July_2010_U.S._Mobile_Subscriber_Market_Share.
73
[26] Crothers, B. (2010) Apple’s iPad: Disruptive product of the year, 31 De-
cember 2010. Available at http://news.cnet.com/8301-13924_3-20026877-
64.html.
[27] Distimo (2012) App stores. Available at http://www.distimo.com/
appstores/.
[28] Dockner, E., Jorgensen, S., Van Long, N., Sorger, G. (2000) Differential games
in economics and management science. Cambridge University Press.
[29] Duryee, T. (2009) Nokia Had Only 10 Million Ovi Downloads In First Three
Months. Availble at http://paidcontent.org/2009/09/03/419-nokia-had-
only-10-million-ovi-downloads-in-first-three-months.
[30] Duryee, T. (2009) BlackBerry Takes Larger Cut Of Developer Revenues In Up-
dated App World. Available at http://paidcontent.org/2010/08/20/419-
blackberry-takes-larger-cut-of-developer-revenues-in-updated-
app-world/.
[31] Eisenmann, T. (2007) Managing Proprietary and Shared Platforms: A Life-
Cycle View. Harvard Business School Working Paper #07-105. Available
at http://www.marketplatforms.com/mpd/Uploads/Life%20Cycle%20HBS%
20WP.pdf.
[32] Eisenmann, T., Parker, G., van Alstyne, M. (2006): Strategies for Two-Sided
Markets. Harvard Business Review, October.
[33] Eisenmann, T., Parker, G., van Alstyne, M. (2007), Platform envelopment.
Harvard Business School Working Paper # 07-104. Available at http://www.
marketplatforms.com/mpd/Uploads/Envelopment%20HBS%20WP.pdf.
[34] Encyclopedia Britannica (2012). Available at http://www.britannica.com/.
[35] Essers, L. (2012) Apple increases App Store prices in Europe. October
26, 2012. Available at http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9232940/
Apple_increases_App_Store_prices_in_Europe.
[36] Evans, D.S. (2003) Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-sided Platform Industries.
Review of Network Economics, Vol. 2, Issue 3, pp. 191–209.
[37] Evans, D.S. (2011) Platform Economics: Essays on Multi-Sided Businesses.
Competition Policy International (CPI).
74
[38] Evans, D.S., Hagiu, A., Schmalensee, R. (2006) Invisible engines – how software
platforms drive innovation and transform industries. The MIT Press.
[39] Farago, P., (2011) App Developers Bet on iOS over Android this Holiday
Season. December 13. Available at http://blog.flurry.com/bid/79061/App-
Developers-Bet-on-iOS-over-Android-this-Holiday-Season.
[40] Farell, J., Saloner, G. (1985) Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation.
Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 70–83.
[41] Farell, J., Saloner, G. (1986) Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation,
Product Preannouncements, and Predation. The American Economic Review,
Vol. 76, No. 5, pp. 940–955.
[42] Foresman, C. (2011) “Apple denied preliminary injunction against Amazon’s
“Appstore”. 7 July 2011. Available at http://arstechnica.com/apple/
2011/07/apples-preliminary-injunction-against-amazons-appstore-
denied/.
[43] Furchgott, R. (2009) “Nokia’s App Store Launches With a Hiccup”, 29 May.
Available at http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/29/nokias-
app-store-launches-with-a-hiccup.
[44] Ganapati, P. (2009) “BlackBerry App Store Gets a Name”, 4 March. Available
at http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2009/03/blackberry-app.
[45] Gartner (2009) Gartner report on mobile phones.
[46] Gartner (2012) Gartner report on mobile phones.
[47] Gartner (2013a) Gartner Says Worldwide Mobile Phone Sales Declined 1.7
Percent in 2012, 13 February 2013. Available at http://www.gartner.com/
newsroom/id/2335616.
[48] Gartner (2013b) Forecast: Mobile App Stores, Worldwide, 2013 Update,
Gartner Research Report, Gartner, Inc.
[49] Gasse´e, J.-L. (2012) Nokia: three big problems for deposed king of mo-
bile phones. 23 April. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/
2012/apr/23/monday-note-nokia.
75
[50] Gawer, A., Cusumano, M.A. (2007): A strategy toolkit for platform leader
wannabes. Working paper, presented at the DRUID summer conference
2007. Available at http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=
1221&cf=9.
[51] Gawer, A., Cusumano, M.A. (2008) How Companies Become Platform Leaders.
MIT Sloan Management Review, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 27–35.
[52] GfK (2010) GfK Research: New Consumer Mindset Driving Smartphone
Products and Services Purchases. GfK press release. Available at http://
www.gfk.com/imperia/md/content/presse/pressemeldungen2010/ctia_-
_new_consumer_mindset_press_release__final__2_.pdf.
[53] GigaOM Pro (2010) Mobile App Developer Survey. Available at
http://pro.gigaom.com/2010/11/mobile-app-developer-survey-
profiles-platforms-and-monetization/.
[54] Global Intelligence Alliance (2010) Mobile applications: native Web
apps – what are the pros and cons? http://www.globalintelligence.
com/insights-analysis/articles/mobile-applications-native-v-web-
apps-what-are-the/read-online.
[55] Hagel, J. and Brown, J.S. (2010) New technologies and companies. Financial
Times, 22 September.
[56] Hagiu, A. (2009) Quantity vs. quality and exclusion by two-sided platforms.
Harvard Business School, Working paper #09-094.
[57] Hagiu, A., Wright, J. (2011) Multi-sided platforms. Harvard Business School,
Working paper #12-024.
[58] IDC (2012) IDC Worldwide Quarterly Media Tablet Tracker.
[59] Jeon, D.-S., Rochet, J.-C. (2010) The pricing of academic journals: a two-sided
market perspective. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 2, No.
2, pp. 222–255.
[60] Jobs, S. (2010) Thoughts on Flash. Available at www.apple.com/hotnews/
thoughts-on-flash.
[61] Jullien, B. (2012) Two-sided B to B platforms. In: The Oxford Handbook
of the Digital Economy. Editors: Peitz, M., Waldfogel, J., Oxford University
Press.
76
[62] Katz, M.L. and Shapiro, C. (1985) Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility. The American Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 3, pp. 424–440.
[63] Katz, M.L. and Shapiro, C. (1986) Technology Adoption in the Presence of
Network Externalities. The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp.
822–841.
[64] Kent, J. (May 3, 2011) Revenue for Major Mobile App Stores
to Rise 77.7 Percent in 2011. http://www.isuppli.com/media-
research/news/pages/revenue-for-major-mobile-app-stores-to-rise-
77-7-percent-in-2011.aspx.
[65] Krueger, M. (2009) The Elasticity Pricing Rule for Two-sided Markets: A
Note. Review of Network Economics, Vol. 8, Issue 3, pp. 271–278.
[66] Kumar, R., Lifshits, Y., Tomkins, A. (2010) Evolution of Two-Sided Markets.
WSDM ’10 Proceedings of the third ACM international conference on Web
search and data mining.
[67] Lee, R. (2010) Dynamic Demand Estimation in Platform and Two-Sided
Markets. Working paper, New York University.
[68] MacMillan, D., Burrows, P., and Ante, S.E. (2009) Cover Story: Inside the
App Economy. Bloomberg Businessweek, October 22.
[69] MacNN (2008) Apple files for MacRuby, App Store & Finder trademarks,
22 July 2008. Available at http://www.macnn.com/blogs/2008/07/22/apple-
files-for-macruby-app-store-finder-trademarks.html.
[70] Meier, R. (2010) Professional Android 2 Application Development. Wiley
Publishing, Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana.
[71] Newel, D. (March 23rd, 2011) Developing Mobile Apps for Multiple Plat-
forms. Available at http://www.getelastic.com/developing-mobile-apps-
for-multiple-platforms/.
[72] Oxford Dictionary (2012). Available at oxforddictionaries.com.
[73] Paczkowski, J. (2010) Apple Unveils New iPods, iTunes Social Network,
Video Rentals. Available at http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughts-on-
flash/.
77
[74] Parker, G., van Alstyne, M. (2009) Six Challenges in Platform Licensing and
Open Innovation, Communications & strategies, 74, pp. 17–36. Available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1559013.
[75] Pickenhain, S., Lykina, V. (2006), Sufficiency conditions for infinite horizon
optimal control problems. In: Recent Advances in Optimization. Editor: Seeger,
A., Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 563, pp. 217–232,
Springer.
[76] Pickenhain, S., Lykina, V., Wagner, M. (2006) Lebesgue and improper Riemann
integrals in infinite horizon optimal control problems. Control and Cybernet.
37, pp. 451–468.
[77] Prosper Mobile Insights (2011), Android vs iPhone/iOS: Quick Facts. http:
//www.bianor.com/blog/android-vs-iphone-ios-quick-facts.
[78] Rochet, J.-C., Tirole, J. (2003) Platform competition in two-sided markets.
Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 990–1029.
[79] Rochet, J.-C., Tirole, J. (2006) Two-sided markets: a progress report. The
RAND Journal of economics, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 645–667.
[80] Rysman, M. (2004) Competition between Networks: A Study of the Market
for Yellow Pages. The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 71, No. 2, pp. 483–512.
[81] Rysman, M. (2009) The Economics of Two-Sided Markets. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp 125–143.
[82] Sage, S. (2010) RIM Q1 2010 Results – 100 Millionth Black-
Berry Served, 24% Revenue Increase Year over Year. Available at
http://www.intomobile.com/2010/06/25/rim-q1-2010-results-100-
millionth-blackberry-served-24-revenue-increase-year-over-year.
[83] Schoen, R. (2006) Dynamic population models. Springer.
[84] Scott, J. (2012) Apple’s App Store metrics. Available at www.148apps.biz.
[85] Shapiro, C., Varian, H.R. (1999) Information rules: a strategic guide to the
network economy. Harvard Business School Press. Boston, Massachusetts.
[86] Sokullu, S. (2010) Nonparametric Analysis of Two-Sided Market. Working
paper.
78
[87] Steiner, I. (2010) eBay announces fee changes, will eliminate store format. Avail-
able at http://www.ecommercebytes.com/C/abblog/blog.pl?/pl/2010/1/
1264511669.html.
[88] Sun, M. (2006) Dynamic network platform competition in two-sided markets.
Dissertation. Stanford University.
[89] Sun, M., Tse, E. (2007) When does the winner take all in two-sided markets?
Review of Network Economics, Vol. 5, Issue 1, pp. 16–40.
[90] Tag, J. (2008) Essays on platforms – business strategies, regulation and policy
in telecommunications, media and technology industries. Ekonomi och samha¨lle,
# 188.
[91] Riley, G. (2010) Smartphones and Apps – Complementary Demand. Avail-
able at http://www.tutor2u.net/blog/index.php/economics/comments/
smartphones-and-apps-complementary-demand.
[92] Virki, T. (2012) Nokia buys Norwegian startup Smarterphone for low-
end push. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/06/us-
nokia-acquisition-idUSTRE8051OJ20120106.
[93] Vogelsang, M. (2010) Dynamics of Two-sided Internet Markets. International
Economics and Economic Policy, Vol. 7, pp. 129–145.
[94] Williams, M. (2012) Apple-Samsung patent battle now in jury’s hands. 21
August. Available at http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9230483/
Apple_Samsung_patent_battle_now_in_jury_39_s_hands.
[95] Wilson, R. B. (1993) Non-linear Pricing. Oxford University Press.
[96] Wolverton, T. (2000) Apple licenses Amazon’s 1-Click. Available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20110616040418/http://news.cnet.com/
2100-1017-245879.html.
[97] Zheng, P. and Ni, L.M. (2006) Smart phone & next generation mobile com-
puting. Elsevier.
Part II
Research papers
79
1Paper I: An Integrated Two-sided
Market Model for Internet
Platforms
Abstract
On two-sided markets, a platform intermediates between two distinct groups of
customers linked by network effects. Over the last decade, a large body of literature
on theoretical as well as applied aspects of two-sided markets has been published,
for example, Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Evans
(2003) and Armstrong (2006), to name just a few. At the same time, newly launched
Internet platforms such as Apple’s App Store call for new extensions and provide
motivation for the further development of two-sided market models. This is the
area of research to which this paper contributes. The objectives of this study are:
i) the integration of prevalent parameters for monopoly two-sided markets models
(like usage fees, membership fees, payment between customer groups, quality review
of participants) into one model; ii) the introduction of new parameters such as
commission fee, the segmentation of participants and adjustments for the number
of interactions, and iii) development of a solution for the new model. Subsequently,
we demonstrate how the integrated model can be applied to model app distribution
platforms like Apple’s App Store.
Keywords: Two-sided market, platform, app, mobile software distribution
platform.
JEL classification numbers: L8, L81, L82, L86, L96.
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1.1 Introduction
Over the last decade, platforms have become the “invisible engines” (cf. Evans et
al., 2006) of our economics. Amazon, eBay and Google have advanced to the top
brands worldwide.1 One of the key aspects of these companies’ business models
is their intermediary role. Instead of producing goods themselves they connect
two distinct groups of customers – sellers and buyers, developers and users, men
and women, who can profit from each other.2 New challenges arise in the area of
platform design (pricing strategy, quantity vs. quality of participants) and platform
competition (e.g., the winner-takes-all dynamics, open source vs. proprietary
design, emergence of new players like wholesalers). Two-sided market theory can
help us both better understand and overcome these challenges, while also being an
interesting research area on its own.
This paper is devoted to the two-sided market models for monopoly platforms.
We integrate prevalent parameters (such as usage fees, membership fees, payment
between customer groups, quality review of participants) that have been proposed
in different papers on two-sided markets into one model. Furthermore, we introduce
three new parameters: i) commission fee, which is proportional to payment between
customer groups, ii) segmentation of participants and iii) adjustments for the
number of interactions. Finally, we develop a solution for a integrated model.
Hence, the resulting model integrates all prevalent parameters of the monopoly
two-sided markets models into one so they can all be considered simultaneously.
The paper is organized as follows: Following a brief introduction to two-sided
market theory in the next section, we discuss the canonical two-sided market model
of Rochet and Tirole (2003) for a monopoly platform with usage fees (Section 1.3).
Next, possible extensions of this model are considered (Section 1.4). Some of them
are new and some have already been discussed in the literature. The parameters that
have already been identified include membership fees (cf. Armstrong, 2006, Rochet
and Tirole, 2006), payments between customer groups (cf. Rochet and Tirole, 2006),
and quality review of participants (cf. Hagiu, 2009, Jeon and Rochet, 2010). The
new extensions are commission fees, segmentation of participants and adjustments
for the number of interactions between customer groups. Commission payment
dependent on payment between customer groups is crucial for such platforms as the
1Cf. www.interbrand.com.
2For an introduction to the intermediary theory, see Peitz and Belleflamme (2010).
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App Store or eBay, since it allows to take into account high variation of prices for
goods sold over these platforms. Customer segmentation allows us to set different
prices for the different customers on the same market side. Adjustment of the
number of interactions reflects the fact that it is unusual for all participants on one
side of the market to interact with all participants on the other side, as is often
assumed in the literature (cf. Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006, Caillaud and Jullien,
2003, Armstrong, 2006, Tag, 2008). We introduce a two-step adjustment: first, we
calculate how many “scannings”3 there are and then assume that only a fraction
of these “scannings” actually leads to an interaction.
In Section 1.5 all parameters are integrated into one model. The main
contribution of the integrated model is that it allows consideration of all parameters
simultaneously. We then apply the methodology of Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006)
and Armstrong (2006) to derive a solution for the new model (Section 1.6). The
solution represents a general case of the underlying models, so the price level
equation resembles Lerner’s index and the allocation of fees is proportional to the
price elasticities up to a certain factor. Key differences compared to Rochet and
Tirole (2003) include an increased number of equations due to segmentation and
correction terms for the proportionality of fees to the price elasticities. Subsequently,
we show how the integrated model can be applied to model app distribution
platforms like Apple’s App Store (Section 1.7). A discussion of the results and
conclusion follow in Section 1.8.
1.2 Two-sided markets
The following rough definition can be provided for the two-sided markets: two-sided
markets are platforms that enable interaction between two groups of customers who
value each other’s presence (cf. Rochet and Tirole 2003, Evans 2003, Tag 2008).
The underlying phenomenon is called “indirect externalities”: The utility on the
one side of the market increases with the number (and/or quality) of participants
on the other side.4 Examples of platforms that can be interpreted as two-sided
3By “scanning” we mean a situation in which one participant gathers information about other
participants, but the interaction has not yet taken place.
4For a precise definition of two-sided markets, see Rochet and Tirole (2006) and Hagiu and
Wright (2011).
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markets range from credit card systems and software platforms to night clubs and
shopping malls.
The platform owner is confronted with two different groups of customers with
corresponding demand functions that are interdependent. To set prices (and other
parameters like quality requirements) properly, the platform owner has to maximize
joint profit from both market sides simultaneously. The theory of two-sided markets
provides models and solutions to deal with this challenge. Due to the diversity of
two-sided market examples, various extensions are needed to describe different kinds
of platforms. In this study, we integrate all prevalent extensions that have already
been discussed in the literature and propose a new combination of parameters that
can be used to model platforms like Amazon, eBay and Apple’s App Store.
The research on two-sided markets builds on network economics and comple-
mentary product pricing.5 Since the first papers by Rochet and Tirole, and Calliaud
and Jullien started circulating aroung 2001, a large body of literature on two-sided
markets has emerged, for example, Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006), Caillaud and
Jullien (2003), Evans (2003) and Armstrong (2006). The main directions of the
two-sided market research have included:
• Introduction of new extensions for the static monopoly model (e.g., Armstrong
(2006) on membership fees, Hagiu (2009), Jeon and Rochet (2010) on quality
preference of participants);
• Investigation of static duopoly as opposed to monopoly and the development of
various extensions for it (e.g., Armstrong (2006) on “competitive bottlenecks”,
Choi (2010) on tying and multi-homing, Tag (2008) on comparison of open
and closed platforms);
• Introduction of dynamic view (e.g., Lee (2010) on dynamic demand estimation,
Kumar, Lifshits and Tomkins (2010) on evolution of two-sided markets,
Vogelsang (2010) on representation of dynamic with the help of differential
equations);
• Conducting of empirical research on two-sided markets (e.g., evaluation of the
indirect network effects by Rysman (2004), Sokullu (2010) on non-parametric
analysis of two-sided markets).
5Cf. Rochet and Tirole (2003), for the early works, see Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986), Farell
and Saloner (1985, 1986), Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
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The emphasis has clearly been on the first two directions – development of
extensions for cases of monopoly and duopoly. The majority of studies investigate
one extension at a time: They either consider the impact of the preference for
quality or payments by the two market sides, or for usage / membership fees.
Hence, in order to analyze various features, several different models are needed and
it is not possible to consider all extensions simultaneously and determine how they
influence each other.
The first objective of this paper, namely the integration of parameters in one
model, arises from this observation. The second objective of this paper follows
from the fact that two further extensions exist which could be crucial for real world
platforms. The first consists of adjustment of the number of interactions. The
second includes the introduction of the segmentation of participants of one market
side.
Less attention has been given to the last two aspects – the dynamic view and
the empirical research of two-sided markets – in the past, but they are gaining in
popularity. They are especially important for the application of two-sided market
theory and provide promising directions for future research.
1.3 Canonical two-sided market model
This section is devoted to the canonical two-sided market model of Rochet and
Tirole (2003). This model conveys the key idea of two-sided markets, namely the
indirect network effects. At the same time, it is not too complicated and provides
the common denominator for several two-sided market models. This property is
crucial, since this study’s objective is to integrate all prevalent extensions into
one model. In the following, we describe the model of Rochet and Tirole (2003).
We begin with general assumptions and a model description. Then we describe
customer utility functions and proceed with platform profit and its maximization.
The model of Rochet and Tirole (2003) was motivated by credit card systems.
The authors include usage fees pB and pS as decision parameters for both market
sides in the canonical model and take into account costs per interaction for the
platform c.
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1.3.1 General assumptions
Rochet and Tirole (2003) consider a monopoly platform that intermediates between
two customer groups i ∈ {B, S}. These could be buyers and sellers, developers
and users, or men and women. We follow the authors and name one market side
B for “buyers” and the other side S for “sellers”. The two market sides want to
interact with each other and profit from the presence of the other side. The more
participants there are on the one side of the market, the more choices the other side
has, and the higher its utility. It is assumed that there are no congestion costs or
search costs. Both market sides experience indirect network effects. The platform
owner enables interactions between the two market sides and obtains payments for
this service. There is no other way for the two customer groups to interact except
via the platform. This assumption implies that other possible opportunities and
their costs and benefits can be neglected.
The timing of decisions in the canonical model are as follows: First, the
platform owner sets her fees. Then participants of the two customer groups
calculate their utility based on these fees and decide whether to join the platform
or not. The second decision the customers take pertains to interaction with the
other side. At this point, Rochet and Tirole (2003) assume that every customer on
the one side interacts with every customer on the other side as soon as they join
the platform. Hence, this decision is automated.
Rochet and Tirole (2003) assume that no fixed costs or benefits are incurred.
There is total transparency regarding pricing structure, costs and utilities. Based
on these assumptions, the platform owner can predict the reactions of platform
participants and can set her prices in the optimal way to maximize her profit. The
next sections are devoted to this procedure.
1.3.2 Customer group utility
The utility of customers on a platform may stem from two sources: First, their
participation in the platform, and second, platform usage. For instance, if you are
a member of a fitness club, you might obtain benefits from belonging to it (the
feeling of being in better shape), even if you never actually use the club’s facilities.
In other cases, usage is the main source of customers’ utility, for instance, as it is
with credit cards. Taking such considerations into account, the platform owner
can decide what type of fees – usage and/or membership fees – to charge. Rochet
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and Tirole (2003) assume that there are no membership fees, only usage fees pB
and pS.6 This means that the platform obtains a total fee p = pB + pS when a
customer from one market side interacts with a customer from the other, whereby
the seller pays pS and the buyer pB.
Furthermore, there are benefits, that are derived from interactions bi. These
can vary among customers, that is, customers are assumed to be heterogeneous.
The number of customers participating in the platform is denoted by N i. Only those
customers whose benefit per interaction bi is higher than the cost per interaction
will be willing to participate in the platform:
N i = Pr(bi ≥ pi) ≡ Di(pi). (1.3.1)
Di(pi) is the demand function of the group i. It depends on the usage fee
pi. Rochet and Tirole (2003) assume that each participant on the market side i
interacts with each participant on the market side j exactly once.7 Therefore, the
utility of a market participant equals the surplus per interaction multiplied by the
number of interactions, which is identical with the number of participants on the
other market side:
U i = (bi − pi)N j. (1.3.2)
The utilities are assumed to be symmetrical for both market sides. The utility
U i of participants on the one market side depends on the number of participants
N j on the other side j and this is a manifestation of the indirect network effects.
1.3.3 Platform’s profit maximization
The aim of the platform is to maximize its profit through optimal price setting
and the allocation of fees. In Rochet and Tirole (2003), the platform has to set
usage fees that attract as many participants as possible from both market sides.
Due to the indirect network effects, the platform has to consider both market sides
6Clearly, there are many two-sided markets to which this assumption does not apply. In the
integrated model, membership fees is one of the extensions that will be taken into account based
on the work of Armstrong (2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2006).
7For many two-sided markets, this assumption is not realistic. The adjustment of the number
of interactions is one of the new extensions introduced in Section 1.4.
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simultaneously and take the aforementioned dependence between the two market
sides into account.
The profit sources for the platform are limited to the usage fees from interac-
tions, since no membership fees are charged. The margin per interaction amounts
to p− c = pB + pS − c with c costs for the platform per interaction. The number
of interactions is the power set DB(pB)DS(pS) which consists of the number of
participants on each market side. This is the implication of the assumption that
each participant of the market side i interacts with each participant of the market
side j exactly once.
Rochet and Tirole (2003) obtain the following profit equation for the platform:
pi = (pB + pS − c)DB(pB)DS(pS). (1.3.3)
This equation completes the canonical model of Rochet and Tirole (2003). A
schematic illustration of the model including utility and profit functions is presented
in Figure 1.1. The arrows represent the flows of usage fees and benefits between
the platform and its customers.
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Platform
Buyer (B)Seller (S)
Figure 1.1: Sketch of the key determinants of the canonical model of Rochet and
Tirole (2003).
The solution of this equation is provided in the following proposition:8
8Cf. proposition 1, p. 997 in Rochet and Tirole (2003).
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Proposition 1.1. 1. The total usage fee p = pB + pS charged by the platform
is given by the following equation:
p− c
p
=
1
η
, (1.3.4)
with η = ηB + ηS being total price elasticity, including ηB = − pB
DB
∂DB
∂pB
,
ηS = − pS
DS
∂DS
∂pS
price elasticity of buyers and sellers accordingly.
2. The allocation of usage fees is proportional to the price elasticities:
pB
pS
=
ηB
ηS
. (1.3.5)
Proof. In this proof we follow Rochet and Tirole (2003, pp. 996-997). Since we
will apply the same methods in Section 1.6 for the integrated model, it is helpful
to review this proof in detail.
The first step consists of logarithmizing the platform profit function pi.9 We
obtain:
log pi = log(pB + pS − c) + logDB(pB) + logDS(pS) (1.3.6)
Then the first derivative is taken and set to zero:
∂(log pi)
∂pB
=
1
pB + pS − c +
(DB)′
DB
= 0, (1.3.7)
∂(log pi)
∂pS
=
1
pB + pS − c +
(DS)′
DS
= 0. (1.3.8)
This yields:
(DB(pB))′
DB(pB)
=
(DS(pS))′
DS(pS)
.
From the last equation it follows that the usage fees pB and pS should be
chosen such that their relative variation has the same effect on both market sides.
Next, Rochet and Tirole (2003, p. 996) introduce price elasticities:
ηB = −p
B(DB)′
DB
und ηS = −p
S(DS)′
DS
. (1.3.9)
9We only consider the log-concave functions DB and DS . Hence, pi is also log-concave as a
product of two log-concave functions. The profit function pi can thus be logarithmized without
change of extrema.
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Hence, from equations 1.3.7 and 1.3.8 follows:
pB + pS − c = (D
B)′
DB
=
pB
ηB
=
(DS)′
DS
=
pS
ηS
Therefore, for the total usage fee p = pB + pS and total price elasticity
η = ηB + ηS with η > 1, the following equation holds:
p− c
p
=
1
η
, or p =
η
η − 1c, (1.3.10)
which is also referred to as Lerner’s index. For the allocation of usage fees to
the two market sides, We obtain:
pB =
ηB
η
p =
ηB
η − 1c,
and
pS =
ηS
η
p =
ηS
η − 1c.
This yields:
pB
ηB
=
pS
ηS
. (1.3.11)
The first statement of the proposition relates to the total price per interaction
charged by the platform. Equation 1.3.4 reminds us of Lerner’s index known from
the monopoly theory, with the difference that the firm’s marginal cost is replaced
by cost per interaction c. Usually, Lerner’s index indicates the firm’s market power.
The second part of the proposition specifies how the total fee p should be
divided between the market sides to achieve the highest possible platform profit.
Equation 1.3.5 suggests that the market side with more elastic demand should be
charged more.10
10This might seem to contradict demand theory where prices have to be cut if demand is more
elastic in order to maintain the same demand level. As Krueger (2009) shows, there is actually
no contradiction if elasticity is understood as a function of price and not as a constant.
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1.4 Extensions for the canonical model
In the following, we describe the extension parameters and how they can be
integrated into the canonical model of Rochet and Tirole (2003). We begin
with established parameters like membership fees, payment between market sides,
and preference for quality. Subsequently, we introduce three new parameters
– commission fees, segmentation and adjustment of the number of interactions.
Unless stated otherwise, all assumptions made in the previous sections (such as
consumer heterogeneity and decision timing) remain the same.
1.4.1 Transaction fees and membership fees
In the canonical model of Rochet and Tirole (2003), it is assumed that the average
fees per interaction pB and pS are equal to the usage fees aB and aS, that is,
the platform does not charge any membership fees.11 But for some platforms,
membership fees AB and AS are crucial. Some platforms only charge membership
fees, some prefer a combination of usage and membership fees. One example are
dating service sites, where interactions are not entirely observable for the platform
and membership fees are therefore the better option for financing the service.
Membership fees are described in the papers of Armstrong (2006), Rochet and
Tirole (2006) and Vogelsang (2010).
In the utility functions of sellers and buyers, membership fees appear as costs.
We assume that there are also corresponding benefits BB and BS from membership,
which come in addition to the benefits from interactions bB and bS.
Compared to the basic model, the key difference for the platform profit
function is that besides profit from the interactions (determined by equation 1.3.3),
two new components are introduced: Profit from the membership of buyers and
profit from the membership of sellers. Profit from membership is represented by
the number of members and membership fees minus membership costs, which is
(AB − CB)NB for buyers and (AS − CS)NS for sellers.
11We assume that usage fees are denoted by aB and aS , membership fees by AB and ASk , and
average fees, which include usage fees and a proportional share of membership fees, by pB and pS .
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1.4.2 Review process and quality of participants
As mentioned before, the utility of one market side depends on the number of
participants on the other market side. Besides the amount of participants, their
quality might also play a role. One of the most prominent examples in which the
quality of participants is crucial are partner search agencies. Agencies such as
Parship.com or Elitepartner.com charge high membership fees. These fees are not
charged to cover costs, but serve primarily as a signal: An individual who is able to
pay such a high membership fee is probably wealthy and serious about his search
for a partner. Many partner search agencies check the potential participants and
might exclude someone even though he is willing to pay the high membership fee.
Another example of quality requirements on two-sided markets comes from the
computer console and game industry. Game developers pay high royalties to game
console producers. This is (at least partially) to ensure that low-quality games do
not become profitable.12
To date, the development of the two-sided market theory has focused on
pricing decision, as asserted by Hagiu:
“The economics and strategy literature on two-sided markets to date
has devoted most of its attention to two-sided pricing strategies (e.g.,
Armstrong (2006), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Parker and Van Alstyne
(2005), Rochet and Tirole (2003) and (2006)) and although some recent
papers have started to tackle certain design issues (cf. Hagiu and Jullien
(2009), Parker and Van Alstyne (2008)), there has been virtually no
formal work on two-sided platform governance rules and the factors
that drive two-sided platforms to restrict access beyond what they can
achieve through pricing alone.”
Hence, the quality of participants is an important parameter that can play
a crucial role for many platforms. Damiano and Li (2007, 2008) were among the
first to discuss the quality of participants. They consider matchmakers who induce
self-selection of participants through fee variations. Damiano and Li (2007) consider
a duopoly in which two platforms offer different prices. Since this study considers
a monopoly case and examines the quality impact within one platform, let us turn
to the two most relevant models by Hagiu (2009) and Jeon and Rochet (2010).
12Hagiu (2009).
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One possibility to restrict access to a platform is to introduce a lower bound
for the quality of participants and to exclude all participants from the platform
who lie beneath this boundary. This is how Hagiu (2009) and Jeon and Rochet
(2010) proceed.
Hagiu (2009) focuses on partner search agencies when he considers quality
requirements. He argues that quality sensitivity is not the same for both market
sides. Usually, one market side is not as sensitive as the other, for example, men
are said to be less “picky” about women than vice versa. Hagiu assumes that the
benefits of one side (W ) depend not only on the number of available participants
on the other side (M), but also on their quality. Hagiu (2009) begins by modeling
quality as a continuous distribution with a lower bound representing the minimum
required quality.
This model is based on membership fees and does not include usage fees.
But it considers both membership and usage benefits, assuming that for the side
W both types of fees depend on the average quality of participants on the side
M . In the following Hagiu (2009) writes the profit function of the platform as
a function of the minimum quality. Then he specifies quality distribution as a
Bernoulli distribution and separates cases for usage and membership benefits. The
main result of the analysis is that there is a trade-off between quality and quantity,
and therefore, the effect on platform profit is ambiguous.
Jeon and Rochet (2010) interpret scientific journals as two-sided markets.
They argue that journals are platforms which connect writers who want to publish
their papers and readers who want to read them. The quality of papers is the
crucial parameter that determines the price (and reputation) of the journal. The
quality of articles is determined in a review process in which the quality of an article
is compared with the minimum required quality. Jeon and Rochet (2010) assume
that usage benefit alone depends on the quality on a linear basis. Apart from that,
they proceed similarly to Hagiu (2009), assuming a Bernoulli distribution for the
papers.
A Bernoulli distribution implies that all participants are divided into two
groups, those with high quality qH and those with low quality qL, e.g., high-quality
men versus low-quality men. This can also be assumed for platforms like Apple’s
App Store. Once developers submit their apps for review, Apple divides them into
two groups: The first group’s apps are approved and can be distributed through
the App Store, while the second group’s are rejected and the group thus does not
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obtain access to the app platform. Sometimes quality is perceived as a subjective
characteristic. Apple claims that it only rejects apps which contain malware, viruses,
and errors, as well as apps that do not do what they promise in the description
or replicate apps that are already available in the App Store.13 Apple accepts
most apps that pass these criteria and leaves it to their customers to decide on the
usefulness of the apps, to rate them and provide evaluations for the apps.14
We adopt the approach of Hagiu (2009) and Jeon and Rochet (2010) and
integrate quality preference for one customer side. Furthermore, we assume a
Bernoulli distribution for the quality of participants. All sellers S are separated
into two groups: There are νNS high quality (qH) and (1− ν)NS low quality (qL)
participants. The platform can decide which share of each group it wants to accept
(βH , βL) ∈ {0, 1}, whereby only two cases are to be considered: The platform can
choose βH = 1, βL = 1 to accept all participants or βH = 1, βL = 0 to exclude low
quality participants. The average quality is determined by the following equation:
q(βH , βL) =
νβHqH + (1− ν)βLqL
νβH + (1− ν)βL . (1.4.1)
This will be taken into account in Section 1.6.
1.4.3 Commission dependent on payments between market
sides
Many Internet platforms like eBay, Amazon or App Store intermediate between two
market sides where one side wants to sell products to the other. These platforms
charge commissions depending on the success and price of products sold. Assume
that the price of a given product equals r and that the platform claims the (1− γ)r
share of the product’s price as commission. The seller side obtains the remaining
rγ. In this case, payment from the buyer to the seller is a crucial part of the utility
equation of buyers and sellers and will affect the amount and allocation of fees they
are willing to pay.
13For a detailed description of the review rules, compare http://developer.apple.com/
appstore/.
14Another possibility for ensuring high quality consists in reviewing sellers instead of (or in
addition to) the products. This is how Nokia’s Ovi Store for app distribution proceeds. They
license developers before their apps proceed to Nokia’s Quality Assurance process (compare Heath
(2009).
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Payment between customer groups can play an important role for all platforms
where goods are sold from one market side to the other, not only for platforms
which charge commission. It is also possible that the payment between customer
groups is rγ = const as assumed in Rochet and Tirole (2006). We consider the
case where rγ is not necessarily constant, but may depend on price r of the good
sold. Usually, the platform charges a commission percentage of 1− γ. The price of
the good r can be determined by the seller or through an auction (e.g., as on eBay).
We assume that the price of goods offered on the platform follow a distribution R
with an average r.
One possible impact of the introduction of payments between market sides
is a (partial) neutralization of indirect network effects. If sellers determine the
prices themselves, they can influence the allocation of fees. Imagine if eBay decided
to charge 10% instead of 5% for successful sales. Sellers could then increase the
price of the product they are offering by 5%, shifting all the fees to the buyers.
Consequently, the number of buyers would go down in equilibrium. In a two-sided
market where the intermediary controls prices, she could keep the prices constant,
meaning that the sellers have to carry the extra costs.
The fact that the intermediary can determine the allocation of fees is central
for a market to be two-sided. Payments between the two market sides can therefore
potentially transform a two-sided market into a one-sided market. There are usually
some additional factors that prevent sellers from the full neutralization of indirect
network effects. These can, for instance, include membership fees that are difficult
to compensate for or price steps requirements for the goods being sold.15
1.4.4 Adjustments for the number of interactions
As mentioned in the previous section, the assumption that each participant on
one market side interacts with each participant of the other market side exactly
once is highly unrealistic for many platforms. That, for example, would mean that
each of the 125.000,000 iPhone owners would buy or download each of the 300,000
available apps.16 This would result in 37.500,000,000,000 downloads instead of
15Many app distribution platforms for mobile devices allow developers to determine app prices
but require the prices to assume certain values like USD 0.99, 1.49, 1.99, etc.
16All numbers as of November 2010, see 148apps.biz.
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the registered 7.000,000,000 downloads.17 Similar examples are available for other
platforms like Amazon or eBay.
In order to take into account that the number of interactions is much lower
than the power set of the number of participants on both market sides, we introduce
an adjustment. We assume that the interaction decision is a two-step process:
The first step is scanning for possible interaction partners by the buyers, and the
second step is the selection of partner(s) from the total scanned amount. The first
step leads to reduction of the number of potential partners from NS to f(NS).
f is supposed to be differentiable and have an inverse function.18 The second
step follows in which the buyer decides to either interact with the seller or not.
This decision is reflected through the probability variable X ≡ E[x(b, a)] with
x(b, a) ∈ [0, 1] being the probability of interaction. Rochet and Tirole (2006) suggest
introducing X to “prune” the power set. But if X is introduced without f , then
the number of interactions is still proportional to NBNS. Real world applications
suggest that this is seldom the case. Following the law of diminishing marginal
utility, the increase from 100 to 200 participants will have much more impact than
the increase from 100,100 to 100,200 participants. Therefore, we propose adding f
which reflects this.
Introduction of the adjustments X and f can also help to take into account
congestion effects on the sellers’ side and increasing searching costs for buyers. As
the number of sellers growths, they can attract more buyers. But later on, it can
happen, that number of sellers growths faster than the number of buyers. This
leads to a situation, where an individual seller make less and less profit, albeit the
number of users is still growing. In this case, congestion effect becomes visible. At
the same time, growing number of sellers implies growing number of goods. This
implies, on the one hand, more choice (which is positive from buyers point of view),
but on the other hand, it increases search cost (which is negative from buyers point
of view). Adjustment factors X and f can be set to reflect this, for instance, if a
non-linear function such as logistic function is used for f .
17It is possible to either consider the number of apps or the number of developers. In the case of
app platforms, the number of downloads belongs to standard KPIs (key performance indicators)
and is also the basis for utility and profit generation. Therefore, we consider the number of apps
here.
18For example, a function from the family of Sigmoids would be suitable, like the logistic
function f(x) = 11+expx or an algebraic version f(x) =
x√
1+x2
. For some platforms, root functions
might provide a suitable approximation.
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Hence, the total number of interactions for a participant from the side B
amounts to Xf(NS); the total number of interactions is XNBf(NS) as shown in
Figure 1.2. The number of interactions per seller is given by the total number of
interactions divided by the number of sellers:
XNBf(NS)
NS
. (1.4.2)
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Figure 1.2: Sketch of the power set NBNS and the reduction to NBf(NS) and
XNBf(NS).
1.4.5 Segmentation of participants
On two-sided markets, two distinct groups of customers interact with each other.
But the differences can occur not only between the two market sides, but also
within them. Again using app platforms as an example, users can be differentiated
according to the number of apps they download or according to the revenue they
induce. App developers might be divided into private, enterprise and non-profit
(e.g., universities). Such segmentations become relevant for the platform if it is
possible to charge participants from different segments different prices. And this
is precisely what Apple, for example, does: Apple distinguishes between different
types of developers and charges different membership fees accordingly. On the
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other hand, the users pay the same price for the apps and the same fees for the
platform, regardless to which segment they belong. Hence, no segmentation occurs
on the user side.
Following this example, we introduce the segmentation of participants for the
sellers’ market side only. We assume that it is possible to divide all sellers into L
groups, so that NS =
∑L
k=1N
S
k . Furthermore, membership fees A
S
k , membership
utility BSk , and the production cost Mk are assumed to differ between the segments.
Moreover, membership costs for the platform CSk may vary, since different customer
groups can require different customer service intensity, and so on. The remaining
parameters are assumed to be the same.
1.5 Utility and profit functions for the inte-
grated model
In this section, we introduce the key equations for the integrated model. We first
consider sellers’, and then buyers’ utility function. The equation for the platform’s
profit follows.
1.5.1 Sellers’ utility equation
To model developers, it suffices to construct their utility equation. Developers
have two sources of benefit: One that depends on the number of interactions
and one that does not. Benefit per interaction bS has already been mentioned.
It corresponds to the cost per interaction aS. Furthermore, payments are made
between the two market sides t = γr. These components have to be weighted with
the number of interactions per seller. As was mentioned in the previous section, the
number of interactions per seller equals XN
Bf(NS)
NS
, derived from the total number
of interactions divided by the number of sellers. All these components are assumed
to be equal across different segments.
Membership utility BSk does not depend on the number of interactions, nor
on membership fee ASk and production costs M
S
k . Membership utility is a benefit
that the market participant obtains, even if he does not interact with the other
market side. It can stem, for example, from the respect and recognition of others
(e.g., it might be considered trendy to be an “Apple developer” – even if one has
never sold an app through the App Store). We also assume that the seller incurs
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some form of costs MSk . These can, for example, comprise production costs or
development costs.
Membership-related parameters are assumed to differ for different segments.
Hence, the utility equations also depend on the segmentation:
USk = (B
S
k − ASk −Mk) + (bS − aS + γr)
XNBf(NS)
NS
. (1.5.1)
Clearly, only sellers with a positive utility will participate in the platform.
The key differences between the sellers’ utility function in the canonical model from
that in the integrated model are: First, the integrated model takes membership fees
ASk , membership benefits B
S
k , and production costs Mk into account, which differ
depending on the market segment; second, we introduce commission payments
γr between the two market sides, and third, we implement adjustments f and
X for the number of interactions per seller. The main structural differences that
influence mathematical handling are the additive term (BSk − ASk −Mk) and the
more complex expression for the number of interactions per seller XN
Bf(NS)
NS
.
1.5.2 Buyers’ utility equation
Similar to the sellers’ utility equation, the buyers’ utility equation also contains
factors that are dependent on and factors that are independent of the number
of interactions. The dependent factors include benefit per interaction bB, fee per
interaction aS, and additional payment r, of which γr goes to the seller and the
remaining (1− γ)r is the platform’s commission. Benefit bB is assumed to depend
on the average quality of sellers: bB = αq. The number of interactions per buyer is
calculated as the total number of interactions divided by the number of buyers,
resulting in Xf(NS).
There are also two membership-related components, BB and AB. Membership
benefit BB does not depend on the number of interactions and may arise from the
potential ability to use the platform. Membership cost AB is the fee that buyers
pay to the platform upfront.
Putting all these parameters together, we obtain the following equation:
UB = (BB − AB) + (αq − aB − r)Xf(NS). (1.5.2)
Again, the key differences compared with the canonical model are the mem-
bership benefit BB, the membership fee AB, the modeling of the usage benefit bB
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to be proportional to the average quality q of participants on the sellers’ side, the
introduction of payment between the two market sides γr, and the adjustment of
the number of interactions per buyer from NS to Xf(NS).
1.5.3 Platform profit function
With regard to the platform, we consider its profit function. The platform charges
both customer groups for usage and membership. The factor that does not depend
on the number of interactions includes membership fees minus costs on the buyers’
side (AB−CB)NB, and the membership fees of the sellers’ side across all segments:∑
k (A
S
k − CSk )NSk . CB and CSk are costs for the platform that do not depend on
the number of interactions. Here, we take into account that sellers are divided into
groups, for whom membership fees and costs may differ.
The part of the profit which depends on the number of interactions looks
similar to that of the canonical model which includes the sum of the usage fees aB
and aS, subtracted by the usage costs c and multiplied by the number of interactions
XNBf(NS). In addition to the usual usage fees aB and aS, the platform receives a
commission fee (1− γ)r. Taken together, this yields the following profit function:
pi = (AB − CB)NB +
∑
k
(ASk − CSk )NSk +
+
∑
k
(aB + aS + (1− γ)r − c)XNBf(NS)N
S
k
NS
= (AB − CB)NB +
∑
k
(ASk − CSk )NSk +
+ (aB + aS + (1− γ)r − c)XNBf(NS)
∑
kN
S
k
NS
= (AB − CB)NB +
∑
k
(ASk − CSk )NSk +
+ (aB + aS + (1− γ)r − c)XNBf(NS). (1.5.3)
The major changes for the platform profit function are the altered expression
for the number of interactions and the integration of the membership fees, which
leads to the two additive terms (AB−CB)NB and ∑k (ASk − CSk )NSk . Furthermore,
the usage fees aB and aS are supplemented by the commission fee (1− γ)r from
the payment r between buyers and sellers.
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1.6 Solution for the integrated model
This section is devoted to the platform’s profit optimization. We first discuss how
to build the tariffs and to determine aB, aS, AB, ASk and γ. Subsequently, we
address the decision on quality review from the platform’s point of view.
1.6.1 Optimal prices
The aim of the platform is to maximize its profit pi under the constraints UB ≥ 0
and US ≥ 0. Hence, we have to determine the optimal aB, aS, AB, and ASk . We
apply the method used by Rochet and Tirole (2003) which was introduced in
Section 1.3. To be able to do so, we have to bring pi into the following form:
pi = (pB + pS − c)DBDS. (1.6.1)
Before we proceed, note that Ai and ai are not independent. That is, if one
part of the tariff, for example, Ai, is fixed, the other part of the tariff ai cannot vary
arbitrarily. This implies that the platform can choose between high Ai combined
with low ai or vice versa. It is possible to build so-called average prices pB(aB, AB)
and pSk (a
S, ASk ) which include usage fees and a share of the membership fees. One
important consequence is that a set of optimal combinations of Ai and ai can
exist. Mathematically, it follows from the fact that the usage of pB(aB, AB) and
pSk (a
S, ASk ) instead of a
B, aS, AB, and ASk reduces the number of equations from
L + 3 being ∂pi
∂AB
= 0 and ∂pi
∂aB
= 0, ∂pi
∂ASk,k=1...L
= 0, and ∂pi
∂aS
= 0 to L + 1. The
ambiguity can be considered a problem, as Armstrong (2006) and Reisinger (2010)
point out.19
As this approach is necessary from a mathematical point of view, we will
follow it.20 We will introduce average prices and adjust the equation 1.5.3 so that it
19This problem was first mentioned by Armsrong (2006). In case of two-part tariffs, there
is a continuum of equilibriums with the same profit for the platform achieved through various
combinations of usage and membership fees. This is attributable to the fact that different
combinations of usage and membership fees can be found, which leads to consumer indifference.
That is, a low usage fee can compensate for a high membership fee and vice versa, resulting in
the same total utility for consumers and, therefore, attracting the same number of consumers.
20Reisinger (2010) suggests an approach to resolve this ambiguity by introducing heterogeneity
in a duopoly market.
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resembles the equation 1.6.1. We first complement all terms so that we can factor
out NBf(NS):
pi = (AB − CB)NB +
∑
k
(ASk − CSk )NSk +
+ (aB + aS + (1− γ)r − c)XNBf(NS) =
= (AB − CB)NB f(N
S)
f(NS)
+
∑
k
(ASk − CSk )NSk
NBf(NS)
NBf(NS)
+
+ (aB + aS + (1− γ)r − c)XNBf(NS) =
= (
(AB − CB)
f(NS)
+
∑
k
(ASk − CSk )
NSk
NBf(NS)
+
+ aBX + aSX + (1− γ)r − cX)NBf(NS) =
= (aBX + (1− γ)rX + (A
B − CB)
f(NS)
+
+ aSX +
∑
k
(ASk − CSk )
NSk
NBf(NS)
− cX)NBf(NS). (1.6.2)
Then, we define the average transaction prices pB and pS the platform charges
per interaction, including the share of both the membership and usage fees:
pB ≡ aBX + (1− γ)rX + (A
B − CB)
f(NS)
, (1.6.3)
pSk ≡ aSX + (ASk − CSk )
NSk
NBf(NS)
. (1.6.4)
We must, however, take into account that pS1 ,...,p
S
L can differ for different
segments.
Rochet and Tirole (2006, p. 661) provide a different definition for pB and
pSk , since they add the component E[b
ix(b, aB) + ti(b, aB)]. This leads to the
introduction of v(aB) = E[(bB + bS − c)x(b, aB)] to compensate for this aspect.
From my point of view, it is possible to avoid this, constructing average transaction
prices as shown in equations 1.6.3 and 1.6.4.
Subsequently, we insert the average prices into the equation 1.6.2:
pi = (pB +
∑
k
pSk − cX)NBf(NS). (1.6.5)
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or with DB(pB, NS) ≡ NB and DS(pS, NB) ≡ f(NS)
pi = (pB +
∑
k
pSk − cX)DBDS. (1.6.6)
Since we have managed to bring the platform profit equation into the same
form as in the canonical model, we can set out to solve it with the help of the same
methods. Similar to the canonical model, we transform the function with the help
of a logarithm, then differentiate and set the result to zero:
log pi = log(pB +
L∑
k
pSk − cX) + logNB(pB) + log f(NS(pS)), (1.6.7)
∂(log pi)
∂pB
=
1
pB +
∑L
k p
S
k − cX
+
∂NB
∂pB
1
NB
≡ 0, (1.6.8)
∂(log pi)
∂pS
=
1
pB +
∑L
k p
S
k − cX
+
∂f(NS)
∂NSk
∂NSk
∂pSk
1
f(NS)
≡ 0. (1.6.9)
Since sellers are divided into L segments, we obtain a system with L + 1
equations. The first summands are identical, so the following can be set as equal:
∂NB
∂pB
1
NB
=
∂f(NS)
∂NSk
∂NSk
∂pSk
1
f(NS)
. (1.6.10)
The price elasticities are defined as follows:
ηB = −∂N
B
∂pB
pB
NB
, (1.6.11)
ηSk = −
∂NSk
∂pSk
pSk
NSk
, with k ∈ [1, ..., L]. (1.6.12)
From that we obtain:
∂NB
∂pB
1
NB
= −η
B
pB
, (1.6.13)
∂NSk
∂pSk
= −ηSk
NSk
pSk
, with k ∈ [1, ..., L]. (1.6.14)
Now we insert the equations 1.6.13 and 1.6.14 into the equation 1.6.10 and
obtain a system with L equations:
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ηS1
pS1
∂f(NS)
∂NS1
NS1
f(NS)
=
ηB
pB
,
...
ηSk
pSk
∂f(NS)
∂NSk
NSk
f(NS)
=
ηB
pB
,
...
ηSL
pSL
∂f(NS)
∂NSL
NSL
f(NS)
=
ηB
pB
.
One more equation follows from equation 1.6.8 together with equation 1.6.11:
pB +
S∑
k
pSk − cX =
pB
ηB
. (1.6.15)
We obtain a system with L+ 1 equations and L+ 1 unknown variables. This
system is a generalization of the solution Rochet and Tirole (2003) provide for the
canonical model (cf. proposition 1 in Section 1.3). There are two crucial differences:
First, due to the segmentation of sellers into L groups, we obtain L+ 1 equations
instead of 2; second, the ratio of the average prices is no longer simply equal to the
price elasticities, but there are correction factors. These differences occur due to
the introduction of the two new parameters, namely, the segmentation of sellers
and the adjustment of the number of interactions. If we set L = 1 and f = 1,
we would obtain the same solution as that developed for the canonical model in
Section 1.3.
Further differences between the canonical model and the integrated model
would be observable if we solved the system of equations. At this point, membership
fees AB and AS, the payment between customer groups γr, and the average quality
of sellers would emerge.
The solution we have developed so far can be recorded as a proposition:
Proposition 1.2. The average prices for a two-sided market with a segmentation
of one market side, with tariffs consisting of both usage and membership fees and the
adjusted amount of interactions written as XNBf(NS) are given in the following
system of equations:
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ηS1
pS1
∂f(NS)
∂NS1
NS1
f(NS)
=
ηB
pB
,
...
ηSk
pSk
∂f(NS)
∂NSk
NSk
f(NS)
=
ηB
pB
,
...
ηSL
pSL
∂f(NS)
∂NSL
NSL
f(NS)
=
ηB
pB
.
and
pB +
S∑
k
pSk − cX =
pB
ηB
. (1.6.16)
It is easy to see that the result of this equation system yields the average
prices pB, pS1 , ..., p
S
L. But what the platform is looking for are the tariffs, that is, a
B,
aS, AB, AS1 , ..., A
S
L. This is the standard approach in the literature to provide the
equation system for pB, pS1 , ..., p
S
L (cf. Armstrong (2006), Rochet und Tirole (2006)).
To determine aB, aS, AB, AS1 , ..., A
S
L, the values for p
B, pS1 , ..., p
S
L must be plugged
into the equations 1.6.3 and 1.6.4. It also requires the definition and incorporation
of the demand functions DB(pB) and DS(pS) from the utility functions that we
have discussed above.
1.6.2 Profitability of the quality review of participants
Besides optimal price setting and allocation, we have to determine the optimal
quality of participants. As mentioned in Section 1.4, there are two possibilities:
The platform either restricts access to the market place, allowing only high quality
sellers to participate or it permits all sellers to participate, regardless of their
quality. In the first case, a review process should be in place. We assume that
the launch of the review process costs κ and that no variable cost is incurred.
We also assume that during the course of the review process, the quality of the
participants is perfectly observable, that is, there are no inaccuracies in the quality
estimation. For now, let us assume that optimal prices are already determined.
We will suspend this assumption later on. If a quality review process is installed,
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the average quality of participants q equals qH , since only high quality sellers are
allowed to participate:
q(βH = 1, βL = 0) =
νβHqH + (1− ν)βLqL
νβH + (1− ν)βL =
νβHqH
νβH
= qH . (1.6.17)
If no quality review process is installed, no investment is necessary. But then
all sellers who are willing to pay the fees gain access to the platform. The average
quality of participants is then given by the average of the Bernoulli distribution
with βH = βL = 1:
q(βH = 1, βL = 1) =
νβHqH + (1− ν)βLqL
νβH + (1− ν)βL = νqH + (1− ν)qL. (1.6.18)
The platform profit function is as follows:
pi(νqH + (1− ν)qL) = (AB − CB)NB +
∑
k
(ASk − CSk )NSk +
+ (aB + aS + (1− γ)r − c)XNBf(NS), (1.6.19)
and the utility functions of the platform yield:
UB(νqH + (1− ν)qL) = (α(νqH + (1− ν)qL)− aB − r)Xf(NS) + (BB − AB),
(1.6.20)
USk (νqH + (1− ν)qL) = (bS − aS + γr)
XNBf(NS)
NS
+ (BSk − ASk −Mk). (1.6.21)
In order for the quality review process to be installed, it must yield a higher
profit compared to the base case which does not involve a quality review. Hence,
these equations build a reference point for the quality review.
To determine the profit in the quality review case, we have to consider what
actually changes if it is introduced – apart from the average quality. First, the
buyers’ benefit per interaction bB increases due to the proportionality between
benefit per interaction and quality bB = αq. Secondly, the number of available
sellers declines from NS to νNS. If we assume that the membership fees do not
change for neither market side, then the platform has to compensate for the loss
of profit by increasing the usage fees from aB to aBH or by increasing the number
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of buyers from NB to NBH . If a quality review process is installed, then the profit
equation is as follows:
pi(qH) = (A
B−CB)NBH+
∑
k
(ASk − CSk )νkNSk +(aBH+aS+(1−γ)r−c)XNBHf(νNS)−κ,
(1.6.22)
with νk being the share of high quality participants among the segment N
S
k
and ν =
∑
k νk. This allows us to take into account the case when there is a
correlation between the segmentation and the quality of participants. The utility
functions for buyers and sellers can be written as described below:
UB(qH) = (B
B − AB) + (αqH − aBH − r)Xf(νNS), (1.6.23)
USk (qH) = (B
S
k − ASk −Mk) + (bS − aS + γr)
XNBf(νNS)
νNS
. (1.6.24)
After we have derived the equations for the platform’s profit with and without
the installment of a quality review process, we can compare them. If pi(qH) −
pi(νqH + (1− ν)qL) ≥ 0, then it is profitable to introduce a quality review process:
pi(qH)− pi(νqH + (1− ν)qL) =
= (AB − CB)NBH +
∑
k
(ASk − CSk )νkNSk + (aBH + aS + (1− γ)r − c)XNBHf(νNS)
− ((AB − CB)NB +
∑
k
(ASk − CSk )NSk + (aB + aS + (1− γ)r − c)XNBf(NS))− κ
= (AB − CB)(NBH −NB) +
∑
k
(ASk − CSk )(νk − 1)NSk + aBHXNBHf(νNS)
+ (aS + (1− γ)r − c)XNBHf(νNS)− κ− (aB + aS + (1− γ)r − c)XNBf(NS)).
(1.6.25)
Using this equation, we can obtain the value for aBH which suits the condition
pi(qH)− pi(νqH + (1− ν)qL) ≥ 0:
aBH ≥
(AB − CB)(NB −NBH ) +
∑
k (A
S
k − CSk )(1− νk)NSk + κ
XNBHf(νN
S)
+ (1.6.26)
− (aS + (1− γ)r − c) + (a
B + aS + (1− γ)r − c)NBf(NS)
NBHf(νN
S)
.
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At the same time, aBH must suit the utility condition U
B(qH) ≥ 0. Hence,
aBH ≤
(BB − AB)
Xf(νNS)
+ αqH − r. (1.6.27)
The two inequalities 1.6.26 and 1.6.27 yield the conditions for the appropriate
aBH . Three cases are possible:
1. The upper bound equals the lower bound, then only one solution exists for
aBH ;
2. The upper bound lies above the lower bound, then a set of feasible values
exists for aBH , and the highest should be taken to maximize profit;
3. The upper bound lies below the lower bound, then no solution exists.
Based on the outcome of these comparisons, the platform can decide whether
it should introduce a quality review process or not. Once quality optimization
procedure is understood, the platform owner can conduct price and quality opti-
mization simultaneously. She would need to consider two cases: The first one with
a review process installed and the second, where no quality review is conducted.
For these two cases, the platform owner will have to determine the optimal prices
and corresponding profits. Then, by comparing the profits, she will be able to see,
which case is preferable – the one with quality review process or without.
1.7 Case example: App platforms
In this section, we provide an example of how the integrated two-sided model
can be used to model app platforms. “App platforms” are software distribution
platforms for mobile devices like smartphones or tablets. They gained popularity
after Apple launched its App Store in 2008. Hence, our monopoly model can be
applied to the time period during which the App Store was the only strong platform
on the market. Although the advantage of the App Store seemed incontestable,
other app platforms like Google Play for Android OS managed to enter the market
and achieve high popularity.21 Other platforms have tried to emulate Apple and
Google, forming coalitions and trying to create niche markets. These developments
provide interesting avenues for a further development of the integrated two-sided
market model and its applications.
21Cf. comScore Reports (2011).
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1.7.1 Introduction to app platforms
App platforms are a special form of electronic markets. Software developers can
distribute their software applications (apps) via app platforms to users of mobile
devices like smartphones or tablets. App platforms can act as an intermediary
connecting the two market sides, as an infomediary providing information about
the market participants or as a certifier verifying identity or controlling the quality
of the market participants.22
Apple’s App Store and Google Play for Android OS are probably the best
known app platforms. Actually, many more app platforms aside from these two
exist – and some of them were founded as early as 1999.23 The launch of the App
Store has changed the mobile phone industry in practically all dimensions.24 After
3 years in the market, there were 425,000 apps available in the App Store. The
number of downloads exceeded 14.000,000,000.25
A lot of companies are trying to replicate the App Store’s success. Among
them are native (to the operating system) platforms like Google Play (Android),
RIM’s App World and Nokia’s Ovi Store, smartphone manufacturers like Samsung,
LG or SonyEricsson, mobile network operators like Verizon, Vodafone or Telekom.
Native platforms have had the highest impact on the industry so far, and they also
tend to be larger (in terms of available apps and downloads). Figure 3.3 in the
appendix provides an overview of the key native app platforms.
Since other app platforms were very small compared to the App Store, the
integrated two-sided market model for monopoly platforms is particularly suitable
for the time period between the launch of the App Store in July 2008 and the
launch of the Android market (the second biggest app platform, now Google Play)
22Cf. Belleflamme and Peitz (2010, pp. 607-676).
23For example, Handango has been providing apps for mobile phones since 1999. But it was
not until the App Store appeared that app platforms have gained momentum. Several hypotheses
may explain why it took until 2008 for app platforms to gain popularity, for example, usability
(size of screen), connectivity (3G and 4G coverage) or the hardware price may have contributed
to the app platform development.
24Cf., for example, the remark in the Financial Times (13 March 2009): “The runaway success
of Apple’s iPhone App Store, the online site where iPhone and iPod Touch owners can download
free or cheap software for their devices, has transformed the mobile software marketplace.” or
the remark by Steve Jobs, CEO of Apple (October 2009): “The App Store is like nothing the
industry has ever seen before in both scale and quality.”
25Cf. Apple (2011).
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at the end of 2008. In the following, we will discuss how the integrated two-sided
market model can be applied to model app platforms.
1.7.2 Structure and operations of an app platform
Before we can turn to modeling, we have to discuss how an app platform operates
and which parameters must be included in the mathematical analysis. Figure 1.3
exemplifies the key participants of app platforms and the interactions between
them. They are developers, an app platform and users. Before a developer can
start to program an app, she has to sign up with the platform. Some platforms
charge membership fees for that, which can vary for private developers, enterprises
and non-profit organizations. In return, the developer gains access to the Software
Development Kit and other tools.
McKinsey & Company 92|
Submit apps Search and download
AppStore
Developers Users
Revenue
Sharing
Pay, rate
Review
Figure 1.3: Sketch of the key participants of an app platform and interactions
between them (exemplified here by the App Store).
Developers write apps which they submit to the app platform. In general,
they are entitled to choose app prices themselves.26 Some platforms conduct quality
26Some platforms restrict prices to certain values like USD 0.99, 1.49, 1.99, and so on. There is
also a new development regarding app prices: Since March 2011, Amazon has been offering another
model for which it determines app prices itself (cf. http://business.chip.de/news/Amazon-
Android-App-Store-oeffnet-fuer-Entwickler_46573233.html).
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reviews before they make apps available to users (e.g., App Store), some do not
(e.g., Google Play market). Once apps are accepted, the platform “publishes” them,
that is, the apps become available to the users. Users may search and download the
apps. Depending on the platform, 20-60% of submitted apps are free of charge.27
The share of free apps among the downloaded apps amounts to 80%-90%.28 The
payment process in the case of apps that can be purchased occurs through the
platform. Users may also rate the downloaded apps and submit reviews for them.
Developers obtain their share of revenues from the platforms (usually around
70%). Payments thus take place between users and developers. The remaining 30%
represents the platform’s commission. In addition, users pay for the mobile phones
and it is likely that part of this payment represents the app platform usage. This
completes the circuit of interactions.
1.7.3 Application of the integrated two-sided market
model
We begin by explaining how the operations of an app platform can be reflected
in two-sided model parameters. Then, we show how utility and profit equations
can be adjusted. The parameters of the integrated two-sided market model can be
interpreted as follows:
• aB, aS – usage fees per download for both users and developers. a = aB + aS
is the total usage fee the platform receives.
• AB, ASk – membership fees for both users and developers. For the users, it can
be interpreted as part of the mobile device cost. For developers, it is the fee
they pay for access to the tools and participation in the platform. It does not
depend on the number of downloads. We take into account that developers
from different groups (private, enterprise or non-profit organization) pay
different membership fees.
• bB, bS – benefit per download. For users, we assume that usage benefit
depends on the average quality of apps bB = αq with α = const, α > 0 and
q = E(Q) =
∑
i∈I qiwi. Usage benefit for developers may stem from other
27Cf. report by Distimo (Juli 2010).
28Cf. report by Gartner (December 2009).
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revenues, such as payment from users (e.g., advertising) or from non-monetary
sources (e.g., recognition from peers). The last source is probably zero for
the majority of developers, especially for enterprise developers.
• BB, BSk – benefit from participation in the platform, which does not depend
on the number of downloads.
• c – costs per download for the platform.
• CB, CSk – cost of membership for the platform, which may derive from service
requirements. We assume that membership costs can vary among developer
segments.
• Mk – production costs for developers.
• pB, pS – average prices consisting of usage fees and a proportional share of
membership fees.
• p = pB + pS – total average price the platform charges per interaction.
• r – app price with distribution R and average r.
• γ – share of app price that developers receive. The remaining (1 − γ)r is
allocated to the platform.
• γr – payment from users to developers.
• q – quality of an app with distribution Q. We assume a Bernoulli distri-
bution for app quality. The average quality is then given by q(βH , βL) =
νβHqH+(1−ν)βLqL
νβH+(1−ν)βL .
• η = ηB + ηS – price elasticity of demand.
• NB = DB(pB) – number of users.
• NS = DS(pS) – number of developers.
• XNBf(NS) – adjustments of the number of interactions.
• x(bB, bS, aB) ∈ [0, 1] with X ≡ E[x(b, aB)] – the probability of download of
scanned apps.
• f – correction function for the number of downloads (differentiable, invertible).
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• Segmentation of developers: ASk , BSk , CSk and NSk , with k = 1, ..., L.
Using these parameters, we can now construct the following equations for
developers, users, and platform profit:
USk = (B
S
k − ASk −Mk) + (bS + γr)
XNBf(NS)
NS
, (1.7.1)
UB = (BB − AB) + (αq − r)Xf(NS), (1.7.2)
pi = (AB − CB)NB +
∑
k
(ASk − CSk )NSk + ((1− γ)r − c)XNBf(NS). (1.7.3)
The solution of this system is basically the same as in Section 1.6. For a
given demand function and benefit values, we can determine the prices, that is, fee
allocation to the two market sides. Using our methodology from Section 1.6.2, we
can also determine whether a quality review system would be profitable for the
app platform.
It would be interesting to test this model empirically and to compare the
results with the App Store performance and strategy in the past. Another research
area that would be particularly interesting from an applied point of view is the
modeling of competition over time and an analysis of the competition between
the App Store and the Google Play. Yet another interesting research focus would
be on competition and coalitions between less dominant app platforms, like the
agreement between Nokia and Windows.29 Modeling of these phenomena provides
promising avenues for future research in two-sided market theory and applications.
Some limitations exist for the application of the two-sided market model.
For example, it is possible to identify further parameters, like branding or in-
terdependence between software and hardware, which might influence the app
platform’s strategy and performance. It might be interesting to explicitly model
such parameters. We must also mention that in the real world, it could be difficult
to determine demand functions or to provide values for price elasticities. In that
case, assumptions and estimations have to be made. They can be revised later and
the fees can be adjusted accordingly.
29Cf. Chip.de (2011).
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1.8 Discussion and conclusion
This study contributes to the theory of two-sided market models. Departing from
the canonical two-sided market model of Rochet and Tirole (2003) for a monopoly
platform with usage fees, we have considered possible extensions of this model.
Some of them were new and others have already been discussed in the literature.
The prevalent parameters include membership fees (cf. Armstrong, 2006, Rochet
and Tirole, 2006), payments between customer groups (cf. Rochet and Tirole,
2006), and quality review of participants (Hagiu, 2009, Jeon and Rochet, 2010).
The new extensions are commission fee, segmentation of participants, introduction
of commission fee and adjustments for the number of interactions between customer
groups.
Subsequently, we integrated all these parameters into one model. The main
contribution of the integrated model is that it allows consideration of all parameters
simultaneously. Using the methodology of Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) and
Armstrong (2006), we have derived a solution for the new model. The solution
is a general case of the underlying models, so the price level equation resembles
Lerner’s index and the allocation of fees is proportional to the price elasticities
up to a certain factor. The key differences compared to Rochet and Tirole (2003)
include an increased number of equations due to segmentation and correction terms
for the proportionality of fees to price elasticities.
The resulting model with a new combination of parameters allows us to
improve the modeling of two-sided market platforms with the following features:
There are usage and membership fees as well as payments between market sides,
the quality of participants is crucial, segmentation is present and the number of
interactions cannot be approximated as the power set of the participants’ number.
Amazon, eBay or Apple’s App Store are prominent examples of this type of market.
Finally, we have discussed an example of how the integrated two-sided market
model can be used to model app platforms – software distribution platforms for
mobile devices like smartphones or tablets. Following a brief description of app
platform operations, we show how the parameters of the integrated two-sided
market model can be interpreted to reflect the structure of app platforms.
The limitations of the model at hand are that while many important param-
eters have been integrated into it, there are many more parameters that might
be useful for the description of real-world two-sided markets. For example, if
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we included such parameters as non-monetary incentives, overall strategy of the
platform, or path dependence, the model would probably reflect the real-world
two-sided markets even better. The integration of these parameters represents
an interesting future research opportunity. Further development opportunities
for this model include the introduction of competition, the integration of market
development over time and empirical tests of the model.
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2Paper II: Toward Understanding
Dynamics and Disruptions in
Two-sided Markets: A Dynamic
Two-sided Market Model
Abstract
Over the last decade, a large body of literature on theoretical, as well as applied
aspects of two-sided markets has emerged. Most of it concentrates on developing
static models. The real-world two-sided markets like app platforms (the App Store
for iOS, Google Play for Android OS, etc.), evolve strongly over time. Also, they
are prone to highly disruptive changes causing fast rise and fall (e.g., Android OS
is up from 0% to more than 60% market share for smartphone shipments, Nokia
OS is down from 70% to 10% in the last 5 years. This implies that static models
and not sufficient to describe such industries. In this research paper, we propose
a dynamic model that explicitly includes evolving number of participants and can
help to analyze disruptive changes.
Our model is based on dynamic systems theory, examples from life sciences
and differential game theory. The centerpiece of the model is a mathematical
representation of the population development over time. These equations serve as
constraints for the optimal pricing policy. Since the model is too complex to be
solved analytically, we use Matlab simulation to analyze model behavior. We derive
strategies for different situations and development phases of app platforms. One
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important result concerns the problem that a platform must get both sides on board
(the so-called “chicken-and-egg” problem). The dynamic model suggests that this
problem can be avoided if membership benefits are high enough to compensate for
the low network effects. Furthermore, we show how the number of agents necessary
to start off the platform can be calculated.
The next series of results show how platform owner should adjust prices in
case there is a chance to do so once the app platform is up and running. Our
findings show that in general, it is optimal to increase fees for users as well as
developers. Furthermore, we analyze disruptions like entrance of new competitors.
We show that competitive entry not necessarily leads to noticeable price reduction.
This can help to explain some real-world observations, for instance, Apple Inc. did
not reduce their fees after other competitors like Android have entered the market.
Our model also helps to evaluate the difference between short-term and long-term
decisions, pointing out how far away the results of optimization can be depending
on the time horizon under consideration. Overall, the dynamic model proves to be a
powerful instrument for analyzing two-sided markets. We hope that future research
will build on this model adding further aspects and conducting empirical research to
better understand Internet-based platforms like App Store, Amazon and eBay.
Keywords: Two-sided market, multi-sided market, platform, e-business, dy-
namic model, “chicken & egg” problem.
JEL classification numbers: L8, L81, L82, L86, L96.
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2.1 Introduction
Over the last decade, a large body of literature on two-sided markets has emerged.
Two-sided markets are platforms that connect two groups of customers who value
each others’ presence. Examples of these markets are abound: Amazon, eBay and
Google have advanced to top brands worldwide (cf. www.interbrand.com) and
have become the “invisible engines” (cf. Evans et al. 2006) of our economies.
To be able to analyze such Internet-based platforms, a model is needed that
incorporates key parameters of these platforms. The parameters include usage and
membership fees, payments between customer groups, role of quality differences,
segmentation and appropriate number of interactions depending on the number of
participants. This was the main topic of Kouris (2011), where several extensions
were introduced and prevalent parameters were integrated into a single unified
model. The focus of this article is on development of a dynamic two-sided market
model based on the integrated model. This leads to a platform strategy that will
remain valid over a longer time period, while price elasticities might change. In this
research paper, we begin with the monopoly case, and proceed with consideration
of external shocks, which represent, for example, competitive entry or introduction
of new technology.
We develop a mathematical representation for the platform dynamics based
on dynamic systems theory, examples from life sciences and differential game theory.
Profit calculation and optimization is implemented in Matlab in form of computer
simulation, since the mathematical problem at hand is too complex to be solved
analytically.
Most two-sided market models focus on pricing strategies in a static setting, for
instance, Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006), Armstrong (2006). We will extend this to
the dynamic setting. The research questions that were central for static models, i.e.,
“Which side to charge and how much?”, “How to divide fees into usage/commission
and membership fees?”, “Is the solution unique?” will be addressed for the dynamic
setting. The dynamic model at hand provides recommendations on how fees should
be optimally allocated between the market sides, so that the solution remains
optimal in the future. In terms of division of fees in usage/commission and
membership fees, the dynamic model provides a unique solution. In the static case,
the solution was not unique, which was considered a problem (cf. Armstrong, 2006;
Reisinger, 2010). The dynamic models helps to resolve this issue.
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Further research questions pertain to the “chicken-and-egg” problem, which
was introduced by Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and refers to the problem of launching
a platform: in order to attract users, developers should have joined the platform
and have offered apps, but developers would only join, if potential users already
have joined. We will discuss the minimal number of participants on both sides
necessary to kick-off the platform and show that this combination is not unique.
These insights are particularly important for the launch of new platforms, where one
needs to know how many participants (and, consequently, resources) are required
to get the platform going.
Furthermore, we compare short-term and long-term optimization strategies
showing how they might differ. Then we analyze the possibility to adjust prices after
a certain period of time. We describe which price component should be adjusted
and how. The next step represents introduction of external shocks, representing
for instance a competitor’s entry, regulations adjustments or introduction of new
technologies. The key threat behind such disruptions is basically the same, namely
reduction of the potential number of participants. Therefore, such external shocks
can be modeled applying the same approach. With help of Matlab simulations we
show that price adjustments in case of disruptions may remain pretty small. This
is in line with real-world observations.
The research paper is organized is as follows. The next section focuses
on literature review and background information on the two-sided markets and
dynamic systems modeling theory. In Section 2.3 we develop a dynamic model. The
model includes the goal function represented through the platform profit equation
(Section 2.3.4), and constraints equations which describe population dynamics
(Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2). For the overall model formulation see Sections 2.3.5.
Section 2.4 describes Matlab simulation approach and simulation results. Section
2.5 concludes.
2.2 Literature and background review
In this section, we provide literature review and background information for the
model. The starting point of the dynamic framework are two-sided market models
originated by Rochet and Tirole (2003). We show how such models evolved since
Rochet and Tirole (2003) in the next section. Furthermore, we provide some
background information on dynamic models. We discuss briefly the most relevant
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aspects of dynamic systems theory, examples from life sciences and differential
game theory.
2.2.1 Two-sided market theory
Two-sided markets are platforms that enable interaction between two groups of
customers who value each other’s presence (cf. Rochet and Tirole, 2003 p. 990,
Evans, 2003 p. 191, Tag, 2008 p. 5.). Research on two-sided markets stems from
network economics and complementary product pricing (cf. Rochet and Tirole,
2003 p. 646). For the early works see Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986), Farell
and Saloner (1985, 1986). One of the key concepts for two-sided markets is that
of “indirect network effects”: The utility on the one side of the market increases
with the number (and/or quality) of participants on the other side.1 Examples
of platforms that can be interpreted as two-sided markets range from credit card
systems and software platforms to night clubs and shopping malls. Due to the
diversity of two-sided market examples various extensions are needed to describe
different kinds of platforms.
Although two-sided market theory emerged only a decade ago2, there is
already a considerable amount of research papers on two-sided markets. The first
published studies include: Rochet and Tirole (2003), Caillaud and Jullien (2003)
and Evans (2003). Since then, two-sided markets research concentrates on four key
directions:
• Introduction of new extensions for a static monopoly model (see Armstrong
(2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2006) on membership fees, Hagiu (2009), Jeon
and Rochet (2010) on quality preference of participants);
• Analysis of duopoly setting and development of extensions for it (see Arm-
strong (2006) on “competitive bottlenecks”, Choi (2010) on tying and multi-
homing, Tag (2008) on comparison of open and closed platforms);
1For exact definition of two-sided markets see Rochet and Tirole, (2006 pp. 657-658). Many
attempts were undertaken to provide a definition for the two-sided markets. One of the latest
was presented by Hagiu and Wright (2011 p. 2): “We define MSP [MPS stands for multi-sided
platforms] to be an organization that creates value primarily by enabling direct interactions
between two (or more) distinct types of affiliated customers.” It remains to be seen whether this
definition will be widely adopted.
2The first research papers on two-sided markets were circulated around 2001 by Rochet and
Tirole, Caillaud and Jullien.
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• Introduction of dynamic view (see Sun and Tse (2007) on an optimal control
model based on differential equations, Lee (2010) on dynamic demand esti-
mation, Kumar et al. (2010) on evolution of two-sided markets, Vogelsang
(2010) on entry deterrence Cabral (2011) on stochastic modeling);
• Conducting of empirical research (see Rysman (2004) on evaluation of the
indirect network effects, Sokullu (2010) on non-parametric analysis of two-
sided markets).
The emphasis was clearly on the first two research directions — development
of extensions for monopoly and duopoly cases. The dynamic view was not getting
much attention before but belongs to the most promising directions for future
research.3 This research paper should help to fill this gap by developing a dynamic
framework for two-sided markets. Thereby we build on the integrated two-sided
market model introduced in Kouris (2011), which includes extensions such as usage
and membership fees, commission fee, correction of the number of participants,
product quality and participants segmentation.4
The need for a dynamic model arises from the observation that in the real-
world platforms the number of participants changes considerably over time in a
non-linear way. Also price elasticities do not remain constant. Take for instance
the attitude change towards paid content from the Internet: in 2000–2001, the
willingness to pay for content downloaded from the Internet was very low compared
to 2010–2011, where eBooks passed paper books on Amazon (cf. Miller and Bosman,
2011) and mobile application platforms’ revenue reaches about USD 4 billion in
2011 as was reported by iSuppli (cf. Kent, 2011).
Hence, the questions arises how to set prices that take these changes and
disruptions into account. Static models consider only current situation and cannot
include anticipated future changes. To overcome this limitation of static models,
we develop a dynamic model that includes the over time evolving number of
participants and calculates the appropriate prices to maximize platform profit. In
the following section, we describe the dynamic theories the model relies on.
3For example, the key note speech by Luiz Cabral delivered on the ICT conference 2011 at
Telecom ParisTech was devoted to dynamic models for two-sided markets.
4For more details on the integration of the prevalent parameters into one integrated model
and analytic solution for this model in the static setting cf. Kouris (2011).
124
2.2.2 Background on dynamic modeling
Dynamical systems theories provide methodologies to handle complex problems
with a dynamic component, that is, systems that evolve over time (cf. Bender,
2000; Fabien, 2009). Dynamic systems modeling and optimization is a vast area. It
includes dynamic programming, differential game theory, system dynamics, optimal
control theory, mathematical biology and many more. Since most processes evolve
over time, dynamic modeling has applications in many sciences pertaining to
subjects such as: population of species, weather forecasting, information diffusion,
management of product cycle, number of people participating in a demo.
Optimal control theory is one branch of dynamic systems theories, that deals
with optimization questions around dynamic processes. It is mainly applied in
Mathematics and Engineering. Optimal control theory helps to determine a control
law for a system consisting of a goal functional and a set of dynamic constraints (cf.
Liberzon, 2012; Kirk, 2004). Goal functional depends on state and control variables.
Constraints are represented by a set of differential equations. For instance, the
aim of a platform owner is to maximize her profit. Hence, profit represents goal
functional in this case. Platform profit depends on control variables set by the
platform (e.g., usage fees) and on development of the number of participants over
time. In order to maximize her profit, the platform owner has to find a balance
between choosing high prices and attracting many participants. In optimal control
theory it is assumed that prices can be adjusted at any point of time. Solutions of
such optimal control problems can be found by applying Pontryagin’s maximum
principle, or by solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (cf. Dockner, 2000,
Pontryagin, 1962).
Application of optimal control theory in economics, especially in strategic
environments, is known as differential game theory (cf. Dockner, 2000). In case
where recursive difference equations replace differential equations, differences game
theory applies. In difference equations population dynamics evolves in discrete time,
with deltas per time period instead of derivatives (cf. Huckfeldt, 1982). Current
state of variables depend on the previous state(s). For instance, the number of
customers at a certain time point t+ 1 is given by the number of customers in the
previous time point t plus change in the number of customers during the period
between t and t + 1. Platform dynamics is then given by a recursively defined
sequence.
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Optimization methods, as opposed to optimal control methods, assume
that control variables remain constant over time. Applied to the platform profit
optimization it means that prices are chosen once with no adjustment possibilities.
Which theory – optimal control or optimization – is more suitable, depends on the
problem at hand.
Over the last five years, efforts were started by Sun and Tse (2007), Markovich
(2008) and Cabral (2011) to provide dedicated dynamic models for the two-sided
markets. Generally, many of these models make simplifying assumptions regarding
consumer behavior. For instance, Markovich (2008) assumes that consumers live for
two periods, therefore, this model cannot provide insights on how platforms evolve
over time or compare short-term and long-term perspective. Earlier research papers
use even stricter and less realistic assumptions, e.g., Fundberg and Tirole (2000),
consider a population consisting of only two consumers. This poses limits to the
degree of comparability with the real two-sided markets. Cabral (20011) develops a
stochastic model with forward-looking consumers. Consumers are assumed to have
idiosyncratic preferences, which lead to stochastic dynamics. Compared to that,
we assume that consumer preferences are determined by their expected utility.
Sun and Tse, (2007) employ differential game theory to study two-sided
markets, considering long-term market development and concentrating on the
steady-state market share. Differential game approach is used, for instance, to
define optimal pricing decisions in other areas like monopolistic network with
positive network effects (e.g., Dhebar and Oren, 1985, 1986). Sun and Tse (2007)
assume that consumer behavior is determined by the current observations and
not their expectations. The major contribution of Sun and Tse (2007) is to show
how two-sided markets can be modeled with help of differential equations as a
two-point boundary value problem. Furthermore, they show how single-homing
vs. multi-homing decision affects long-term equilibrium. We begin by building a
model which is based on Sun and Tse (2007) approach. But since we are rather
interested in the dynamic than in the final state, we then switch to a model that
does not require to adjust prices constantly.
The model presented in this research paper is based on differential and
difference games theory (cf. Dockner et al., 2000). As Huckefeldt et al. (1982)
asserts, “The goal of dynamic modeling is to specify the structure of such processes
and to deduce the manner in which they generate [...] change”. We begin by
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developing a continuous-time differential game model. Then we transform it into a
discrete-time optimization model. We will elucidate this in the following sections.
2.3 Model formulation
We begin this section with construction of population dynamic in continuous time
based on dynamic systems theory, examples from life sciences and differential
game theory. Then we show how to adjust this for the discrete-time optimization.
Subsequently, we determine expected utility and NPV expressions which are needed
for the system dynamic equations. Finally, we derive goal function and formulate
the optimization problem.
2.3.1 Population dynamics in continuous time
The number of platform participants usually changes over time. The platform
owner should take that into account when determining profit maximizing prices.
In reality we observe different types of platform dynamics. Consider, for instance,
sales development of smartphones by operating system (OS). This is, in fact, a
good representation of the number of app platform users. Figure 2.1 displays
development of the four major operating systems over the last 5 years.5 Cumulated
smartphone sales show how customer populations for different smartphones evolved
over time. Some display an exponential kind of growth like Android, others grow
slowly like Nokia’ Symbian during the last 5 years.6
Generally, Sterman (2000), suggests that despite of the vast variety of dy-
namic processes, all of them can be represented through a very small number
of fundamental patterns, which are shown on Figure 2.2. Three most important
models of dynamic system behavior are (exponential) growth, goal seeking and
oscillation. Three more common patterns are a combination of the previous two
and include S-shaped growth, growth with overshoot and overshoot and collapse.
The first three patterns result from a simple feedback structure: growth occurs
when there is positive feedback, goal seeking from negative feedback and oscillation
5Apple iOS includes only iPhones. To take the full impact of the operating system into account,
iPads and iPods ought to be considered as well.
6Actually, considering Nokia, we have to take into account that this is just a part of a larger
picture. They were on the smartphone market since 1999, hence, in 2007–2012 their smartphones
were in a different phase of the product life cycle compared to Android smartphones.
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Cumulated world-wide smartphone sales 2007 Q1 – 2012 Q1, millions of units
SOURCE: Gartner: World-Wide Smartphone Sales (Millions of Units) 
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Figure 2.1: Cumulated world-wide smartphone sales 2007 Q1–2012 Q1, millions of
units. Source: Gartner.
results from negative feedback with time lag (cf. Sterman, 2000). Further structures
arise from combinations of the fundamental feedback patterns.
The case of linear growth presupposes that there is no feedback. This occurs
rarely. As Sterman (2000) points out, “what appears to be linear growth, is
often actually exponential, but viewed over a time horizon too short to observe
acceleration”. We can observe this effect on Figure 2.1 with the Nokia’s Symbian
case.
Platform dynamics could potentially show all these patterns at different times.
The most widespread dynamics for app platforms until now can be described best
as exponential growth. Since potential number of customers is restricted by the
total population of the Earth with income high enough to buy a mobile device,
there will be an inflection point which leads to an S-curve. On the long run, we
would expect to see a growth rate decline as observed for product life cycles.7
7Clearly, population limitation is not the only reason for the decline. For instance, appearance
of a substitution product can lead to sales decline.
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Common modes of behavior in dynamic systems
Exponential Growth
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Goal Seeking
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Figure 2.2: Common modes of behavior in dynamic systems. Source: Sterman
(2000).
A lot of work on population dynamics was done in life sciences. Different types
of population dynamics were proposed and analyzed. Key factors that determine
population growth in life sciences are birth and death rates, immigration and
emigration, environmental influences, competitive or mutual relationships with
other species, etc. (cf. Schoen, 2006). In other areas like IT there are also processes
that require application of the optimal control theory. For instance, information
diffusion can be described as a system of differential equations (e.g., Wang et al.,
2011).
In life sciences, birth and death rates are usually used. The meaning of
birth rate is that the future population size depends on the current number of
participants in a direct way. Every participant “produces” future participants with
a certain probability at a certain point of time. For platforms under consideration
it is rather not the current platform participants on the same market side, but
the number of participants on the other market side which is crucial. This is the
manifestation of the indirect network effects. More precise, the dynamics of the
number of participants on the one side depends on the expected utility based on
the number or participants on the other market side.8
8Sure enough, there might also be same-side effects involved, positive and well as negative.
But they are assumed to be not central and, hence, not to be modeled explicitly in this research
paper.
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One more factor that influences participants’ behavior is maximum size of
population that could potentially join the platform. In case of app platforms this
population consists of all people in the world who could afford a mobile device.
This population is called carrying capacity in the life sciences (cf. Sterman, 2000,
de Vries, 2006). Carrying capacity Ki limits possible growth of a platform. Its
influence can be modeled by multiplying potential change in participant number
by the factor (1− N i
Ki
). It is easy to see that this factor is close to 1 as long as the
population is small
lim
N i→0
(1− N
i
Ki
) = 1. (2.3.1)
When population growth is approaching carrying capacity, that is, N i → Ki,
we have
lim
N i→Ki
(1− N
i
Ki
) = 0. (2.3.2)
Hence, this factor does not allow population to grow higher than carrying
capacity. Altogether, we obtain the following equation for the population dynamics:
dN i(t)
dt
= λiEU i ·
(
1− N
i(t)
Ki
)
, i ∈ {B, S}, (2.3.3)
The usual assumption for agents’ decision regarding joining the platform is
“fulfilled expectations” (Katz and Shapiro, 1985, 1986) or “perfect foresight” (Shy,
2001). It is assumed that platform participants can predict the future network
size correctly at any point of time. Sun and Tse (2007) suggest another approach.
They assume that potential participants make their decision based on what they
currently observe, rather than trying to predict future population development. In
this research paper, we propose to use a mixed approach: The population diffusion
is assumed to be proportional to the expected utility or NPV (net present value),
at the same time, for the future network size agents take current network size as a
proxy. Therefore, potential participants are forward looking, but are not supposed
to be able to predict the future. We will discuss the exact expressions for the
expected utility and NPV in detail in Section 2.3.3,
Population diffusion is proportional to the expected utility or NPV (net
present value), as opposed to current utility. The reason for that is that current
utility takes into account only current losses and gains and does not take into
account future cash flows. But many businesses require an upfront investment,
delivering profits and benefits only in the future. For instance, app developers have
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to invest money in hardware, software and membership fee and their time into
programming of an app before they can start selling it. The same is true for users:
they have to buy a mobile device to obtain access to the apps on an app platform,
hoping that the package will provide enough benefits in the future. In order to
take future cash flows in account, we operate with expected utility.
2.3.2 Population dynamic in discrete time
Dynamic pricing (as discussed in the previous section) would mean for eBay or App
Store, that they would have to adjust their membership and/or usage fees constantly.
For instance, App Store would have to charge on one day 30% commission and on
the next day 50% commission. This would create high instability and insecurity
for developers, who now rely on the constant commission. This could cause many
developers to leave the platform.
In case of discrete dynamic the number of participants in the next period
N i(t+1) can be obtained recursively from the number of participants in the current
moment t and change in the number of participants between t+ 1 and t:
N i(t+ 1) = N i(t) + ∆N i(t+ 1), i ∈ {B, S}, (2.3.4)
with ∆N i(t) being change in the number of customers as shown in Figure
2.3. For ∆t→ 0 we obtain the differential equations used in the previous sections.
The willingness of agents to join the platform depends on the expected utility they 
would obtain. Growth is limited by the carrying capacity
SOURCE: Source
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NS ( t+1 )
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∆ NB ( t+1) = E(UB) (1-NB/KB) 
∆ NS ( t +1) = E(US) (1-NS/KS) 
Figure 2.3: Discrete-time structure of the model dynamics.
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We obtain the following recursive difference equations:
∆N i(t+ 1) = λiEU i(t)
(
1− N
i(t)
Ki
)
, i ∈ {B, S}. (2.3.5)
The next step consists in making assumptions regarding EU i(t). As in the
continuous problem formulation, we assume that the willingness of customers to
join the platform depends on the expected utility (or the net present value of the
future utility) they would obtain. If the NPV of future utility in the current period
is positive, new customers will join the platform in the next period, if the utility is
negative, customers will leave the platform. Hence, we can use similar equations as
in the continuous case.
2.3.3 Expected utility and NPV
For users, we can consider expected utility, for developers, it can be expected utility
or NPV, if they follow strictly monetaristic incentives. Expected utility can contain
two components, namely usage and membership (dis-)utilities. The membership
component stems from the participation in the platform alone and does not depend
on platform usage (it can be periodical as well). For instance, developers incur
costs MS to produce their apps. They have to buy hardware and software, learn
programming language, pay membership fees (denoted AS) to the platform and
spend time programming the apps. Similar aspects apply to users. They also have
to buy a mobile device and invest time in getting used to the new mobile device.
Platform participants might experience not only membership costs, but also
membership benefits from joining the platform. Users might obtain benefit from
belonging to the platform, that is, having an iPhone, without using it much. They
obtain then membership benefit BB. Similarly, some developers might be proud to
be an iOS or Android developer, even if they do not sell many copies of their apps.
BS denotes developers’ benefit. We assume that membership costs AB and AS
are paid only once. This can be easily extended to the case with yearly/monthly
payments.
Usage benefits bB and bS stem from interactions with participants from the
other market side accordingly. In case of app platforms these are app downloads.
Developers obtain revenues each time their app is downloaded (if the app in not
offered for free). They obtain a percentage γ of the app price r. App prices are
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assumed to follow a distribution R with average r. The remaining part is obtained
by the platform as a commission. In addition, platforms might charge a certain
amount ai which does not depend on the price of goods sold over the platform (e.g.,
some mobile tariffs charge for each domestic call a certain amount independent on
the actual usage, namely on the call length). There are also other sources of usage
benefit/cost. For instance, developers might obtain revenue from in-app-purchases
or from advertisement9. Also users obtain benefits not only from downloading apps
alone, but also by app usage later on. For the time being we assume that these
benefits are included in the usage benefits bB and bS.
The number of downloads per user depends on the amount of available apps.
As opposed to the current literature on two-sided markets (e.g., Rochet and Tirole,
2006, Armstrong, 2006), which assumes that each participant on the one market side
interacts with each participant on the other market side, we suggest a correction in
form of a two-step process (cf. Kouris, 2011). The first step of an app download is
sifting through available apps (scanning process), of which some get downloaded in
the second step. We assume that each user considers certain number of apps f(NS),
with NS being the number of apps and f(NS) << NS. The correction function f
is chosen to be differentiable and invertible for NS > 0. f should insure that the
number of scanned apps does not explode with the number of available apps. For
instance, if 1000 apps are available, a user might check 100 of them. If 500,000
apps are available on an app-platform, user might scan 500 apps, but probably
not 50,000, as proportionality would imply. In addition, we assume that of f(NS)
apps under consideration users download only a certain fraction XSf(NS) with
0 ≤ XS ≤ 1.10 Hence, total number of download per user amounts to XSf(NS).
It follows that the total number of downloads is the total number of users NB
multiplied with the number of downloads per user resulting in XSNBf(NS). The
number of downloads per seller amounts then to X
SNBf(NS)
NS
, derived from the total
number of interactions divided by the number of sellers.
For the expected utility and NPV calculations timing of payments is crucial.
We assume that membership fees and benefits accrue as soon as a member joins
9Cf. Gans (2011), in-app ads are a growing segment. This factor might provide an interesting
model extension in future research.
10Generally, it is possible to subsume XS and f(NS) into one function. The reason why we
suggest to consider them separately is because it reflects the actual process of buying goods on
Internet platform – first check several, then buy some.
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the platform. Usage fees and benefits are distributed over the next t time periods
and should therefore be discounted by 1
(1+σ)t
with a discounting rate σ. Platform
participants consider current number of users and developers and assume that they
will stay stable in the future. Altogether, we obtain the following equations for the
expected utility of users B and developers S:
EUB(t) = BB − AB +
∑
t
1
(1 + σ)t
(bB − aB − r)XSf(NS(t)) (2.3.6)
EUS(t) = BS − AS −M +
∑
t
1
(1 + σ)t
(bS − aS + γr)X
SNB(t)f(NS(t))
NS(t)
(2.3.7)
2.3.4 Goal function: platform profit
Besides constraint equations, a goal function is needed to complete the optimization
problem. The goal function is in this case cumulative platform profit. Similar as
for customer groups, platform profit has a membership component and a usage
component. Both components include profit from developers’ market side and from
the users’ side.
Usage profit component includes possible usage fees for users and developers
aB and aS. Furthermore, there is the commission (1− γ)r and cost per download
from the platform point of view c. The sum of all these components, multiplied
with the number of interactions XSNBf(NS), yield the platform profit share that
stems from the usage:
piuse(a
B, aS, γ) ≡ (aB + aS + (1− γ)r − c)XNB(t)f(NS(t)). (2.3.8)
Profit the platform owner obtains from users’ membership at a certain period
of time amounts to (AB − CB)∆NB with AB being membership fee (e.g., price of
mobile device or cost of mobile tariff) and CB cost for platform per user (e.g., cost
of mobile device production). The analogous formula applies for the developers:
(AS − CS)∆NS. We have to consider the case where ∆N i < 0, that is, if agents
leave the platform, separately. In this case, profit from membership is 0, but not
negative. This is due to the fact that the membership profit is realized as soon as
participants join the platform. Therefore, from the membership profit perspective,
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it is irrelevant if they stay with the platform or leave it. Hence, for the platform
membership calculation we have to consider four cases:
pimem(A
B, AS) =

(AB − CB)∆NB(t) + (AS − CS)∆NS(t), if ∆NB > 0,∆NS > 0;
(AS − CS)∆NS(t), if ∆NB ≤ 0,∆NS > 0;
(AB − CB)∆NB(t), if ∆NB > 0,∆NS ≤ 0;
0, if ∆NB ≤ 0,∆NS ≤ 0.
(2.3.9)
To obtain the final goal function equation we take into account a discounting
rate 1
(1+σ)t
, with discounting factor σ. We choose σ based on the usual assumptions,
depending on the period length ∆t.11 Altogether, we consider T periods, it can
be assumed that T →∞ if long-term strategy is required. Total platform profit
includes the usage and the membership components, and amounts to:
maxpi(ai, Ai, γ) = max
T∑
t=0
1
(1 + σ)t
(pimem + piuse), i ∈ B, S (2.3.10)
whereby pimem(A
B, AS) varies between 0 and (AB − CB)∆NB(t) + (AS −
CS)∆NS(t). With the goal function our optimization problem is complete. Its
formulation follows in the next section.
2.3.5 Optimization problem formulation
In this section we will formulation the optimization problem. It includes the goal
function and constraint equations as defined in the the previous sections:
The goal function:
maxpi(ai, Ai) = max
T∑
t=0
1
(1 + σ)t
(pimem + piuse), i ∈ B, S (2.3.11)
Constraint equations with a discrete variant of the expected utility equations:
11Clearly, if we choose ∆t = 1 day its value differs from the situation where ∆t = 1 month.
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NB(t+ 1) = NB(t) + ∆NB(t+ 1) = NB(t) + λBEUB(t)
(
1− N
B(t)
KB
)
=
= NB(t) + λB(BB − AB+
+
∑
t
1
(1 + σ)t
(bB − aB − r)XSf(NS(t)))
(
1− N
B(t)
KB
)
(2.3.12)
NS(t+ 1) = NS(t) + ∆NS(t+ 1) = NS(t) + λSEUS(t)
(
1− N
S(t)
KS
)
=
= NS(t) + λS(BS − AS −M+
+
∑
t
1
(1 + σ)t
(bS − aS + γr)X
SNB(t)f(NS(t))
NS(t)
)
(
1− N
S(t)
KS
)
(2.3.13)
Furthermore, we require that the number of participants must be non-negative:
NB(t) ≥ 0
NS(t) ≥ 0
With this dynamic model we take into account development of the platform
participants’ number and determine optimal pricing which would remain constant
during the whole time. For instance, if the platform owner assumes certain prices
ai, Ai and (1− γ), she can calculate expected utility for platform participants and
from that determine population dynamics. Then the platform owner can calculate
her cumulated profit. This procedure can be repeated for the whole range of
suitable prices. At the end, the platform owner can compare cumulated profits
resulting from different price setting options and chose the one with the highest
cumulated profit.
Equations 2.3.12 and 2.3.13 are first level recursive equations with two state
interdependent variables NB and NS. Some difference equations can be rewritten
in the analytic form, that is, not dependent on the previous period, initial values
only. Whether this is possible or not, depends on the order and the linearity of
the underlying recurrence equations. Since we have two implicitly interdependent
variables NB and NS which are connected through indirect network effects, their
combination would lead to an increase in the order of the lag (Huckfeldt et al.,
1982). This would also transform the system of linear equations into one non-
linear equations. For the nonlinear dynamic systems, there are no general solution
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techniques. As Huckfeldt et al. (1982) asserts, “solutions to such systems are rarely
known”. Due to this fact, we propose to model the system period by period. We
use Matlab to implement the dynamic framework and analyze the results. Details
will follow in the next section.
2.4 Matlab solution and simulation results
After a brief comment on the implementation in Matlab, we explain the results of
dynamic modeling with respect to the research questions that were formulated in
the introduction section. The first step includes analysis of the model behavior,
which is driven by the customers’ population diffusion. In this section, we consider
the research questions suggested in the introduction and discuss simulation results.
2.4.1 Implementation in Matlab
According to the research questions suggested in the introduction, our goals include
profit maximum calculation and analysis of the model behavior depending on
usage and membership fee and other parameters. The platform owner can vary
all decision parameters, that is, usage and membership fees, etc. to maximize her
profit. Parameter values are to be set only once, in the first period. Also, initial
conditions for other parameters like initial number of platform participants are to be
chosen. Together with the dynamics defined in the previous section and the initial
conditions for the number of participants, the model is completely determined.
We implement variation of parameters with the help of for-loops. All prices are
varied in certain ranges, e.g., membership fee Ai is increasing from 0 to a certain
value comparable to the benefits that a platform participant obtains. Generally, Ai
should not be much higher than membership benefit Bi except in cases where low
membership benefits can be compensated through high usage benefits.
The structure of the Matlab program consists of three major blocks: The
first is parameters and variables declaration, the second includes the main body
with loops that go over fees ranges and time, the third part includes analyses,
visualization of results and various cross-checks. The main body requires some
more explanations.
Beginning with the initial conditions at t = 0, we calculate expected utilities
EU i(t), i ∈ {B, S}. Using those we determine ∆N i(t+ 1) and N i(t+ 1) accordingly.
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Then we calculate platform profit pi(t + 1). Two checks are conducted before
platform profit is calculated: the first one tests whether N i > 0, the second takes
care of different formulations of pi depending on the valued assumed by ∆N i. For
instance, if ∆N i < 0 it does not mean that platform loses membership profit as
was discussed in Section 2.3.4.
This part of the algorithm is to be repeated T times to calculate cumulated
total profit. Further outputs of the time loop are trajectory of the number of
participants and their utilities over time. These calculations must be repeated for
every combination of usage and membership fees for both sides yielding five more
loops including aB, AB, aS, AS, γ.
Platform owners’ task is to set prices. Hence, in general, the fees
aB, AB, aS, AS, γ are varied. Other parameters, like the benefits bB, BB, bS, BS,
costs M for the developers and costs CB, CS, c for the platform, app prices r,
etc., are assumed to be constant. We usually consider T = 50 periods. For
the calibration purposes we considered the following ranges for these parame-
ters: BB ∈ [0; 300], bB ∈ [0; 5], λB ∈ [0.5; 10], BS ∈ [0; 100],M ∈ [30; 300], bS ∈
[0; 5], X ∈ [0.01; 0.1], λS ∈ [0.5; 10], CB = 50, CS = 50, c = 0.5, r = 1. Apart from
model calibration, we used variation of parameter values to prove robustness. We
will comment on this in the following sections. The adjustment function f(NS) is
assumed to be a square root, reflecting the fact that number of interactions grows
under-proportionally with the number of sellers NS.
2.4.2 Analysis of population dynamics
There are different possibilities to model population development. In this model,
the number of new participants is assumed to be proportional to the expected
utility and limited by carrying capacity. There are four cases that describe the
relationship between expected utility and population dynamics:
As long as the impact of carrying capacity is low, four cases are possible
depending on expected utility:
• If expected utility is positive and growing, the number of participants should
be growing with an increasing rate
• If expected utility is positive but sinking, the number of participants should
still be growing but with a decreasing rate
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• If expected utility is negative and rising, the number of participants should
go down with a decreasing rate
• If expected utility is negative and sinking, the number of participants should
go down with an increasing rate.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the case where utility is positive and growing in the
beginning. We have assumed the following parameter values after calibration: For
the users’ side BB = 30, bB = 2, λB = 2; For the developers’ side BS = 0,MS =
50, bS = 0, X = 0.1, λS = 0.5; For the platform owner CB = 50, CS = 50, c = 0.
The initial numbers of participants are NB(t = 0) = 5000, NS(t = 0) = 1000. The
carrying capacities are KB = 100000, KS = 5000. We assume that f(NS) is a
root function, which reflects the idea, that in the beginning the function should
be similar to linear and later on, when more agents join the platform, it should
restrict the number of interactions considerably.
After the 30th time period, population of developers approaches its carrying
capacity KS. This is reflected through slower growth towards the end of the time
interval under consideration. Since the number of developers (and apps) stops
growing, the utility of users decelerates and converges against a certain level. This
leads to an almost constant growth rate and, hence, to an almost linear population
increase. This state will last until carrying capacity of users KB is approached.
Figure 2.4: Rising population and utility.
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In the beginning of the simulation runs, we observe that platform needs a
certain mass to start off, otherwise network effects are not strong enough. This
aspect is called “chicken & egg”-problem, we will discuss it in detail in the next
section. In addition, initial values chosen for N i(t = 0) must agree with other
parameters like the carrying population Ki and λ, otherwise instabilities and
“artificial” oscillations might occur in the first periods.
If the expected utility of at least one side is negative, the participants on this
side will leave the platform. This can happen if the fees for this market side are
set too high. Figure 2.5 illustrates this case. Utility of users (top left graph) is
negative (but increasing). Therefore, the number of users decreases (bottom left
graph), leading to a decrease of the developers’ utility (top right graph). Since
developers utility remains positive, their number is rising but growth is slowing
down (bottom right graph). To prevent number of participants from decreasing, it
is necessary to ensure that their utility is positive.
Figure 2.5: Decreasing population and utility.
2.4.3 Platform profit maximization
One of the key questions in two-sided market theory concerns profit maximizing
pricing strategy. In our case, platform owner can vary five pricing components to
optimize her profit: usage fees aB, aS, membership fees AB, AS and commission fee
(1− γ). She can choose, for instance, to compensate high membership fees with
low usage fees (or the other way around).
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Figure 2.6: Platform profit depending on membership fees AB and AS, aB = aS = 0,
γ = 0, 5. Maximum is assumed at AB = 110, AS = 151.
Analysis and visualization are challenging, since we have five pricing parame-
ters to vary (i.e., usage fees aB, aS, membership fees AB, AS for the both market
sides and commission payment (1− γ)). To address this challenge, we begin with
varying two pricing components first. Then we build up on this and increase
complexity by introducing commission fee next, and finally, usage fees. In the first
case, we optimize platform profit with respect to AB and AS, assuming following
values for the remaining pricing parameters: aB = aS = 0, γ = 50%. We will relax
these assumptions later on.
Profit projection depending on both membership fees AB, AS is a cone-shaped
structure with a unique maximum (cf. Figure 2.6). Maximum profit equals 2.79
million, corresponding membership fees amount to AB = 110, AS = 151. Hence, in
terms of membership fees there is a unique maximum.
141
Next, we want to find out, what happens if commission fee can be chosen also.
It can vary from 0 to 100%, hence it represents the profit share which developers
are getting per sold app. Altogether, we now have three decision parameters and
vary them to maximize profit. In this case, we obtain maximal profit of 2.84
million for the following combination of pricing parameters: AB = 103, AS = 1 and
(1 − γ) = 30% (see Figures 2.7 and 2.8). That means, when flexibility is given,
platform owner choses to reduce membership fee, but to take higher commission.
Compared to the previous case with higher membership fees, but lower commission,
this leads to a steeper growth of platform participants amounts (number of users
equals 18,000 after 50 periods, instead of 12,000, number of developers equals 4,400
instead of 2,400). That is, due to lower membership costs, more participants join
the platform. And more participants lead to more interactions and therefore higher
profit from usage. Hence, the platform owner can increase her profit altogether
capitalizing on increased transactions even more by increasing commission fee from
50% to 70%. On the long run, the effect is even larger, since growth of participants
number slows down as it reaches carrying capacity. Then, less and less profit comes
from membership fees. In this case, high number of interactions is crucial.
One more advantage of fast platform growth is that participants get into a
lock-in situation. This reduces the threat from competitors, since they have to
overcome this lock-in effect first. In many cases, it was crucial for platforms to build
up customer base before competitors join the business. For instance, currently Nokia
has tremendous difficulties to increase its smartphone customer base, although
device quality is quite high (cf., for instance, Cando, 2012), since most potential
customers already own an iPhone, Samsung, HTC or some other smartphone.
Therefore, the possibility to drive down membership fees by introducing higher
commission fee, provides an important degree of freedom.
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 illustrate that there is a unique maximum, both in terms
of membership and commission fees. Several research papers on two-sided markets,
e.g., Rochet and Tirole (2006), Armstrong (2006) and Reisinger (2010), suggest
that in the static setting, it is possible to find more than one combination of usage
and membership fees leading to the same maximum profit. This was considered a
problem, since it made specific recommendations for platform owners impossible,
as Reisinger (2010, p. 1) states:
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Figure 2.7: Platform profit depending on membership fee AB and commission
payment (1− γ). Usage fees are assumed to be 0.
“He [Armstrong (2006)] shows that when platforms compete in two-
part tariffs, a continuum of equilibria exists, each one with a different
profit and surplus for both sides. This causes major problems on the
predictive power of such models. The reason for this multiplicity is
that, given the prices of the rival, a platform receives the same profit
via different combinations of the fixed and the per-transaction fee. In
particular, an agent is indifferent between paying a high fixed fee but a
small per-transaction fee and a low fixed fee but a high per-transaction
fee. Therefore, these combinations attract the same number of agents
and a platform obtains the same profit. Since this holds for both
platforms, a tremendous multiplicity of equilibria emerges.”
In the dynamic case, however, different combinations of fees lead to different
population dynamics. This results in a unique solution achieved through a unique
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Figure 2.8: Platform profit in terms of membership fees AB and AS. Usage fees
are assumed to be 0. Maximum profit is at AB = 103, AS = 1 and (1− γ) = 30%.
combination of usage, membership fees and commission. This is an important
difference between static and dynamic models.
The next step consists in considering all fees simultaneously. So we optimize
platform profit with respect to all five pricing parameters. Interestingly, Matlab
simulation suggest that usage fees aB and aS should be set zero to obtain maximum
profit. Therefore, this yields the same result, as in the previous situation: AB =
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103, AS = 1, (1 − γ) = 30% and aB = aS = 0. The meaning of this result is
that it appears preferable to charge a commission (1− γ) depending on the app
price, rather than a constant per transaction usage fee for users and developers.12
Simulations show that usage fees for the users are supposed to be zero in the
optimal case. This is compensated through comparatively high membership fees
for users.
Extensive testing shows that commission fee proves to be the preferred pricing
instrument in our setting, resulting in aB = aS = 0. Hence, we assume aB = aS = 0
going forward. Since other research papers do not use the whole set of fees including
usage, membership and commission fees, as we do, they also do not deliver any
comparable result. The result that platforms rather use commission fees than
constant usage fees, is remarkable. The reasoning behind this is that a commission
fee allows developers (or, in general, sellers) to offer inexpensive or even free apps
(or goods), what leads to high trading volumes. But it also allows platforms
to capitalize on expensive goods obtaining a share of sales prices. This pricing
mechanism is employed widely by such platforms as the App Store, Amazon and
eBay.
2.4.4 Platform kick-off and minimal number of partici-
pants
One of the key challenges on two-sided markets is that a platform must get both
customer sides on board to do business. But as long as there are no users, no
developers would join and vice versa. Caillaud and Jullien (2003) have called this
phenomenon “chicken & egg” problem. Which number of participants would be
sufficient to kick-off the platform, depends on several parameters. First, looking
at the expected utility equations, we recognize that due to the low number of
participants the usage part will be quite small in the beginning. This must be
compensated with very high membership benefits. For developers the initial
investment is quite high, since they do not only pay fees and buy hardware, but also
12Clearly, it is possible to choose usage fee equivalently to the commission fee for developers.
But in general, commission fee can vary depending on the app prices.
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invest time in programming and designing the apps. Platforms will be forced to ask
for extremely low membership payments in order to attract more participants.13
This is an interesting result that also provides an explanation for the phe-
nomenal success of Apple’s App Store or Amazon’s market place. Due to high
membership benefits, they managed to attract users first, then app developers or
sellers followed very fast.
In the beginning, membership fees are the key platform engine. Later in the
lifecycle, usage fees become more and more important due to two effects. The
number of participants on both sides is high enough to enable many interactions,
leading to a higher profit from platform usage. At the same time, the number
of new customers per period will finally decrease, so that the contribution of the
membership component for the platform will decrease. Altogether, this suggests
that on many platforms, a shift should occur from the membership fees in the
beginning of the life cycle, to the usage fees later on. We will discuss this in more
detail in Section 2.4.6.
Once platform owner recognizes that she needs a certain number of partic-
ipants on both sides to start-off the platform, she might ask herself, how many
participants exactly are necessary. In the following, we show how the initial number
of participants necessary to ensure that the platform can kick-off can be determined.
Compare Figures 2.9 and 2.10. On Figure 2.9 expected utility drops to 0, also
population of B’s decreases to 0 in the second period (in the first period population
is determined by initial conditions). On Figure 2.10 utilities are slightly positive,
and also number of participants starts to grow. In the first case we used 1137 as
the initial number of users (buyers), in the second case, 1138. We assume that we
have only one developer (seller) in the beginning and calculate, how many users are
at least necessary to kick-off the platform nonetheless. We have assumed λB = 10
to speed up population growth14, all other parameters remain the same.
It is easy to imagine that this combination of values is not unique. Clearly,
lower initial number of users can be compensated by higher number of developers
13As some key developers (Cheezburger Network, Foursquare) considered Microsoft’s market
share too small to justify development of a new app for the Windows Phone, Microsoft reacted
by incentivizing developers. Not only did Microsoft provide developers with free phones and
prime spots in its app platform, in some cases Microsoft even financed the app development (cf.
Wortham and Wingfield, 2012).
14This allows us to operate with lower initial numbers, which requires less resources, and
therefore makes Matlab simulation faster.
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Figure 2.9: There are infinitely many combinations of developers and users numbers
that are not sufficient to get the platform going.
Figure 2.10: Adding a small number of agents (in this case one) to at least one of
the sides might be sufficient to kick-off the platform.
and vice versa. Hence, the question arises, how to find the optimal combination of
initial number of users and developers that would allow to kick-off the platform.
Table 2.1 shows profit assigned to different combinations of initial numbers of users
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and developers varied by 100 for a given pricing decision.15 Profit is assumed to
be 0 if platform fails to kick-off. Shaded areas highlight combinations of users
and developers numbers, where profit switches from 0 to a positive number, hence,
where the platform kicks off.
Information regarding minimal number of participants necessary to kick off
the platform can be very useful for a platform owner who wants to launch a new
platform. In this case, she can determine, how many participants are needed on
both sides. For instance, the platform would start off if 500 developers and 800 users
are on board. If there are only 400 developers, 800 users would not be sufficient.
But the solution is not unique, that is, there are infinitely many combinations
of user and developer numbers that allow to just kick off the platform.16 This is
an important insight, leading to the conclusion that if a platform possesses many
customers on the one market side, that can compensate for the lack of customers on
the other market side, attracting missing customers due to high potential indirect
network effects. Still, not all these combinations lead to the same platform profit.
Hence, from the platform’s point of view, an additional profit optimization is
necessary.
One more important insight is that the result (that is, platform profit), reacts
to the absolute change in the number of agents on the both market sides not in
the same way. In this case, profit responds more strongly to the absolute change
in the number of developers. This is due to the fact, that we assumed that much
less developers (or apps) are available (and needed) to start of the platform. It
is easy to imagine that if there are 10,000 users and 100 developers17, each user
has a choice between 100 apps. This would result in many interactions. Ideally,
each of the 10,000 users would download each app, resulting in 1,000,000 total
downloads. Moreover, if there are 100 users and 10,000 apps, it is not probable that
we would obtain the same number of interactions, because there are limits to the
sensible number of apps per mobile device. So even if every of the 100 users would
download the same 100 apps, we would obtain only 10,000 downloads instead of
1,000,000. From the mathematical point of view, this fact is expressed through
15Clearly, the initial numbers of users and developers can be varied by 10s or 1s, we consider
the variation by 100s to speed up Matlab simulations.
16There are infinitely many solutions if we assume that the number of participants need not be
an integer.
17We assume that each developer produces one app.
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Table 2.1: Profit depending on the combinations of initial numbers of developers
and users.
usage of the adjustment function XSf(NS) introduced in Section 2.3.3. Hence, in
order to kick off the platform, platform owner can put together a table with profits
assigned to combination of initial numbers of developers and users. Then she can
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analyze, which group shows higher sensitivity/indirect network effects.18 Finally,
she can estimate, which group is easier to attract, for instance, through subsidizing
membership fees or increasing membership benefits). Based on all these factors
she can decide, which combination of initial number of users and sellers to chose.
2.4.5 Short-term versus long-term optimization
As was discussed before, we assume an S-curve population development. Carrying
capacity (1− N i
Ki
) limits platform growth. As was pointed out in Section 2.3.1, this
factor ensures that the number of users of an app platform cannot grow higher than
total world population that can afford a mobile device or that can program an app.
Hence, in the long run, platform participants numbers will converge (cf. Figure
2.4). This results in the non-linear curve with three possible life-cycle phases: i)
underproportional growth, ii) stronger overproportional growth and, finally, iii) a
slow down as carrying capacity is reached.
Its non-linear character suggests that there might be a difference between long-
term and short-term optimization. As explained in detail in Kouris (2012), different
life-cycles of the platform development require different strategic approaches. This
has also impact on pricing. In the launch phase, platforms tend to set very low
prices to attract a critical mass of participants. Later on, it might be beneficial
to increase the prices to cash the profits. And once competition appears, price
reductions can be necessary. Hence, depending on perspective, there might be
differences for price setting strategies. To see these differences we compare prices
and population dynamics for 3 different time horizons: 30, 50 and 70 periods. We
observe that optimal prices can differ by more than 50% (cf. Table 2.2).
Number of periods AB AS (1− γ)
30 69 1 20%
50 103 1 30%
70 150 1 30%
Table 2.2: Fees optimized for 30, 50 and 70 periods.
In general, the shorter the time horizon, the lower the fees. Both membership
fees (for users) and commission fee are affected: AB = 69, (1 − γ) = 20% for
18In the static case, price elasticities are used to indicate this sensitivity.
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30 periods versus AB = 150, (1 − γ) = 30% for 70 periods. This supports our
hypothesis, that in the launch phase optimal prices tend to be lower than later on.
The second reason for setting lower fees over the shorter horizon is that membership
cost must be recovered over a shorter horizon. That is, expected costs and benefits
are calculated over 30 periods instead of 50 or 70 periods. Simulations show that if
platform owner would set the same prices for 30 periods as those that would be
optimal for 70 periods (namely AB = 150, AS = 1, (1 − γ) = 30%), users would
be forced to leave the platform, since expected costs are too high compared with
expected benefits over 30 periods (cf. Figure 2.11).
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Figure 2.11: Platform dynamics over 30 periods with AB = 150, AS = 1, (1− γ) =
30%.
Also population dynamics do not look the same, although the overall form
remains similar. Figures 2.12 and 2.13 show platform dynamics for users and
developers compared over 30, 50 and 70 periods (each with optimal prices). We
observe that the longer the horizon the more participants are attracted and willing
to invest membership fees both on users’ and developers’ sides. Hence, in general,
short-term and long-term profit maximization might lead to quite different results.
Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate carefully the differences and to clearly define,
which perspective to focus on.
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Figure 2.12: Users’ dynamics over 30, 50 and 70 periods.
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Figure 2.13: Developers’ dynamics over 30, 50 and 70 periods.
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2.4.6 Price adjustments
We observe that in some real-world situations platforms adjust their rules, and
especially prices, over time. For instance, eBay alters its rules from time to time
(cf. Steiner, 2010). At the same time, we have observed that app platforms did
not change their fees much, at least not in obvious ways, that is, commission fee of
30% remains the same over time and across most app platforms. Also membership
fees, which are the costs of the devices, seem not to change much. But a more close
look shows that there are some changes going on. For instance, recently the App
Store has adjusted the app price levels (cf. Essers, 2012). This has a similar effect
to increasing commission fees. So we want to understand, what would our model
suggest in terms of price adjustment. We model a setting, where after a certain
period of time the platform obtains the opportunity to adjust its prices.
Our Matlab simulations show that the optimal platform owner’s strategy is
to increase fees if given a chance. Also, simulations show that fees increase should
be the higher, the later it occurs, since platform owner can afford to set the higher
prices if more agents have already joined the platform. First, we consider the usual
profit optimization situation (all parameters remain the same as before, λB = 2,
λS = 0.5). In this case, optimal prices are AB = 103, AS = 1 and (1− γ) = 30%.
Then we assume that the platform owner decides to adjust prices after 10 periods. In
this case, the optimal prices going forward are AB = 124, AS = 1 and (1−γ) = 30%.
The user’s membership fee rises, other fees remain the same. Subsequently, we
consider price adjustments after 15, 20 and 30 periods. The results are summarized
in Table 2.3. We observe two phenomena: i) for users, there is an increase in
membership fees; ii) membership fees for developers remain the same and as low
as possible; iii) commission fees become smaller and smaller. This means that the
platform owner keeps attracting more and more developers, therefore being able to
provide higher utility for (potential) users. And due to the increasing utility, the
platform owner is able to charge higher membership fees.
Therefore, if there is no competition, it would be optimal from the platform
owner point of view to increase membership fees for the users over time. Also,
the later possibility of price change occurs, the higher fees platform owner can
afford to chose. For instance, membership prices for users increase by 20% after 20
periods. Now the question occurs, how competition would influence this strategy.
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Number of periods AB AS (1− γ)
0 103 1 30%
10 124 1 30%
15 125 1 20%
20 129 1 10%
30 153 1 10%
Table 2.3: Adjustment of optimal fees depending on the time point (after 0, 10, 15,
20 and 30 periods).
To analyze this, we introduce external shocks in form of competition in the next
section.
2.4.7 Reaction to external shocks
This section is devoted to exogenous disruptive influences. While in the previous
sections we have considered platform development influenced by endogenous factors
only, here we will cover situations where exogenous impulses occur. This is an
important extension from applied point of view, since analysis of reaction to
disruptions due to external influence (like introduction of competition, adjustments
of regulations or introduction of new technologies) is crucial for such industries as
app platforms for mobile devices.
We begin Matlab simulations with one platform evolving over time (as before).
But at a certain point of time a disruption will occur, caused, for instance, by new
competitor’s entry. The main influence of a new competitor manifests itself in luring
developers and users from the incumbent platform. As a result, the incumbent can
attract less new participants in the short run and even loose churning participants
on the long run.19 The same approach can be used also in case of other disruptions,
e.g., new regulations or new technology. This is due to the fact that all of them
result the same threat, namely reduction of potential participants.
Reduction of the number of new participants can be modeled by introducing
a new parameter φi ∈ [0; 1], i ∈ B, S, showing which of the 2 competing platforms a
participant decides to join. φi can be different for developers and users, depending
19Since we consider time periods shorter than 2 years, which is the usual duration of a mobile
contracts, churn is negligible, but it can be easily introduced as an extension.
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on attractiveness of the new platform. This would alter platform dynamics in the
following way:
∆N i(t+ 1) = φiλiEU i(t)
(
1− N
i(t)
Ki
)
, i ∈ {B, S}. (2.4.1)
Now let us assume that after a certain number of periods (e.g., T = 10) a new
platform enters the market claiming a share of the new market participants (e.g.,
1/2).20 We assume for now that participants who already belong to the incumbent
platform do not churn. With help of Matlab simulation we want to find out, how
this exogenous shock impacts choice of optimal prices. We consider two cases: in
the base case no competitors enter the market, in the new case, a competitor enters
the market. In the first case optimal membership prices are AB = 95 and AS = 188
for a given commission (1− γ) = 50%.
In the case where a new competitor enters claiming 1/2 of new potential
customers, the optimal price combination is as follows: AB = 93, AS = 181. Hence,
change in the optimal membership fees amounts to less than 5%. Taking into
account that we assumed relatively high φi of 50% for each market side, this seems
an astonishingly week reaction.
As was mentioned before, the canonical oligopoly theories like Bertrand or
Cournot competition would suggest a noticeable price adjustment. The first aspect
that is responsible for these discrepancies are indirect network effects: once the
critical mass is reached, the new competitors are much less dangerous, than in
the situation without network effects. The second aspect that plays an important
role for the platform price setting strategy is availability of multi-homing. If multi-
homing is costly (as it is the case for app platforms), the new competitor would
have more difficulties while trying to enter the market as Sun and Tse (2007) show.
One more interesting question pertains to the status of subsidy side. Matlab
simulation shows that entrance of a competitor might lead to switching between
subsidizing one side to subsidizing the other. Consider the usual setting (initial
number of participants N i(t = 0) equals 2000 and 500 respectively), assume constant
(1− γ) = 30%. Optimal prices without disruption equal AB = 86 and AS = 284.
Now consider a disruption after 10 periods. Then optimal prices starting in period
10 would be AB = 89 and AS = 238. While prices for sellers go down as expected
201/2 is a rather high share for a new platform, but looking at the real-world platforms launches,
like Android in 2008, it can be plausible.
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as a reaction to the competitor entry, price for users goes up slightly. This is done
to compensate for revenue losses from the sellers’ side. Hence, platform moves
toward a situation where the price for users goes up, so that they start subsidizing
the other side. This effects gets the stronger, the later in time disruption occurs.
Also, similar to the previous case the price adjustment remains quite low (around
15% in this case). These results remain robust with variation of parameters.
The key finding of this section, namely, that new competitor entry not
necessarily results in noticeable price reductions, can help to explain, what was
observed for the app platforms during the last years. After the success of the App
Store, many other app platforms were launched. But Apple has never changed
their pricing strategy, neither the membership fees, nor the commission payments.
Also other platforms like Google Play or BlackBerry App World practically do not
alter their pricing. The simulations at hand might provide an explanation for that,
namely, once a certain number of platform participants is achieved, optimal pricing
strategy is not affected strongly by new competitors entry.
2.5 Conclusion
This research paper focuses on a dynamic two-sided market model. This model
aims at overcoming limitations of static two-sided models. It is based on the
dynamic systems theory, examples from life sciences and differential game theory.
The dynamic model at hand builds on the integrated two-sided market model (cf.
Kouris, 2011). It includes several new extensions like adjustment of the number
of interactions and commission payments between market sides, and integrates
several prevailing parameters into one model. Based on system dynamics, examples
from life sciences and differential game theory, we develop a dynamic model.
Profit calculation and optimization is implemented in Matlab in form of computer
simulation, since the mathematical problem at hand is too complex to be solved
analytically.
Section 2.4 shows that it is possible to determine a unique profit maximum
for the platform. The combination of usage/commission and membership fees to
reach the maximum is also unique in the dynamic case. The next result pertains to
the “chicken & egg” problem. It can be avoided if membership benefits are large
enough to compensate for low network effects. It is also possible to determine the
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minimal number of participants on both market sides which is necessary to start-off
the platform as was shown in Section 2.4.4.
In Section 2.4.5 we have demonstrated that despite of convergence of the
population dynamic, short-term and long-term strategies might differ. This should
be taken into account when developing strategies for platforms. The next research
question considered in Section 2.4.6 was touching upon possibility to adjust prices
after a certain period of time. We were able to show that platform owner should
increase prices, in particular, membership fees for the users if there is a chance to
do so. The later this price adjustment happens, the higher fees platform owner
should chose.
After having analyzed possible price adjustments, we proceed with consid-
eration of external shocks in Section 2.4.7. Reaction to external shocks, such as
competition, new technologies or new regulations, is an important question from
the platform-owner point of view. Matlab simulations show that optimal price
reduction due to entrance of new competitors might turn out surprisingly small
(less than 5%), even in cases where a competitor attacks 1/2 of the new participants.
This is in line with real-world observations: commission fee remains constant over
time across all app platforms, and also membership fees do not change much.21
Overall, the dynamic model proves to be a powerful instrument to understand
the behavior of two-sided markets, and especially of app platforms. The model
at hand provides the first step towards modeling of dynamic platform behavior.
The next steps can include mitigating limitations of this model or using different
research methods, for instance, empirical, to extend and validate our results.
Our research presented here displays several limitations. We consider pricing
variables, that is, membership, usage and commission fees being the only parameters
to be set by the platform. In reality, there are many more strategic parameters, like
marketing and advertizing spend, open versus closed approach to app development,
content providing and compatibility of adjacent fields (e.g., other hardware and
content should be ideally compatible with the operating system used by the app
platform). Furthermore, we have explored one possible mathematical approach to
the dynamic two-sided market models, based on dynamic system theory, examples
from life sciences and differential game theory. It would be interesting to try to
develop an analogous model (including membership, usage and commission fees)
21We observe a slight price reduction for mobile devices due to the technological progress and
increased supply.
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using other mathematical approaches mentioned in Section 2.2.2, for instance that
of Sun and Tse (2007) or Cabral (2011). We believe, it would be insightful to find
out, if it is possible to build such models at all, and if the results developed with
help of different mathematical approaches are compatible. If not, it is necessary to
understand, how this can be overcome to arrive at viable recommendations for the
real world platforms.
Other simplification we used is restricting ourselves to the 3 most important
kinds of stakeholders – platform owner, users and developers. In reality, more other
participants contribute and depend on mobile ecosystems around app platforms,
e.g., mobile operators, content providers and advertisers. These stakeholders can
have significant impact on the mobile ecosystem, platform owner decisions and
pricing strategies. Although we refrained from including further stakeholders in our
models to avoid further complexity, we believe that it would be a great opportunity
for future research to include these stakeholders in two-sided market models and
thereby develop a real multi-sided model.
One more large avenue for future research are empirical surveys and appli-
cations of our model to various real-world platforms. Also simulation of entry
deterrence in this setting could provide and interesting line for future research.
Introduction of stochastic behavior might be a valuable extension allowing to reflect
the uncertainty which we observe in the real world.
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3Paper III: App Store, Quo Vadis?
Challenges and Strategies for App
Platforms
Abstract
“App platforms” are electronic software distribution markets for mobile devices
like smartphones or tablets. They gained popularity after Apple launched its App
Store in 2008. Since then, app platforms have transformed the entire mobile
communications industry, including mobile network operators, device producers,
software suppliers, content providers, advertisers, etc.
Platforms (like the App Store) which intermediate between two distinct groups
of customers connected through indirect network effects can be effectively analyzed by
applying the theory of two-sided markets. The interdependence between customers,
platforms, and developers require consideration of strategic issues not present in
traditional models. These issues may pertain to all development phases, including
platform design, launch, and competition, and thus have an effect on existing and
new business models in this sector.
Economics literature on two-sided markets focuses on theoretical analysis,
paying only little attention to managerial implications. Strategic management
literature, on the other hand, rather provides practical guidelines. This paper
discusses strategic issues arising in the app platform industry, combining these two
streams of literature. Based on a thorough analysis of the key stakeholders in the
app platform industry (platform owner, developers, and users), we use our findings
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to provide management recommendations and discuss possible developments of the
industry.
Keywords: Business models, two-sided market, app platform, mobile industry,
pricing strategy, competition.
JEL classification numbers: L8, L81, L82, L86, L96.
165
3.1 Introduction
“App platforms” are electronic software distribution platforms for mobile devices
like smartphones or tablets. They gained popularity after Apple launched its App
Store in July 2008. Since then, app platforms have transformed the entire mobile
communications industry, including mobile network operators, device producers,
software suppliers, content providers, advertisers, and so on.1 Although the App
Store’s advantage seemed incontestable, other app platforms such as Google Play
for Android OS have managed to enter the market and gain high popularity (cf.
comScore Reports, 2011). Other platforms have followed Apple and Google, forming
coalitions and trying to create niche markets. This has lead to differentiation and
further development of the business model.
App platforms are not a single example but part of large-scale change. Over
the last decade, platforms became the “invisible engines” of our economies (Evans
et al., 2006). Amazon, eBay, and Google have advanced to top brands worldwide.2
Following Gawer and Cusumano (2007, p. 2), we define platforms as “systems
of technologies that combine core components with complementary products and
services usually made by a variety of firms.” Platforms spread across many
industries, leading to the creation of new business areas and products. Moreover,
they change the entire economic structure and fundamentally influence business
strategies.
The underlying structure of a platform is that of a network. One crucial feature
of networks are network effects. These denote the phenomenon that participants’
profit depends on the number of other participants in the market (Katz and Shapiro,
1985, 1986, Farell and Saloner, 1985, 1986). There are direct and indirect network
effects. Direct network effects (or same-side effects) occur between members of
the same customer group, for instance, the more participants join a telephone
network, the more people can be reached, the higher the utility of each single
participant. Indirect network effects (or cross-side effects) occur between members
of the disjunct groups, like developers and users. That is, the more developers
join a platform, the higher the users’ benefit. Strategic management literature
1“The runaway success of Apple’s iPhone App Store, the online site where iPhone and iPod
Touch owners can download free or cheap software for their devices, has transformed the mobile
software marketplace.” – Taylor (2009).
2Cf. www.interbrand.com.
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on platform management (e.g., Gawer and Cusumano, 2008, Eisenmann, 2007)
provides practical guidelines on how to deal with these effects. However, it does
not provide an adequate theoretical framework to thoroughly analyze complex
interactions. Economic literature, on the other hand, analyzes platforms that
intermediate between two distinct groups of customers connected through indirect
network effects in so called two-sided market models (e.g., Rochet and Tirole, 2003,
Evans, 2003, Tag, 2008). However, the analysis focuses on the theoretical aspects
of two-sided markets, and not so much on the managerial implications of these
theories. With this paper, we aim to bring these two streams of literature closer
together. We analyze the app platform industry and the business models of the
stakeholders involved. The main contribution of our paper are applications of
the theoretical findings to the app platform industry: We show which strategic
decisions are the most important ones in the different lifecycle stages of an app
platform. We will primarily cover the app platform owner’s perspective, leaving
developers’ and customers’ perspectives to future research.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin with a literature
review on platform analysis and two-sided market models in Section 3.2. We explain
the key economic principles of two-sided markets to arrive at a framework for indus-
try analysis. Subsequently, we consider app platforms for mobile devices in Section
3.3. We provide an industry overview and discuss the platform business model
and key stakeholders. Section 3.4 covers strategic issues and insights structured
according to the three lifecycle phases (design, launch, and competition). Although
we focus on app platforms for mobile devices as the underlying industry, the insights
apply to many other Internet-based platforms. Section 3.5 concludes and points
out interesting aspects for further research from a managerial perspective.
3.2 Literature Review and Background
In this section, we provide the background for platform analysis. We begin with a
brief literature overview on platforms and two-sided markets and then explain the
key economic principles of two-sided market models. The focus is on understanding
the main features of such models and their implications.
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3.2.1 Platforms
In recent years, platform competition has become a key element in many (and in
particular high-tech) industries (Evans et al., 2006, Gawer and Cusumano, 2008).
Hidding et al. (2011) identify four fundamental drivers for the rise of platforms:
Modularity, increased interconnectivity, self-organization, and low marginal cost of
production. Given the increased number of industries with platform character, it
is not surprising that management literature on this topic is growing. The main
research directions include network analysis, platform competition, and management
of complementors, which are briefly described in the following paragraphs.
In the literature on networks, platforms assume a key role among actors (Eaton
et al., 2010). Platforms, as a bottleneck, may constrain the overall performance
(Baldwin and Clark, 2006) and limit the service level of the network (Teece, 1986).
On the other hand, the gate keeping position allows the platform owner to extract
a significant share of the economic value of the network (Baldwin and Clark, 2006)
and thus sustain a competitive advantage (Porter, 1985). Basole (2009) shows how
a structural analysis of networks can be used to visualize the ecosystem of actors.
This can be used to identify a platform’s competitive position and characterize its
business strategy.
The literature on platform competition addresses what business and tech-
nology decisions help companies become and remain platform leaders (Gawer and
Cusumano, 2008). While there is a certain advantage of being the first to market
(established customer base, switching costs, network effects), Hidding et al. (2011)
find that in their sample of 15 platform industries, the first mover continues to
be the leader in only one market. Successful followers mainly used a “platform
envelopment strategy” (Eisenmann et al., 2007), which means that the entrant
combines its own functionality with the leader’s platform to leverage shared user
relationships and common components.
Companies providing complementary services are crucial, since they signifi-
cantly enhance the platform’s value. Platform owners should therefore pay close
attention to how they attract and manage their complementors. In an extensive case
study on Intel’s strategy, Gawer and Henderson (2007) find that Intel established
a good balance of encouraging entry, despite the fact that Intel has the potential
to “squeeze” entrants ex-post. Related to this issue is the level of a platform’s
openness. Parker and van Alstyne (2009) analyze the tension between innovation
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and open access. In essence, they find that the platform sponsor has to establish a
balance between fostering platform adoption and complementary investment versus
capturing immediate profits from the platform itself. Boudreau (2010) analyzes
different modes of open access to a platform. He finds that licensing complementary
hardware developers had a strong, inverted U-shaped effect on innovation. The
effect of IP sharing in the form of reference design was smaller. With respect to
giving up platform control, he also finds a positive, yet small effect of openness
on innovation. However, as the focus of Boudreau’s paper is innovativeness, the
effects on platform profits are not analyzed. Eisenmann (2007) analyzes factors
that favor proprietary versus shared models when designing new platforms. For
the subsequent lifecycle stages (network mobilization and platform maturity), he
explains how management challenges differ between these two types of platforms.
While the strategic platform management literature clearly provides several
valuable recommendations for platform management, it does not offer an adequate
theoretical framework to fully describe the complex network interactions. We
therefore now turn to the (more theory-based) economic literature on two-sided
markets.
3.2.2 Two-sided markets
Two-sided markets can roughly be defined as platforms that enable interactions
between two groups of customers who value each other’s presence (Rochet and
Tirole, 2003, Evans, 2003, Tag, 2008). Research on two-sided markets builds on
network economics and complementary product pricing (cf. Rochet and Tirole,
2003, earlier assessments are, e.g., from Katz and Shapiro, 1985, 1986, Farell and
Saloner 1985, 1986). One of the key concepts for two-sided markets is that of
“indirect network effects”: The utility of those on one side of the market increases
with the number (and/or quality) of participants on the other side. Examples of
platforms that can be interpreted as two-sided markets range from credit card
systems and software platforms to night clubs and shopping malls. Due to the
diversity of two-sided market examples, various extensions are necessary to describe
different types of platforms.
A large body of literature on two-sided markets has emerged over the last
decade (cf. Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006, Caillaud and Jullien, 2003, Evans, 2003,
and Armstrong, 2006, to name just a few). The emphasis has clearly been on two
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research directions – the development of extensions for monopoly and duopoly cases.
Other research thrusts, such as dynamic two-sided market models or empirical
evaluations are still quite rare and definitely represent interesting development
opportunities for future research.
3.2.3 Two-sided market models
Two-sided market models are usually based on three equations: The platform profit
equation and the two utility equations for the two market sides (Rochet and Tirole,
2003) – the one for the seller side, the other for the user side. Each of them can
consist of membership and usage parts. Membership benefits, fees and costs are
induced only once, while usage benefits, fees, and costs are recurring and depend
on the number of transactions, e.g., downloads.
The key insight of two-sided market models is that the solution does not only
depend on the total fee level, but on the pricing structure. Hence, total demand
(and total revenue) depends on the allocation of fees among the two market sides.
Imagine two customer groups (sellers and buyers) whose respective demand curves
are presented in Figure 3.1. Assume that sellers’ fees are reduced and buyers’ fees
are increased by the same amount. As a result, the number of sellers increases
significantly, attracting new buyers so that the buyers’ demand curve shifts. The
total effect is a relatively small reduction in revenue on the seller’s side, which
leads to a strong increase in revenue on the buyers’ side. This example denotes the
interdependence between the two market sides and the importance of determining
the optimal fee allocation.
Traditional economic intuition suggests that if prices are equal in the beginning
for both sides, a price increase is more effective on the side with the steeper demand
curve, while a reduction is more effective on the side with the curve that is less
steep. This also holds for two-sided markets. One prominent example is the pricing
strategy of night clubs. Often, women do not only get in free of charge, they even
get a free drink. If there are many women in a night club, men are willing to pay
more to compensate for the revenue loss of free drinks.
What is new in two-sided market theory is that in equilibrium, the ratio of
fees for the two market sides should be proportional to the ratio of their price
elasticities (not the other way around). The market side with the lower price
elasticity pays less than the other side and is often even subsidized (“subsidy side”)
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Figure 3.1: The key feature of the two-sided market is that the platform owner has
to take two interdependent demand functions into account.
to attract the other side (“money side”). This result was first reported in Rochet
and Tirole (2003). It is often seen as counterintuitive, since the more elastic market
side is supposed to pay more (Bolt and Tieman, 2005). Price elasticities cannot be
treated as constants, but should be seen as functions of prices. The inverse slopes
of demand curves are not equivalent to price elasticities. As Krueger (2009) points
out, this resolves the seeming contradiction.
For the model to reflect the app platform structure, we have to adjust the
canonical model of Rochet and Tirole (2003). We have to consider additional
parameters and extensions, like usage fees, membership fees, payment between cus-
tomer groups, and quality review of participants, which were discussed in different
papers on two-sided markets in a different context or industry. Armstrong (2006)
and Rochet and Tirole (2006) introduce membership fees and payments between
customer groups, and Hagiu (2009) and Jeon and Rochet (2010) analyze quality
reviews. Furthermore, new parameters must be introduced, like segmentation of
participants, commission payments, and adjustments for the number of interactions.
Kouris (2011) explains these additional elements and derives a solution for the
resulting model based on price elasticities. Understanding the impact of parameters
like membership fees, quality of apps, and customer segmentation, etc., is key for
addressing challenges pertaining to app platform stakeholders.
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For competition between platforms, multi-homing is an important issue.
“Multi-homing” refers to a situation in which participants might join more than
one platform (cf. Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006, Armstrong, 2006, Armstrong and
Wright, 2007, Sun and Tse, 2007). Market participants might choose between three
possibilities: To not join any platform, to join only one platform (“single-homing”)
or to join more than one platform (“multi-homing”). The decision is taken at the
individual participant’s level, that is, not all participants need to join more than
one platform in the case of multi-homing, but only some. For single-homing, not all
agents have to be part of the same platform, but they might decide to join different
platforms (albeit only one at a time). Single-homing behavior can be driven by
the requirements imposed by platforms, like exclusive contracts. Alternatively,
it can be driven by the costs of multi-homing, for instance, when platforms are
incompatible or charge high membership fees. The more single-homing behavior is
observed, the more likely it is for a single platform (“winner-takes-all” dynamic) to
dominate. We will return to this aspect in Section 3.4.
Economides and Katsamakas (2006) compare a proprietary with an open
source platform. They find that when users prefer application variety, the total
profits of the proprietary industry are larger than the total profits of an industry
based on an open source platform. Application variety, however, is larger in the
open source platform.
Another key factor for platform competition are the same-side effects. There
are networks with positive same side effect, for instance, file exchange is only
possible between computer users if they have the same (or a compatible) operating
system. For many networks, the side effects are negative due to crowding out and
increasing competition: The higher the number of developers who participate in a
platform, the lower the attention a single developer gets. Both effects exist for app
platforms as we will discuss in the following Section 3.3. In most models, network
effects are exogenously given. Bakos and Katsamakas (2008) address this gap in
the literature and allow for investments by the platform owner to influence network
effects. They show that an independent platform owner invests too little compared
to the social optimum.
Given the theoretical insights of this stream of literature, we now aim to
derive managerial implications for app platforms, using the findings of strategic
management literature on platforms as well. We first describe the app platform
industry and the key stakeholders. Consequently, we discuss how the insights gained
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from the two-sided market theory can be applied to address strategic challenges
arising in the app platform industry and how they affect business models in these
markets.
3.3 App platforms
App platforms are a special form of electronic markets. Software developers can
distribute their software applications (apps) among users of mobile devices like
smartphones or tablets via app platforms. Hence, developers and users are indirectly
connected: Developers profit from the users who purchase their apps and users
benefit from the apps. The groups are not disjunct, since some users are also
developers and many developers are also users, but they are nonetheless distinct
enough. Due to these direct and indirect network effects, app platforms can be
analyzed using two-sided market theory.
In this section, we provide background information on app platforms and
identify those parameters from two-sided market theory which are relevant for app
platforms. We begin with a brief industry overview and proceed with a description
of business models and key stakeholders of app platforms. This creates a foundation
for understanding the industry’s key challenges and issues.
3.3.1 Industry overview
Apple’s App Store and Google Play for Android OS are probably the best known
app platforms. In fact, there are many more app platforms – and some of them
were founded as early as 1999. For example, Handango has been offering apps for
mobile phones since 1999. But it was not until the App Store opened that app
platforms gained momentum. Several hypotheses can be provided to explain why
it took until 2008 for app platforms to gain popularity, for example, usability (size
of screen), connectivity (3G and 4G coverage) or the hardware price might have
contributed to the development of the app platform. The launch of the App Store
has changed the mobile phone industry in practically all dimensions.3 After three
years on the market, there were 425,000 apps available in the App Store. The
number of downloads exceeded 14,000,000,000 (Apple, 2011).
3Cf., for instance, the remark by Steve Jobs, the founder and former CEO of Apple: “The App
Store is like nothing the industry has ever seen before in both scale and quality.” Apple (2009).
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The app platform industry as a whole thrived especially in 2011, growing by
around 150% and reaching USD 5.6 billion in revenues in 2011. Apple managed
to remain the market leader, accounting for 75% of total market revenues, by far
outpacing other market participants (Kent, 2011). Projections for the future are
positive as well: In 2013, total revenues are expected to reach USD 26 billion and
this number is estimated to grow up to USD 77 billion in 2017 (Gartner, 2013).
In 2011, Apple, Google, Nokia, and RIM were the most important players
in the market. Apple will probably remain the leader in terms of revenues for
the next 2–3 years, but other platforms will also gain traction. Android currently
enjoys high shares in the smartphone market (53% in the USA) and high sales (e.g.,
61% in Germany in 2011). Windows and Nokia are continuously losing market
share (Nokia from around 70% in 2006 to under 30% in 2011 in terms of the
number of handsets worldwide), however, together they have an interesting value
proposition for the future. Due to the consolidation and merging of mobile devices
and computers, Windows could become the key player in this process. Nokia
has the capacity to produce low-cost devices that can boost sales as soon as the
high-end market is saturated (Virki, 2012).
3.3.2 Business models and key stakeholders
In this section, we provide a brief description of app platform business models
and operations. There are three key types of participants in app platforms: The
platform owner, developers, and users. Platform owners connect developers and
users, specify the rules and provide services. Developers program apps and submit
them to the platform so users can download them. In the following, we describe
each group of participants in detail.
App platform owners App platform operators provide the entire infrastructure
(like user interface, server space, etc.) and determine the rules for the interaction
between the two market sides. They can also provide information about apps and
developers and serve as a trusted third party by controlling app quality.
Belleflamme and Peitz (2010) refer to the business model used by platforms
as an intermediary business model. They distinguish between 4 major roles of
intermediaries: Dealer (resells goods), platform operator (connects sellers and
buyers), infomediary (facilitates information gathering and procession), and trusted
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third party (certification agent). Many platforms have chosen a hybrid business
model. For instance, in 1995, Amazon started off as a dealer of books only,
subsequently adding many other product categories. Then, following eBay in
2001, Amazon launched Amazon marketplace. This transformed Amazon from a
’pure’ dealer into a platform operator. At the same time, Amazon assumed the
infomediary and trusted third party role. There are also examples where companies
have skipped the dealer role: Apple was never perceived as a pure re-seller. Its
“pre-platform phase” included offering own apps before launching the App Store.
The main difference between a dealer and a platform operator is that the latter
does not control the transaction price in a direct way by buying and reselling
products, instead, he or she charges for platform membership and transactions.
App platform owners are platform operators in the first place, and some combine
this function with infomediary and/or trusted third party roles. The neglect of
some roles by certain (prominent) players leaves room for entrants in this market
to perform these duties.
App platforms can be classified in various ways. Following Distimo (2011),
we divide app platforms into 4 categories: Native platforms, pure mobile device
manufacturers, mobile network operators, and independent. Examples are presented
in Figure 3.2. In contrast to Distimo, we suggest differentiating between native
platforms (which provide an operating system and hardware) and pure mobile device
manufacturers, instead of device manufacturers versus operating system developers.
Our classification allows taking the fact into account that many successful app
platforms provide both the hardware and the operating system (Apple, BlackBerry,
Nokia/Windows). Moreover, there are key strategic differences between companies
which offer an integrated experience like Apple and BlackBerry versus those which
provide hardware only, like HTC. For instance, if an app platform provides an
operating system and/or mobile hardware, it can more easily assess whether apps
will work well on their system. Hence, their own apps are better adjusted to the
other parts, can offer better functionality, and can review third-party apps with
less effort. Mobile network operators already have a customer base and a billing
system in place, so they can quickly acquire customers for new products like apps
and/or take over the payment procedure.
Native (or integrated) platforms belong to the largest platforms (in terms of
available apps and downloads) and have had the highest impact on the industry
so far. Figure 3.3 provides an overview of the major native app platforms. These
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Platforms classification
Figure 3.2: Classification of app platforms. Based on: Distimo (2012).
app platforms are built around different operating systems and use different pro-
gramming languages and software tools. Hence, compatibility is very low. This is
important for multi-homing and has an impact on the market structure as we will
see in Section 3.4.
Due to the explosion in the number of app platforms, challenges surrounding
platform competition are currently the focus of the app platform industry. However,
new platforms are also being launched. For these new entrants platform launch
and design are the most important features. Incumbent platforms should also
occasionally re-evaluate their design and consider adjustments to pricing and/or
quality to deter the entry of new platforms and to remain competitive. We will
discuss strategies to address all these challenges in Section 3.4.
When Apple’s App Store was created, it was not supposed to yield high
revenues, but rather strengthen the ecosystem and drive demand for iOS-devices.4
As we have seen, app platforms are now a business in their own right, especially
for the large native platforms. The main source of app platform revenue are the
4Cf. http://communities-dominate.blogs.com/brands/2010/06.
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Name Owner Launch Number of 
apps
Number of 
downloads
 Installed 
base 
Operating 
system
Developer 
membership 
fee
Google Play 
(Android 
market)
Google 22.10.2008 1 000 000
(Jul 2013)
50 bn
(Jul 2013)
500 mn 
(Jun 2012)
Android 25 USD
App Catalog Palm/HP 06.06.2009 10 000
(Dec 2011)
108 mn
(Aug 2011)
2,6 mn
(Jul 2010)
webOS free
App Store Apple 10.07.2008 900 000
(Juil 2013)
50 bn
(Mar 2013)
500 mn 
(Jan 2012)
iOS 99 USD per 
annum
BlackBerry 
World 
(App World)
BlackBerry 
(RIM)
01.04.2009 120 000
(May 2013)
3 bn 
(May 2012)
75 mn 
(Jan 2012) 
BlackBerry 
OS
free
Nokia Store 
(Ovi Store)
Nokia 26.05.2009 120 000 
(Aug 2012)
6 bn 
(Aug 2012)
885 mn
(Mar 2012)
Multiple (e.g., 
Symbian, 
Java, MeeGo)
1 EUR (+ 
additional 
cost)
Samsung 
Apps
Samsung, 
Handmark
14.09.2009 13 000
(Mar 2011)
120 mn
(Jun 2013)
5 mn
(Mar 2011)
Multiple (e.g., 
Android, 
bada)
free
Windows 
Phone Store
Microsoft 21.10.2010 160 000
(May 2013)
54 per person 
(Dec 2012)
31 mn 
(Mar 2013)
Windows 
Phone
99 USD per 
annum
Figure 3.3: Native app platforms. Source: Devblog (2012); Gartner (2013);
Ingraham (2013); Nokia (2013 b); Surur (2013); Welch (2013) AndroLib (2010),
comScore Reports (2010), Jobs (2010), Paczkowski (2010), Sage (2010), Duryee
(2009).
commission payments made by developers as a percentage of the downloaded apps’
price. Additionally, app platforms charge participant membership fees in the form
of an annual lump sum payment and complementary products like mobile devices
and software tools. This will be described in more detail in the following sections.
Developers The first challenge for many (especially professional) developers is
the question, which platform to join. App platforms do not require single-homing
(limitation to one platform), i.e., developers are allowed to develop apps for more
than one platform. Since apps are information goods (cf. Shapiro and Varian, 1999),
the main costs are the fixed costs of programming – the marginal costs are basically
zero. But transition to another platform costs around 50% of the development costs
due to the differences in programming language, operating system, and hardware.
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The possibility of programming universal apps that run on all platforms are still
very limited (cf., Newel 2011). There are several engines like Titanium, Ramp or
PhoneGap which allow development for more than one platform simultaneously,
but additional work is still necessary to adopt the apps. Therefore, many (especially
small) development companies have to decide which platform(s) to join and which
ones to reject.
In 2008, Apple’s App Store was virtually the only relevant platform. Since
2009, Google Play for Android OS has gained popularity. Later, other platforms
started attracting attention. Developments such as the launch of Amazon’s Appstore
and the cooperation between Nokia and Windows indicate that the industry
landscape is changing, often in a disruptive way. Currently, there are several
well established app platforms. Joining the biggest one is not necessarily the
best decision. The bigger platforms have a larger customer base, but there is a
congestion problem – with over half a million apps on the market, how will a new
app be noticed?5 Nonetheless, Apple’s App Store continues to be the winner, since
three times more new app projects are introduced for the App Store compared to
Android (cf. Dredge, 2011).
Once the decision about which platform(s) to join is made, developers have
to sign up with the platform(s) and obtain the necessary tools consisting of
hardware (computer) and software (e.g., software development kit) components.
Some platforms charge membership fees for this service, which can vary for private
developers, enterprises, and non-profit organizations. In return, developers gain
access to the software development kit and other tools and services.
Developers program apps which they submit to the app platform. In general,
they are entitled to choose app prices themselves.6 Different pricing strategies exist,
including “simply buy it”, “in-app-purchase”, and financing through advertisement
(cf. Gans, 2012). The key instruments for extracting revenue are versioning (lite
vs. prime), free trials, and personification of information goods (cf. Shapiro and
Varian, 1999).
5This information problem provides business opportunities for knowledge brokers simplifying
the search for relevant apps.
6Some platforms restrict prices to certain values like USD 0.99, 1.49, 1.99 and so on. There is
also a new development regarding app prices: Since March 2011, Amazon has been offering another
model whereby it determines app prices itself (cf. http://business.chip.de/news/Amazon-
Android-App-Store-oeffnet-fuer-Entwickler_46573233.html). This allows Amazon to de-
termine its own pricing policy, which is consistent with the firm’s overall interests.
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Some platforms conduct quality reviews before they make apps available to
users (e.g., App Store), others do not (e.g., Google Play). If an app is accepted,
the platform “publishes” it, that is, the app becomes available to users. Users may
search and download apps. Depending on the platform, 20-60% of the submitted
apps are free (Distimo, 2010). The share of free apps among the total apps
downloaded amounts to 80%-90% (Gartner, 2009). The payment process in the
case of apps that can be purchased occurs through the platform. Developers receive
their share of the revenue (usually around 70%). The remaining 30% represents
platform’s commission fees.
App platform users The other market side of an app platform are its users.
They determine which apps are successful and, ultimately, which ecosystem will
win. Hence, it is important for the platform operator as well as for developers to
understand the users’ side.
App platform users access the platform through their mobile devices. Mobile
devices are complementary goods7 and can be considered a one-time membership
fee. The features of mobile devices are key for consumer experience, they determine
which apps can be installed and used. For users, it is not only the apps that count,
they consider their mobile device and the software that comes with it as a whole.
Value and benefits are determined by the ecosystem.
Users search, download, pay for, and rate apps. The best way to understand
the consumer side of the market is probably to conduct a segmentation analysis.
Segmentation divides users into several groups according to their needs, income,
demographic factors, etc. This helps to decide which groups to target and allows
addressing them in a better way. Interestingly enough, customer segmentation
surveys uncover differences between the customer bases of different app platforms.
For instance, Apple and RIM BlackBerry users were found to be wealthier than
Android users (cf. Prosper Mobile Insights, 2011). This is reflected by the cost of
mobile devices and also has an impact on the app platform, since more affluent
customers are more willing to pay for apps. This is evident in the app platforms’
revenues: The same apps on the Android market generate only about 25% of the
App Store’s revenues (cf. Farago, 2011). These differences between the users of
7Since apps cannot be consumed without a mobile device, they are perfect complements. If
built-in apps are neglected, mobile devices are also fairly useless without apps.
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different platforms are key for the “winner takes all” question (see next section),
since niche creation allows companies to survive in the app platform market.
3.4 Key strategic issues and insights
Business models based on two-sided markets must consider strategic issues excluded
from traditional models. In the following, we analyze which characteristics of app
platforms specifically are affected by the factors described in Section 3.2. We
structure our arguments along the three lifecycle stages described in Eisenmann
(2007): platform design, launch, and competition.
3.4.1 Platform design
From a strategic perspective, it is first necessary to determine the criteria for a
product to become a platform. Gawer and Cusumano (2007) argue that a product
needs to (i) perform one essential function or solve one essential problem for several
actors in an industry, (ii) be easy to connect or build upon, and (iii) be difficult to
substitute. Clearly, the leading app platforms satisfy these criteria. In order to
make the platform successful, the authors then recommend a “coring strategy”,
which aims at making the platform the “core” of a technological system. That was
exactly the strategy implemented by Apple when the company realized the potential
of the App Store: Before its launch, the mobile industry was organized around
mobile devices and mobile network operators, with device features and network
coverage being the key differentiation factors. Since the App Store’s launch, the
mobile industry’s structure has changed profoundly, now having software (operating
system plus apps) at its core. As the “Gesellschaft fu¨r Konsumforschung” (GfK),
the largest German consumer research agency, suggests in its press release from 7
October 2010:
“Amidst a landscape where overall handset sales are declining, sales
of smartphones have steadily increased as more consumers gravitate
towards mobile applications. The survey of 1,000 adults found that
the value of the smartphone and selection of mobile applications were
greater priorities to consumers than reliable coverage and customer
service. ’Our research shows that we are at a mobile application tipping
point, where the applications are driving customer purchases of the
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technology more so than the smartphones themselves,’ said [David]
Krajicek, [Managing Director of GfK Business & Technology]” (GfK,
2010).
Hence, app platforms have recognized the importance of the coring strategy
and managed to apply it, arranging the entire mobile industry around them. Once
this factor is taken into account, other important platform design issues should
be considered, like pricing and quality settings. As we have seen in Section 3.2.3,
pricing is more complex in two-sided markets and requires consideration of the
interaction between different market sides. Regarding pricing strategy, two decisions
need to be made: Firstly, which side to subsidize, and secondly, what kind of fees
to charge.
Which side to subsidize is a non-trivial decision (Eisenmann et al., 2006). For
instance, in the video game industry consoles are sold to users at or even below
cost (“subsidy side”). The developers’ side is the “money side” and it has to pay
high royalties for the development of the games. In the personal computer industry,
the situation is reversed: Users pay high prices for the operating system software
while developers obtain free software development kits. The differences can even
be observed within one and the same industry – Apple tried to charge developers
USD 10,000 for the Mac software development kit, but was not successful with this
strategy after having lost market shares in the mid-1990s to Windows and open
source operating systems.
For app platforms, we observe that users are usually the “subsidy side” and
developers the “money side”. Around 80-90% (depending on the platform) of app
downloads are free of charge. The remaining apps are charged with a commission
of 30% that goes to the platform. Apart from that, the mobile device price can be
partly interpreted as membership fee for the app platform.
Clearly, there are differences between the platforms. Apple charges USD
600-800 for the iPad which costs around USD 300 in production, Amazon charges
only USD 200 for its Fire tablet – which is below the manufacturing cost (iSupply
tear-down report, 2012). Amazon is aspiring to install another business model,
extracting even more revenue from developers.8 Hence, we observe that there
are different business models, even within the app platform industry. It would
8In addition, Amazon is hoping to achieve cross-financing from other areas like advertising
and additional sells in their Amazon online store and Kindle ebooks store.
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be interesting to empirically evaluate, which side has higher price elasticity and
whether the two-sided market fee allocation rule is complied with. If not, it opens
opportunity to improve pricing and extract additional revenues.
The second question pertains to the different kinds of applicable fees. In
different industries, different kinds of fees are used. The two types that are
considered in the two-sided markets literature are membership fees (one-time or
periodical) and usage fees. Membership fees (also called lump sum or access fee) is
charged independently of interactions between the two market sides. Membership
fees are especially useful if transactions between participants cannot be observed, like
on partner search platforms. Usage fees, on the other hand, apply per transaction.
The literature on static two-sided markets suggests that the optimal combina-
tion of membership and usage fees is not unique (Rochet and Tirole 2006, Reisinger
2010). In a dynamic setting, the combination is unique for most situations due
to the uniqueness of market dynamics. Therefore, for most settings, it is possible
to make an optimal subdivision between usage and membership fees (cf. Kouris,
2012).
It generally depends on the cost structure which type of fees should be
incurred. Here, not only the platform cost structure but also the developers’ costs
and revenue structure play an important role. Usually, for information goods like
apps, fixed costs are high and marginal costs are virtually zero, or as Shapiro and
Varian (1999, p.3) put it, “information is costly to produce but cheap to reproduce.”
In contrast, revenues are obtained on a per-download basis. Generally, information
goods like apps should be priced not based on production costs, but based on the
value to the customers (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). Thus, app platforms can best
contribute to the developers’ success if they charge a per-transaction commission.
Besides optimal price setting and allocation, the quality of apps is an im-
portant issue. One of the most prominent examples for which the quality of
participants is crucial are partner search agencies. Agencies such as Parship.com or
ElitePartner.com charge high membership fees. This is not due to the high costs
they have, but rather serves as a signal: Someone who is able to pay such a high
membership fee is probably wealthy and is serious about his partner search. Many
partner search agencies check potential participants and might exclude someone
even though he is willing to pay the high membership fees. Another example of
quality requirements on two-sided markets comes from the computer console and
game industry. Game developers pay high royalties to game console producers.
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This is (at least partially) to ensure that low-quality games are not profitable and
to exclude them from the platform (Hagiu, 2009).
Quality belongs to the key platform design factors for app platforms as well.
For users it is important for downloaded apps to at least not contain malware,
viruses, and spyware. That is the first level of quality differentiation – and it
is objective. The next level is that of usability and the content quality of apps.
This may be perceived differently, and is therefore subjective. App platforms
differ in their approach toward certification of app quality. Apple is known for its
rigorous approach: They review all apps before placing them in the App Store.
Other platforms like Google Play do not have a pre-placement review process, but
they do occasionally delete low-quality apps. In addition to these types of quality
certification processes, every app platform has a ranking mechanism in place so
users can rate the app quality and comment on it.
Theoretical analysis shows that the side in a two-sided market which requires
higher quality (consumers) should be subsidized (Hagiu, 2009, Eisenmann et al.,
2006). In reality, we observe that App Store app developers pay more for platforms
in which a quality review process is installed (e.g., App Store). The exclusion of
low quality apps leads to higher benefits for users, a larger customer base, and –
through the indirect network effects – to a higher interest to develop for high-quality
platforms. One more benefit for developers is that negative same-side effects are
reduced through exclusion, thus decreasing the congestion problem. Kouris (2011)
provides a suggestion, how to determine whether a quality review process would
be beneficial.
With regard to platform quality, no general recommendations can be made
that cover every situation. However, it is crucial for platforms to decide whether
they want to differentiate between quality and quantity. Those who cannot decide
will easily be dominated by other platforms in one direction or the other.
3.4.2 Platform launch
The so-called “chicken & egg”-problem is the main issue during the launch phase.
Caillaud and Jullien (2003) use this expression in their first paper on two-sided
markets. The key challenge for two-sided markets is that the platform must
win both customer sides to do business. But as long as there are no users, no
developers would join and vice versa. As explained in Section 3.2.3, platform owners’
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revenues consist of two components, membership and usage parts. When the usage
component is too small due to a low number of participants, the membership
component may suffice to get the platform up and running. This requires the
membership component of utility and the profit equation to be high enough to
compensate for low usage benefits. This also explains the phenomenal success of
Apple’s App Store or Amazon’s marketplace. Due to high membership benefits,
they managed to attract users first, then developers, and independent sellers who
followed very quickly.
At the outset, membership fees are the key platform engine. Later in the
lifecycle, the importance of usage fees increases due to two effects. The number of
participants on both sides is high enough for many interactions, which leads to a
higher profit from platform usage. At the same time, the number of new customers
per period will ultimately decrease, so that the contribution of the membership
component to the platform’s profit decreases. On the whole, this suggests that
a shift occurs in many platforms from membership fees at the beginning of the
lifecycle to usage fees at a later point.
The first implication for platform operators is that new entrants may be able
to prevent the “chicken & egg” problem” by charging low membership fees and
providing high membership benefits. The second implication is that at a later stage,
platforms might want to reassess their pricing strategy and adjust their prices. In
reality, we have not yet observed any major price changes. Kouris (2012) explains,
why and under which circumstances such behavior is justified.
Once the platform is launched, its degree of openness appears to be a key
strategic decision for the two-sided market (Rysman, 2009). Most app platform
owners pursue a proprietary strategy, which means that they have full control
over the platform and can therefore capture most of the added value themselves.
Following Eisenmann (2007), this is the right strategy for leaders in the market.
Followers, however, might choose a more open, collaborative approach (i.e., cooper-
ating with competitors or complementors) in order to differentiate themselves and
exert competitive pressure.
When entering into an already existing market, it is of strategic importance
for the remaining market to still be large enough to create substantial network
effects or, if possible, to attract customers and developers from existing platforms.
Eisenmann et al. (2007) and Hidding et al. (2011) describe platform envelopment
as a promising strategy for followers. Google successfully linked many platform
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markets to its search platform (like Google Docs or Chrome) and naturally also used
this position to support Android OS and Google Play. Through indirect network
effects, the market share of developers also affects users. As some key developers
(Cheezburger Network, Foursquare) considered Microsoft’s market share to be too
small to justify the development of a new app for the Windows Phone, Microsoft
reacted by incentivizing developers. Not only did Microsoft provide developers
with free phones and prime spots in its app store, in some cases, Microsoft even
financed the app development (cf. Wortham and Wingfield, 2012). This is similar
to the strategy of in-house complements described in Eisenmann (2007).
3.4.3 Platform competition
Many managers in the mobile industry wonder whether app platforms will evolve
a “winner-takes-all” dynamic or allow for the existence of several competitors.
This question is crucial for all business areas around mobile ecosystems. The
winner-takes-all dynamic emerges due to network effects and increasing returns to
scale. For instance, the market for keyboards is 100% dominated by the “qwerty”-
keyboard (with small variations for different languages). On the video market, the
VHS format wiped out Sony’s Betamax video format. At the same time, there are
markets in which several platforms coexist. For instance, there are several web-
browsers like Mozilla Firefox, Safari, Chrome, and Internet Explorer. The market
for computer operating systems is divided among several companies (Windows,
iOS, Linux, and Unix). The crucial question is then how to decide whether the
“winner-takes-all” dynamic will evolve in the app platform market or not.
There are 4 conditions that follow from two-sided market theory and make
the “winner-takes-all” dynamics probable (cf. Eisenmann et al., 2006, Sun and
Tse, 2007):
1. It is costly to multi-home – at least for one market side,
2. There are high indirect network effects – at least for the side with high
multi-homing costs,
3. Same-side effects are not negative and strong, that is, the congestion effect is
not too high,
4. The goods are rather homogeneous and there is no demand for differentiation.
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In the following, we explain these conditions in detail and examine whether
they apply to the app platform market. The first condition pertains to multi-
homing. To “multi-home” means to have access to more than one platform as
explained in Section 3.2.3. If platforms are not perfectly compatible, multi-homing
incurs costs, like additional equipment or the time necessary to learn how to use
other platforms. In the case of app platforms, the incompatibility is quite high:
Different app platforms use different operating systems, different programming
languages, and they run on different mobile devices with different functionalities.
For instance, it is costly to port an app that was created for iOS to Android OS or
Windows Mobile OS.9 Developers must possess both programming languages and
know the differences between them. They must also understand the differences
in the operating systems and in the middleware of both platforms. Additionally,
developers have to buy certain hardware. For instance, in order to develop for
Apple’s iOS, it is necessary to have a Mac. In addition, SDKs and other tools are
required. And some platforms charge membership fees, as was discussed in Section
3.3. Hence, development for different platforms entails quite an investment.
For consumers, multi-homing costs are also high. In order to use more than
one native app platform, users have to purchase and carry more than one mobile
device that is compatible.10 In addition, there is a lock-in effect: If a user has
spent some money and time on apps of a given platform, she might be reluctant
to switch systems. Generally, we can conclude that the costs of multi-homing are
quite high for both market sides of app platforms. That supports the consolidation
of the market toward a single platform.
Developers can only profit if there are users who download and buy their apps.
Hence, indirect network effects are relatively high. This causes the participants
in the app market to converge onto one platform. Once there is a clear leader,
other platforms’ chances to secure enough customers diminish. Vogelsang (2010)
shows that these network effects increase the possibility of entry deterrence by
incumbents. As a consequence, the market leader does not exploit the monopoly
profits in early stages of the market, but rather in a more mature stage. Hence,
the second condition applies as well and reinforces consolidation.
9Porting costs are estimated to be around 50% of the initial programming costs, on average.
10RIM has announced that it will introduce Android market for the BlackBerry, but there are
many problems relating to insecurity, incompatibility, and sub-optimality of Android-based apps.
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The effect of the third condition is not as clear as that of the first two. On
the developers’ side, there are negative same-side effects, since they prefer to have
fewer competitors. With more than half a million apps on a platform, the marginal
visibility and utility of an additional app diminishes. Then, other things like quality
and the variety of apps and good platform infrastructure become more and more
important. On the users’ side, there are positive same-side effects: People can
share apps and communicate easily. For instance, they may use the same chat apps,
some of which are also platform-specific, e.g., BlackBerry messenger. In general, we
can say that negative same-side effects might work against platform consolidation.
The fourth condition implies that if different features are necessary, there
might be room for niche building and, therefore, for more than one platform. Hence,
the effect of the fourth condition is also not obvious. On the users’ side, there are
different customer segments: there are, for instance, business customers with a
preference for security, very high quality, and the ability to pay for it, on the one
hand, and budgeters, on the other, who are not willing to pay much, and those
who want to be able to adjust apps as they wish, etc. All these customer groups
have different needs. While it is possible to serve all of them on one platform, it
requires the co-existence of specialized platforms. Also, developers are different, for
instance, in terms of their motives: Some develop for monetary rewards, others for
fun, and still others for the recognition they receive from their peers (Harhoff et
al., 2003). Hence, there are still opportunities for niche-building and co-existence
of several platforms.
The factors discussed above arise from two-sided market theory and have an
impact on the app platforms’ business models and strategy. Besides these factors,
there are several other aspects that are not part of two-sided market theory, but
must be taken into account when talking about app platform strategies. These are,
for instance, the brand image of the platform owner and the platform ecosystem
(Kotler, 2004), possible disruptions like new coalitions between key players, new
mobile devices, trends from adjacent industries like smart home, and questions
regarding possible vertical integration. These aspects must be taken into account
when considering strategic issues on app platforms.
Summarizing all factors addressed in this subsection, we can conclude that the
app platform industry shows a high tendency toward convergence, but leaves room
for niche building and differentiation. Moreover, this market is subject to a wide
range of innovations, including technologies and services. It is crucial to develop
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unique features and bundle products, and to provide incentives to complementors
to innovate in order to remain competitive. Gawer and Cusumano (2008) call this
a “tipping strategy” for platform owners. The key issue for the incumbent app
platforms is to push for further consolidation. Possible challengers have to find their
niche to be successful. And developers should not spread their resources too much
and carefully scan the market for disruptions and trends toward consolidation.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the key issues and strategies of the app platform
industry from a two-sided market perspective. We combined the strategic manage-
ment literature on platforms with the economic literature on two-sided markets
to establish a solid background for our analysis of the app platform industry. We
have analyzed the current industry situation and trends, platform business models,
and key stakeholders. Building on existing literature and the industry analysis,
we have discussed key strategic issues in the app platform industry. Along the
lifecycle of a platform (launch, design, and competition), we have developed several
management recommendations and perspectives for this industry.
We have seen that two-sided market business models require consideration
of strategic issues which are not present in traditional models. These issues
may pertain to all development phases, including platform design, launch, and
competition. Pricing represents the key strategic challenge for platform design.
Two-sided market theory suggests that in equilibrium, fees should be proportional
to the price elasticities (contrary to the usual economic intuition). Furthermore,
it provides recommendations on types of fees to charge (usage, membership, one-
time or periodical fees). Subsequently, we have discussed the impact of quality
on platform design. Quality is – in addition to price – the key parameter that
determines platform design. In two-sided markets, the side that requires higher
quality gets subsidized. During platform launch, the “chicken & egg” problem arises.
Two-sided market theory helps us understand and reduce or avoid this problem by
determining an optimal membership component. Platform competition pertains to
the possible market structure – the “winner takes all” dynamic and the number of
competing platforms that can share the market. Four factors specific to two-sided
markets influence the market structure: Multi-homing, size of indirect network
effects, same-side effects, and differentiation opportunities. Our analysis points
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out that the app platform industry shows a high tendency toward convergence,
but leaves room for niche building and differentiation. The key implication for
the incumbent app platforms is to push for further consolidation while possible
challengers have to find their niche to be successful. For developers, it is crucial
to scan the market for disruptions and trends toward consolidation in order to
efficiently allocate their resources.
For the future research agenda, we suggest further investigation of three
aspects from a theoretical as well as from an applied perspective. The first pertains
to pricing strategy reassessment in different development phases, which seems to
be recommendable from a theoretical point of view, but is not observed in reality.
However, as important as the pricing aspect appears to be in these markets, other
factors like creating a trustworthy relationship with complementors, encouraging
internal and external innovation, and reacting strategically to competitors’ actions
(Cusumano and Gawer, 2002) must not be discarded.
The second aspect concerns the empirical evaluation of compliance with the
fee allocation rule. This requires empirical estimation of the price elasticities of the
two market sides of different app platforms. If the allocation rule does not hold,
it might open opportunities to improve pricing and extract additional revenues.
Generally, more empirical studies on strategic behavior in the app platform industry
are desirable.
A third factor that appears interesting is the level of openness (Eisenmann,
2007). Collaboration of firms to provide users with different but compatible versions
of app platform seems like a promising strategy for followers to capture a large
enough market share to be competitive alongside the big players. Moreover, we did
not go into much detail regarding the strategic perspective of developers. Collabo-
ration of developers and the openness of platforms naturally has a considerable
effect on this side of the market, which deserves further analysis.
On the whole, two-sided market theory proves helpful in addressing strategic
issues of real-world app platforms. It provides tools to analyze app platform
business models and their strategic issues during all development phases.
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Appendix A
List of variables
Parameters from the canonical model by Rochet and Tirole (2003)
• aB, aS – usage fee per interaction
• pB = aB, pS = aS – average transaction fee
• bB, bS – benefit from an interaction
• η = ηB + ηS – price elasticity of demand
• NB = DB(pB) = Pr(bB ≥ pB) – number of buyers/users
• NS = DS(pS) = Pr(bS ≥ pS) – number of sellers/developers
• c – cost per interaction for the platform owner
Extensions and adjustments for the integrated two-sided market
model
• x(bB, bS, aB, sS, γ) ∈ [0, 1] with X ≡ E[x(bi, ai, γ)] – probability of interaction
• f – adjustment function, invertible, with an inverse f−1
• XNBf(NS) – adjusted number of interaction
• Segmentation of participants with ASk , BSk , CSk and NSk
• AB, AS – membership fees
• BB, BS – membership benefit
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• CB, CS – membership costs for the platform owner
• r – average app price
• γ – revenue share of developers, 1− γ – platform commission
• γr – payments between customer groups
• q – app quality with a distribution Q. bB = αq with α = const, α > 0 and
q = E(Q) =
∑
i∈I qiwi. We assume that Q follows Bernoulli distribution with
average quality q(βH , βL) =
νβHqH+(1−ν)βLqL
νβH+(1−ν)βL
• κ – quality review setup cost
Additional parameters for the dynamic view
• σ – discounting factor
• t – time
• T – end point
• Ki, i ∈ B, S – carrying capacity, that is, maximal number of market partici-
pants
• λB, λS – proportionality factors
• ∆NB, ∆NS – change of populations per period
• φi ∈ [0; 1], i ∈ B, S – share of market participants, who join the platform
after the disruption. 1− φi is then share of market participants, who chose
to join competitive platform
